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OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EXTENDED
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY FOR DURABLE AND
CONSUMABLE PRODUCTS
Approved by:
Professor Atalay Atasu, Advisor
Scheller College of Business
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Vishal Agrawal
McDonough School of Business
Georgetown University
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SUMMARY
Growing post-consumer waste and associated environmental and public health
concerns have resulted in more regulated waste management. In this context,
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has emerged as an environmental policy
concept that focuses on the “polluter pays” principle. This principle shifts the
economic burden of waste management on producers by imposing collection and
recycling obligations. EPR aims to decrease the total environmental impact
associated with the products by (i) diverting post-consumer products from landfills;
and (ii) making producers internalize the environmental cost of their products. Over
the last two decades, EPR has gained momentum all around the world from the
US to EU, Japan and China for several product categories including batteries,
carpet, leftover paint, unused pharmaceuticals, and electronics. This thesis consists
of three essays that contribute to the understanding of the economic implications
of EPR-based legislation from an operational perspective by analyzing how EPR
affects the markets for certain durable (such as electronics) and consumable (such as
pharmaceuticals) products.
In the first essay “Extended Producer Responsibility and Secondary Markets”, we
investigate the effect of EPR-based policy on a durable good producer’s secondary
market strategy. One of the underlying assumptions of EPR is that it imposes
producer responsibility for end-of-life products, i.e., the producers recycle only
the end-of-life products under EPR-based obligations. This assumption effectively
leads to a conclusion that EPR results in environmental benefits by achieving
landfill diversion through recycling and reducing new production. In this essay, we
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challenge this premise by taking into account the durable nature of products such
as electronics: Durable good producers have incentives to recover used products
from the secondary markets and discard them. These incentives arise from two
main effects: Used product recovery decreases the cannibalization of new product
demand by decreasing substitutability of new products, and increases the value of new
products by establishing a resale value for them. Under these effects, producers have
adopted various strategies to recover used products, one of the most popular one being
the buy-back programs (e.g. Dell, HP, Fujitsu, Apples). These observations suggest
that EPR appears to target end-of-life products but durable good producers have a
strong incentive to recover used products in working condition from the secondary
market and recycle them to meet EPR obligations.
Accordingly, in this essay, we investigate whether and how EPR influences the
secondary market strategy of a durable good producer. We develop a discrete-time,
sequential, producer-consumer game over an infinite time horizon, where the producer
is operationally responsible to meet the collection and recycling obligations of
EPR. In our model, we adopt commonly observed assumptions from the durable
products literature to provide a comprehensive framework, where a profit-maximizing
producer can collect end-of-life products or utilize used products through paying the
market-clearing price to comply with EPR obligations. We capture three possible
levers of EPR policy: (1) a collection rate as a fraction of sales, (2) a recycling
standard and (3) collection infrastructure requirements. Based on this model, we
characterize the effect of EPR-based policy on the secondary market interference
strategy of the producer. We analyze the environmental effectiveness of EPR for
durable products by utilizing three key environmental performance measures by Waste
Management Hierarchy: reduce, reuse and recycle.
We demonstrate that the effect of EPR and its associated environmental
implications depend on product durability. In the absence of EPR, a producer may
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choose not to interfere with the secondary market for products with high durability.
In that case, EPR may provide producers with an incentive to interfere with the
secondary market by recovering and prematurely recycling used products to meet
EPR obligations. This in turn leads to lower reuse and higher production levels. For
low durability products, a producer may readily interfere with the secondary market
even in the absence of EPR, and the effect of EPR depends on its implementation
parameters. In particular, EPR increases (reduces) the producer’s secondary market
interference when collection targets are high (low) and recycling standards are low
(high). These observations, in turn, imply that EPR-based take-back legislation
may have unintended consequences in a durable product setting: It may diminish
environmental goals such as reducing new production and increasing reuse levels.
However, we find that such unintended consequences may be attenuated by increased
recycling standards, while more stringent collection targets and infrastructure
requirements may back fire in EPR implementations for durable products. To the
best of our knowledge, our results are first to identify the interaction between EPR
and secondary market strategies based on the durable nature of the products
Moreover, we explore the implications of EPR in practice by calibrating our model
for iPod Nanos and iPhones. The motivation behind our choice of these products is
that Apple buys back these products by paying consumers through its Apple Reuse
and Recycling Program and does not re-market these products, implying that the
company diverts these products to recycling. This numerical study allows us to
highlight several producer strategies taking place in practice by indicating that the
practice of several companies is aligned with our analytical and numerical results. To
further generalize our results and discussion, we extend our base model into multiple
directions including the cases where (i) the producer can refurbish recovered products
from the secondary market and sell them back to consumers; (ii) the producer
may not access all of the used and end-of-life products; and (iii) a state/non-profit
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entity manages or operates the recycling system and charges consumers a recycling
fee, unlike the case where the producer is operationally responsible in fulfilling the
EPR obligations. In all the extensions, we find that the producer may still recover
used products from the secondary market and recycle used products to meet EPR
obligations and our structural results on new production and reuse levels continue to
hold.
In the second essay “A Market-Based Extended Producer Responsibility
Implementation - The Case of Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act”, we investigate
the operational implementation details of EPR-based policy on the ground. In putting
the EPR concept into operation, the recently popular approach in the US is the
“market-based” approach. This approach employs free market principles and allows
for independent stakeholder decisions to promote cost efficiency. It manages the
tension between environmental and economic outcomes by setting desirable targets for
collection but then providing a lot of flexibility to producers to achieve these targets.
This approach has gained significant advocacy from the industry and some NGOs
following the argument that allowing flexibility to the private sector enhances the
effectiveness of operations as compared to the case where government dictates specific
operational choices for implementation of the “central coordination” approach.
In this essay, we investigate whether the advocated benefits of the marked-based
approach hold in practice by focusing on the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act,
a prevailing working example of a market-based EPR implementation. Based on
publicly available reports and interviews with stakeholders (e.g., policy makers,
producers, collectors, recyclers, and local government representatives), we conduct an
in-depth analysis of the act along the dimensions of underlying motivations behind its
implementation rules, associated stakeholder perspectives and resulting effectiveness.
To enrich our analysis, we make comparisons with the Washington E-Waste Recycling
Law that represents a comprehensive working system with a central coordination
xi
approach, which probably stands at the other end of the spectrum.
Our key finding is that the Minnesota Act achieves the high collection rate and
high cost efficiency premises of the market-based approach, but this occurs at the
expense of several unintended outcomes. These outcomes include environmental
disadvantages due to “selective” collection and recycling rather than handling of
e-waste evenly, an increased economic burden on local governments and limited
incentives for environmentally benign design. Such unintended outcomes arise
from market dynamics at the implementation (execution) stage and unanticipated
interactions between stakeholders in response to these. Accordingly, our analysis
suggests that the effectiveness of the market-based approach in practice depends
significantly on the operational rules chosen for its implementation. This further
implies that the market-based approach may not be necessarily effective in all
dimensions unless its operational details are carefully managed.
In the third essay “Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals”, we
focus on EPR-based policies for unused pharmaceuticals, a category of consumable
products. Unused pharmaceuticals have been recognized as an emerging issue
with substantial economic, environmental and public health impacts. Consequently,
preventing the accumulation of unused pharmaceuticals at households and in the
environment has become a serious concern. To address this concern, pharmaceutical
policies based on EPR concept have gained traction in practice. For instance, the
EU and two counties in the US (Alameda County, CA and King County, WA) passed
EPR-based legislation, which require producers to establish and fund pharmaceutical
collection programs. Although such legislation appear to be the preferred mode of
operation in practice, their effectiveness is unknown since pharmaceuticals and their
unique characteristics (e.g. consumable nature, mediated demand structure, limited
end-of-use treatment procedures) have not been analyzed in the context of EPR to
date.
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Motivated by this, we investigate the effectiveness of EPR-based policies in
addressing the pharmaceutical overage problem. We posit that the consumable
and perishable nature of pharmaceuticals allow for a narrow set of policy options.
In particular, there are primarily two viable policies to operationalize EPR for
pharmaceuticals; (i) Source Reduction (SR), i.e., a form of fee imposed on producers
for their sales to limit the amount of dispensed pharmaceuticals (as implemented in
British Columbia and Portugal), or (ii) End-of-Pipe Control (EC) where producers
establish and operate programs for collecting unused pharmaceuticals (as in Hungary
and Belgium). To compare these policies, we develop a game-theoretic model that
involves a social planner, a producer, a doctor, and a heterogeneous patient base. In
our model, the social planner sets the EPR-based policy, EC vs. SR, the producer
sets the price and promotional efforts directed at the doctor and patient; the doctor
decides on the prescription amount that maximizes her utility by considering the
patient’s health, promotional effects and her reputation; and the patient makes his
consumption decision. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical
model that analyzes the interactions in the pharmaceutical chain as they relate to
EPR. Accordingly, this essay contributes at the interface of operations management,
health and environmental economics literatures by building an integrated analysis
framework.
We find that the pharmaceutical context may imply stronger preference for
adopting the EC policy (over SR) when compared to other product categories
for which EPR is prevalent. More specifically, we show that EC works better
for pharmaceuticals with (i) high social and environmental externalities; (ii) high
collection costs (e.g. stringent collection requirements or standards); and (iii)
moderate treatment impacts from usage. This result contradicts the results of a
similar analysis in the context of durable products, which would suggest that SR
policy should be preferred in a similar setting. The reversal in the policy choice
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is due to the consumable nature and mediated demand of pharmaceuticals, which in
turn demonstrates that the characteristics specific to the pharmaceutical supply chain
determine the effectiveness of EPR-based policies for pharmaceuticals. Accordingly,
our results indicate that there is no one-size-fits-all EPR-based policy in the context
of pharmaceuticals. We extend our base model and validate the robustness of our
results by considering certain insurance coverage, different consumer usage behavior
and alternative promotional effects.
Furthermore, we investigate the perspectives of pharmaceutical stakeholders on
the policy choice to understand possible tensions and accordingly inform policy
makers. We demonstrate that there are several interrelated factors including the
collection cost and healthcare impact of the medicine that influence the stakeholders’
perspectives in different ways. Based on these factors, we show that aligning
stakeholder preferences for effective EPR-based policy can be significantly harder
in the pharmaceutical context. Accordingly, our results collectively suggest that the
characteristics of the pharmaceutical supply chain and the associated dynamics within
need to be carefully analyzed before undertaking any EPR-based policy decision.
From a methodological perspective, the first and third essays employ techniques
and notions from optimization, game theory, and industrial organization. In these
essays, we introduce stylized frameworks that capture critical operational factors in
the relevant problem setting. Utilizing these frameworks, we characterize the effect
of EPR-based policies on business practices, and generate insights for operations
strategy on the one hand and policy design on the other. The second essay draws
on collaborations with practitioners from industry and the public sector involved
in crafting and implementing the EPR-based policies. Analyzing the operational
implementation details on the ground, we generate lessons on what can be learned
from the existing implementations.
In sum, the three essays in this thesis provide managerial insights and policy
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guidelines regarding how to obtain economically and environmentally effective
EPR-based policies contingent on the nature of the products and market dynamics
from an operational perspective. The results have implications for multiple
stakeholders, including the society, the industry and the environment, and they can
help achieve better environmental and economic outcomes, e.g., developing effective
and well-functioning collection and processing infrastructures, improving collection





Sustainable operations have become an indispensable part of decision-making at all
levels and created irreversible dynamics in the global area. This is due to urgent
challenges that our world is now facing, such as growing amounts of waste, elevating
levels of pollution, climate change, and resource constraints. Majority of sustainable
solutions dealing with these challenges focus on producers, since producers have the
greatest control over resource consumption and greatest ability to reduce waste. In
this thesis, we focus on one of the related global trends, bringing environmental
responsibility for producers so that producers take into account environmental impact
of their decisions. The prevalent concept in this context is Extended Producer
Responsibility, EPR.
EPR is an environmental policy concept first introduced in Sweden in 1990 [63].
As its name implies, it extends producer responsibility for a product beyond the
traditional boundaries, to the post-consumer stage of the product life-cycle. In
particular, EPR concept adopts “polluter pays” principle and with this principle,
it holds producers financially and/or physically responsible for environmentally safe
treatment of their end-of-life products [95]. To this end, it uses the mechanism
of imposing collection and recycling obligations on producers. This means that
producers are now responsible for taking back their post-consumer products and
ensuring their proper recycling. EPR has two goals: (i) ensuring the environmentally
responsible management of discarded products by diverting them away from landfills
and promoting their recycling; and (ii) providing incentives for environmentally
benign designs by having producers internalize post-use processing costs associated
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with their products [100].
Over the last two decades, EPR-based policies have become widespread in many
countries around the world (e.g. US, EU, Japan, and China) for several products with
high potential to harm the environment such as automobiles, electrical and electronic
devices, which have a durable nature. There is a rich body of analysis that focuses on
implementation of EPR for these products and associated operational decisions such
as product design, new product introduction and supply chain configuration. This
suggests that these implementations lead to better environmental outcomes. However,
existing analysis and current implementations ignore durable nature of these products
and related dynamics in the market, which may have a significant effect on the
environmental outcomes. In the first essay, we investigate these ignored aspects and
identify the interaction between durability and EPR-based policies with a particular
emphasis on electronics. In this context, we consider incentives of durable good
producers to recover used products from the secondary markets and discard them. We
base our analysis on the buy-back programs of producers that offer consumers a fair
market values for the return of their used products (e.g. Dell, HP, Fujitsu, Apple). We
find that such secondary market interference may deteriorate environmental outcomes
by increasing new production and reducing reuse levels. We provide insights into
how to set EPR obligations to avoid these adverse outcomes. Furthermore, we
validate our results by calibrating with real-life data and considering a number of
extensions that represent different operational environments. Our analysis collectively
uncovers possible strategic approach of durable good producers to EPR obligations
and suggests that EPR obligations may result in unintended outcomes in a durable
setting.
In the implementation of EPR-based policies, “market-based” approach has
recently become the mostly advocated approach [83, 28]. Its main premises
are to promote cost efficiency and to achieve better environmental outcomes by
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adopting free market principle and setting desirable targets for collection with
broad flexibilities. In the second essay, we analyze whether these premises hold
by focusing on the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act, a prevailing example of
marked-based EPR policy implementation in the US. Based on publicly available
reports and our interviews with the stakeholders, we explore its implementation
rules, stakeholder perspectives, and resulting outcomes together with underlying
dynamics. To better evaluate the dynamics, we make comparisons with The
Washington E-Waste Recycling Law, where government determines the operational
choices with a “central coordination” approach. We find that the Minnesota Act
appears to achieve the premises of the market-based approach, but this possibly
occurs at the expense of several environmental disadvantages. Our analysis suggests
that these disadvantages arise from market dynamics at the implementation stage
and associated stakeholder interactions. This implies that the overall effectiveness of
the market-based approach in practice depends significantly on the operational rules
chosen for its implementation.
Following their widespread adoption for durable products, EPR-based policies
have recently gained popularity for pharmaceuticals to address their recently
recognized environmental and public health externalities. So far, EU, British
Columbia and two states in the United States (California and Washington) have
enacted EPR-based policies that mandate producers to operate and fund the
pharmaceutical collection and disposal systems [133, 87, 5]. Many other states
and countries are in the process of establishing similar policies. However, little
is known regarding the effectiveness of these policies for pharmaceuticals and
little guidance can be obtained from EPR implementations for durable products,
because product characteristics, demand structures and market dynamics are very
different. Motivated by this, in the third essay, we analyze how the EPR
concept can be effectively operationalized for pharmaceuticals by focusing on major
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stakeholders (pharmaceutical producers, doctors, patients, the environment and
public health) and their unique and complex interactions as well as moderating
factors for these interactions (pharmaceutical promotions, mediated demand structure
due to doctor-patient interaction). With this framework, we investigate the
effectiveness of EPR-based policies and demonstrate that the preferred policy from
the welfare perspective depends on the healthcare and externality characteristics of
the medicine together with collection-related requirements in place. This shows that
experiences and well-established premises learned from EPR implementations for
durable products do not necessarily hold for consumables such as pharmaceuticals.
Accordingly, our results suggest that identifying ideal EPR implementations for
pharmaceuticals requires a careful investigation.
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CHAPTER II
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY AND
SECONDARY MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
EPR-based approach has been employed prevalently for electronic waste (e-waste)
[119] as e-waste has been considered to be the fastest growing and most toxic type of
post-consumer waste [107]. Some early examples of EPR-based take-back legislation
(hereafter referred to as EPR) for e-waste are The Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (WEEE) Directive (Directive 2003/108/EC) in Europe [55], and The
Specified Household Appliance Recycling (SHAR) Law passed in Japan in 2005 [17].
Following this global trend, the number of state legislation based on the EPR concept
has steadily increased in the U.S. over the last decade, and 26 states have enacted
state-wide take-back legislation for discarded electronics [45].
One of the fundamental premises underlying EPR is that it imposes producer
responsibility for end-of-life products [95, 18]. In other words, it is implicitly assumed
that only end-of-life products that are discarded by end-users will be recycled under
EPR-based take-back systems. In this essay, we challenge this premise in the context
of durable products such as electronics: Durable goods producers may collect and
discard end-of-use products (hereafter referred to as used products) that still have
useful life remaining. For example, producers of electronic products such as Dell,
HP, Fujitsu and Apple offer buyback programs that pay consumers or businesses for
used electronics in working condition, including desktop computers, notebooks, and
printers [39, 73, 59, 7] and do not necessarily remarket these recovered products.
Such secondary market interference through recovery and disposal of used products
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helps a producer moderate competition against secondary markets, thereby reducing
cannibalization of new product sales. It also increases the resale value of used
products, resulting in higher valuation, and in turn, higher sales price of new products
[143, 71]. Because EPR implementations do not necessarily specify the condition
of products to be recycled, this observation suggests that a producer can utilize
end-of-life and/or used products to meet EPR obligations. In other words, a producer
may recover used products in working condition from the secondary market and
recycle them to meet EPR obligations. Hence, a natural question is whether and how
EPR affects a durable good producer’s secondary market interference. This is the
first question that we address in this essay.
We also note that a producer’s secondary market interference may have important
environmental implications. In particular, recovering used products in working
condition and recycling them effectively curbs product reuse, shortens the average
useful life of products, and increases new production in durable goods markets. In
other words, secondary market interference diminishes the “reduce” and “reuse”
levels in markets for durable goods, which are superior alternatives to recycling
in the “reduce-reuse-recycle” waste management hierarchy [142]. Accordingly, the
extent to which EPR influences the producer’s approach to secondary markets,
i.e. whether it moderates or exacerbates secondary market interference, has
important environmental implications. Therefore, how EPR-driven secondary market
interference influences the environmental effectiveness of EPR implementations is the
second question that we address in this essay.
To address these two questions, we develop and analyze a stylized model that
considers a durable goods producer subject to EPR. This analysis shows that the effect
of EPR on a producer’s secondary market strategy and its associated environmental
implications depend on product durability. In the absence of EPR, a producer
may choose not to interfere with the secondary market for products with high
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durability. This is because the cost of interference (i.e., the cost of buying/acquiring
used products from the secondary market) can outweigh its benefits (e.g., reducing
secondary market competition and increasing new product sales). In this case, we find
that EPR induces a producer to recover and recycle used products to meet its EPR
obligations when the recycling standards are low. For products with low durability,
a producer may readily interfere with the secondary market even in the absence of
EPR. In this case, the effect of EPR depends on its implementation parameters.
In particular, EPR increases the producer’s secondary market interference when
collection targets are high, increasing the quantity needed to be recycled, and
recycling standards are low, making recycling less expensive. Overall, our results
suggest an unexplored and undesirable potential effect of EPR for durable goods: It
may induce or increase secondary market interference by producers.
These observations, collectively imply that EPR-based take-back legislation
may have unintended environmental consequences in a durable goods setting.
More specifically, prevalent EPR implementation models’ focus on the “recycle”
dimension may diminish incentives to “reduce” and “reuse” in markets for durable
goods [142]. Nevertheless, we find that such unintended consequences may be
attenuated by increased recycling standards, while more stringent collection targets
and infrastructure requirements may backfire in EPR implementations for durable
products. We also validate these results by calibrating our model with real-life data
for two types of consumer electronics (MP3 players and cellular phones). Finally, we
consider a number of extensions to analyze the robustness of our results under different
operational environments. These extensions suggest that EPR-driven incentives to
recycle used products in working condition persist (i) when a producer refurbishes
recovered used products, (ii) under state-operated EPR implementations that limit
the producer’s role in compliance, and (iii) when the producer (or the EPR system)
has limited access to used and end-of-life products.
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2.2 Related Literature
This essay is closely related to the stream of literature in operations management
research that examines the impact of environmental legislation on a firm’s decisions
such as new product introductions [116], technology choice [41, 90], competitive
testing to enforce product standards [115], operating strategies of a waste-to-energy
firm [10] and replacement of hazardous substances [88, 89]. A stream in this literature
focuses on the effect of EPR-based take-back legislation on operational decisions such
as design of recovery processes [149], supply chain configuration choices [85], product
design [15, 13, 123, 54], and the welfare implications of these decisions [18, 141, 11, 52].
To the best of our knowledge, this stream of literature does not consider the durable
nature of certain product categories that EPR applies to (e.g., electronics). We
contribute to this literature by analyzing how product durability and EPR affect a
producer’s strategic approach to secondary markets and the resulting environmental
implications.
Our work also relates to the closed-loop supply chain management literature,
particularly to papers that study producers’ recycling, remanufacturing, or
refurbishing decisions [128, 38, 57, 146, 12, 52, 53] (see [132] for a recent overview).
While most papers in this literature do not consider the presence of EPR, a few
notable exceptions are [146], [52] and [53], who analyze the effect of EPR on an
OEM’s competitive refurbishing strategies. However, these papers do not consider
the durable nature of products and thus ignore secondary markets. We contribute to
this stream of literature by investigating a durable good producer’s strategic choices
regarding secondary market interference, refurbishing, and recycling to meet EPR
obligations.
Finally, our work also relates to the extensive literature on durable goods, which
has paid considerable attention to secondary markets as their presence has several
important implications for a producer (see [144] for an overview): Secondary markets
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exert a positive effect on the new product price as they establish a future resale
value for new products, and also allow the producer to segment consumers based
on the heterogeneity in their willingness to pay for product quality. On the other
hand, secondary markets may decrease the demand for new products, i.e., the
cannibalization effect, due to the competition between new and used products. In the
presence of these two opposing effects arising from the durable nature of products,
producers may decrease the availability of used products via planned obsolescence
[144, 4], or choose to eliminate secondary markets by using different strategies such
as leasing [143, 71, 3], relicensing fees [110], buy-backs, or trade-ins [58, 122]. However,
this literature does not analyze the effect of EPR on a durable good producer’s
secondary market strategy. Our work fills this gap by analyzing this effect and showing
that EPR may provide additional incentives to interfere with the secondary market.
2.3 Model
We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist producer that sells a durable product
subject to EPR. We develop a discrete-time, infinite horizon, sequential game between
the producer and consumers. We begin by outlining our assumptions for the producer
and consumer decisions. Periods are indexed by t ≥ 0.
Product Characteristics. The production cost per unit of the durable product is
denoted by c, where c ≥ 0. The product depreciates with use. The useful life of the
product is assumed to be two periods [40, 79, 3, 4]. We consider a product to be new
when it has never been used and has two periods of useful life left. We refer to a
product as used when it only has a period of useful life left, and as end-of-life when
it has been used for two periods. We use subscripts n, u, and eol for new, used, and
end-of-life products, respectively.
Consumer Characteristics. We assume that there is a unit mass of consumers,
who are heterogeneous in their valuations for the product. Consumer valuations for
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the product, denoted by θ, are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] [40, 79]. Each consumer
uses at most one unit of product at a time, and the consumer population remains
constant over time. In every period, a consumer with valuation θ receives gross utility
Un(θ) = θ from using a new product, Uu(θ) = δθ from using a used product, and
Ui(θ) = 0 from remaining inactive, where δ ∈ (0, 1] represents the level of product
durability. This representation captures that every consumer prefers a new product
to a used product, and the relative substitutability between new and used products
depends on product durability.
Let ptn denote the sales price for the new product sold by the producer in period t.
We assume that there exists a secondary market, where consumers can buy and sell
used products, and it operates at a market-clearing price denoted by ptu. Therefore, in
every period, a consumer has three available actions: buying a new product from the
producer, buying a used product from the secondary market, or remaining inactive.1
Consumers are forward looking and maximize their net present utility.
EPR Implementation. We first formulate a model of EPR implementations where
the producer is operationally responsible2 to meet its EPR obligations defined by the
following requirements:
1. Recycling standards: Most EPR implementations impose standards for how
products have to be recycled, e.g., they may require the producer to utilize
better quality recycling processes, certified recyclers, or safer handling of
resulting materials. As more stringent recycling standards result in higher
recycling costs, we model a more stringent recycling standard through a higher
unit recycling cost s > 0 incurred by the producer.
1In §2.6.1, we consider an extension where the producer can also refurbish recovered used products
and sell them back to consumers.
2See §2.6.3 for an extension that considers EPR implementations where the producer or consumers
are subject to a recycling fee as opposed to the operational responsibility model we consider in our
main analysis.
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2. Requirements on collection infrastructure: EPR implementations also impose
certain requirements on how the collection infrastructure is set up. For
example, in the Washington state, EPR compliance systems (operated by
producers or the state) are required to have at least one collection point in
each city or town with more than ten thousand residents [65]. In states such
as New York and Michigan [108, 46] producers may manage collection points
for end-of-life products, while in other states such as Connecticut and Maine
end-of-life product collection is managed only by municipalities [46, 99]. These
choices clearly influence collection costs, e.g., establishing collection centers in
scarcely-populated locations increases collection costs, and the municipalities
may charge higher collection fees to the producers (than they may be able to
achieve independently). In our model, we capture the requirements on the
collection infrastructure through a per-unit cost k incurred by the producer for
collection of end-of-life products.
3. Collection and recycling targets: EPR implementations with producer
operational responsibility commonly impose collection and recycling rate
targets, which are defined as the fraction of sales that the producer has to
collect and recycle (e.g., as in Indiana, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin and in
the E.U.), respectively. We model those by assuming that if qt−1n denotes the
sales of new products in the previous period, then the producer has to collect
and recycle at least αqt−1n products in period t, where α ∈ (0, 1]. For brevity,
we refer to this simply as the collection target hereafter.
Fulfilling EPR Obligations. In order to meet the EPR obligations, a producer
with operational take-back responsibility can recover products from two different
sources. First, the producer can recover end-of-life products. This option requires
the producer to obtain end-of-life products from households, or municipal or local
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collection points. Therefore, the producer incurs a unit collection cost k per end-of-life
product collected, as defined above. If collecting an end-of-life product requires paying
the consumer, it is straightforward to show that this cost can be internalized in
the production and collection costs by rearranging the cost terms in our model (see
Appendix A §A4 for details). We do not consider possible economies or diseconomies
of scale in collection of end-of-life products (cf. [16]) for simplicity, as their presence
does not change our structural results or qualitative insights. It can be shown that
collection of end-of-life (used) products becomes relatively more attractive under
economies (diseconomies) of scale. We denote the volume of end-of-life products
collected in period t by qteol.
Second, the producer can recover used products (which have a period of useful life
left) from the secondary market. Let qtu denote the quantity of used products recovered
by the producer in period t. We assume that the producer pays the market-clearing
price ptu for each used product recovered from the secondary market. Furthermore,
because consumers get paid for returning their used products to the firm, we assume
that any additional collection costs incurred by the producer are negligible under this
option. It is straightforward to show that such a cost can be captured in our model,
and it can be internalized in the marginal production cost and end-of-life collection
cost by rearranging the cost terms (see Appendix A §A3 for details). Finally, in our
main analysis, we assume that all products that reach end-of-use or end-of-life can be
collected. In §2.6.2, we generalize our model to consider a situation where a fraction
of such products may not be accessible for collection.
Specification of the Game. We assume that EPR obligations are specified at the
start of the game. In each ensuing period of the dynamic game, the producer first
makes its quantity decisions, viz., the quantity of new products to sell, the quantity
of used products to recover from the secondary market, and the quantity of end-of-life
products to recover. Subsequently, consumers make their purchasing decisions. The
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producer and consumers maximize their net utility with a common discount factor
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Given the sequential nature of the game within each period, we solve for
subgame perfect equilibrium by using backward induction. We restrict our attention
to Markov-perfect, stationary equilibria [79, 116, 3, 4], where all decisions remain
constant in time, i.e., qtn = qn, q
t
u = qu and q
t
eol = qeol. Note that the time inconsistency
problem does not exist in our model because we consider a product with a finite life
cycle over an infinite horizon [79]. We also assume that all information regarding
consumer preferences and cost structures are common knowledge.
Inverse Demand Functions. We provide a brief sketch of the derivation of the
inverse demand functions. For ease of exposition, the proof and details for this section
are relegated to Appendix A §A1. For a given price for the new product pn and price
of the used product on the secondary market pu, there are at most three undominated
consumer strategies: Consumers of type θ ∈ (θ1(pn, pu), 1] purchase a new product
and sell their used product on the secondary market in every period, consumers of
type θ ∈ (θ2(pu), θ1(pn, pu)] buy a used product from the secondary market in every






. Accordingly, the demand for new products is given by qn = 1−θ1(pn, pu),
and the demand for used products from consumers is given by qud = θ1(pn, pu)−θ2(pu).
Given these consumer strategies, we can derive the market-clearing price for used
products on the secondary market for a given pn. The supply of used products
on the secondary market is from consumers who always buy a new product. The
demand for used products on the secondary market is from the consumers who buy
a used product in every period (qud), and from the producer, which is denoted by qu.
Note that such recovery of used products by the producer is similar to a trade-in or
buyback program, where the trade-in/buyback price is equal to the market-clearing
price on the secondary market. The market-clearing price can then be found by






. Note that the market-clearing price increases in the
quantity of used products acquired by the producer.
The inverse demand function for new products is obtained by solving for pn in
qn = 1− θ1(pn, pu). We find pn(qn, qu) = 1 + ρδ − qn(1 + δ + 2ρδ) + δqu(1 + ρ). The
new product price increases in qu because a higher qu implies a higher market-clearing
price on the secondary market, and hence a higher resale value in the future. Using
pn(qn, qu), the market-clearing price for used products can be expressed as pu(qn, qu) =
δ(1 − 2qn + qu). In order to eliminate uninteresting cases where the business is not
profitable for the producer, we assume that the production cost is not too high, i.e.,
c < 1 + δ−α(s+ min(δ, k)), for the rest of the essay. We also assume ρ = 1 hereafter
for ease of exposition.
Formulation of the Producer’s Problem. Recall that we focus on
Markov-perfect, stationary equilibria, under which the producer’s problem reduces
to the following steady-state formulation:
max
qn,qu,qeol
Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − kqeol − sαqn
such that qeol ≤ qn − qu, αqn ≤ qu + qeol, qn, qu, qeol ≥ 0,
where the constraint qeol ≤ qn − qu captures that the quantity of end-of-life products
the producer can recover is constrained by the total quantity of end-of-life products
held by consumers. The constraint αqn ≤ qu + qeol ensures that the amount of
products recovered and recycled at least equals the target set by EPR obligations. In
the producer’s objective, kqeol represents the cost of recovering end-of-life products,
and pu(qn, qu)qu denotes the cost of recovering used products from the secondary
market. The producer only recycles the quantity mandated by EPR obligations αqn
at a cost sαqn.
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2.4 The Effect of EPR on a Producer’s Secondary Market
Strategy
In this section, we first analyze a benchmark case in §2.4.1, where EPR is absent.
Then, in §2.4.2, we investigate the effect of EPR on the producer’s secondary market
strategy.
2.4.1 Benchmark: No EPR
Consider the absence of EPR by assuming α = 0. Note that if there are no EPR
obligations, the producer has no reason to recover end-of-life products, i.e., qeol = 0.
Therefore, the producer’s problem reduces to maxqn,qu Π(qn, qu, 0) = (pn(qn, qu) −
c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu such that 0 ≤ qu ≤ qn.
Lemma 1 In the absence of EPR, the producer interferes with the secondary market
by recovering used products (qu > 0) if and only if δ < 1 − 2c. The producer never
shuts down the entire secondary market, i.e., qu < qn.
Lemma 1 shows that the producer may choose to interfere with the secondary
market by recovering used products in the absence of EPR. This is because it allows
the producer to reduce cannibalization of its new products. However, the producer
does not interfere with the secondary market if product durability or production
cost are high. The reason for this is that higher durability implies higher value
from a used product, leading to a higher price (pu) on the secondary market, which
makes recovering used products very expensive for the producer. Similarly, a higher
production cost requires the producer to charge a higher price for the new product.
This reduces the demand for new products, and consequently the availability of used
products on the secondary market, increasing the market-clearing price for them.
Therefore, a higher production cost also leads to a higher price of used products on
the secondary market. Accordingly, when product durability and production cost are
high, the cost of recovering used products is prohibitively high for the producer,
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and interfering with the secondary market is not profitable. We also note that
an interfering producer does not shut down the secondary market completely, and
maintains some active consumer-to-consumer trade on the secondary market.
2.4.2 Secondary Market Interference under EPR
We next analyze the producer’s decision to interfere with the secondary market in
the presence of EPR. Recall from Lemma 1 that in the absence of EPR, the producer
does not interfere with the secondary market if δ ≥ 1− 2c. We begin by focusing on
this case as it allows us to isolate the effect of EPR on secondary market interference
by the producer. The closed-form expressions for all thresholds defined in the analysis
below are provided in the Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Let δ ≥ 1 − 2c. If δ ≤ k, EPR leads the producer to interfere with
the secondary market and utilize only used products to meet the EPR obligations (i.e.,
qu = αqn and qeol = 0).
Proposition 1 shows that EPR may induce a durable good producer to interfere
with the secondary market. This is an intuitive result when product durability (δ) is
relatively lower than the end-of-life product collection cost (k). The EPR obligations
can be met by recovering used products at a unit price pu from the secondary market
or by recovering end-of-life products at a unit cost of k. It is straightforward to show
that the maximum market-clearing price for a used product on the secondary market
is δ (see §A1 in the Appendix A). Therefore, when the cost to collect end-of-life
products (k) is higher than the maximum possible price for a used product (δ), it is
clearly cheaper for the producer to recover used products from the secondary market
instead of collecting end-of-life products. This result implies that if the collection
infrastructure requirements result in a high collection cost, producers may respond to
the legislation by exclusively interfering with the secondary market and recycling only
used products to fulfill EPR-related obligations. Hereafter, we refer to this strategy,
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where the producer utilizes only used products to meet her EPR obligations, as the
Used Product Recycling strategy.
A natural follow-up question is how the producer responds to EPR when the
collection cost for end-of-life products is lower than the maximum value of used
products on the secondary market (i.e., δ > k), a more likely scenario in practice.
Therefore, we next focus on the case where the collection cost for end-of-life products
is low and the producer does not interfere with the secondary market in the absence of
EPR. The producer’s strategy to comply with the EPR obligations under this setting
is illustrated in Figure 1 (see §2.4.3 for a similar illustration with calibrated real-life
data).
Proposition 2 Let δ ≥ 1 − 2c and k < δ. There exists s1(δ, α, c, k) ≤ s2(δ, α, c, k)
such that: If s ≤ s1(δ, α, c, k), then the producer fulfills EPR obligations completely
through recycling of used products, i.e., qu = αqn and qeol = 0. If s1(δ, α, c, k) < s <
s2(δ, α, c, k), then the producer recycles a mix of used and end-of-life products to fulfill
EPR obligations, i.e., qu, qeol > 0 and qu + qeol = αqn. Finally, if s2(δ, α, c, k) ≤ s,
then the producer only recycles end-of-life products to fulfill EPR obligations, i.e.,
qu = 0 and qeol = αqn.
Proposition 2 shows that the result from Proposition 1 that EPR may induce
secondary market interference holds even when the cost to collect end-of-life products
k is low. Moreover, in this scenario, the producer’s decision of how to comply with the
EPR obligations, i.e., whether to utilize used products and/or end-of-life products,
depends on the stringency of the recycling standard (see Figure 1). As recycling
requirements become more stringent, the recycling cost imposed by EPR increases,
leading to a higher per-unit cost faced by the producer. This drives the producer to
charge a higher price and reduces the demand for its new products. Consequently, a
smaller supply of used products is available for trade on the secondary market, which
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Figure 1: Producer’s decision of how to comply with EPR obligations as a function

























Note: In the above figure, α = 0.5, c = 0.2, k = 0.1 and δ = 0.6.
increases the market-clearing price for used products. Therefore, a more stringent
recycling requirement (i.e., a higher recycling cost) makes recovering used products
more expensive, while it has no influence on the cost to collect end-of-life products.
Hence, if the recycling cost is sufficiently low (s ≤ s1(δ, α, c, k)), the producer
utilizes the Used Product Recycling strategy, despite the low cost to collect end-of-life
products. As recycling cost increases further (s1(δ, α, c, k) < s < s2(δ, α, c, k)), the
producer uses a mix of used and end-of-life products to meet the EPR obligations
(hereafter referred to as the Mixed Recycling strategy). Finally, if the recycling cost
is sufficiently high, the producer only uses end-of-life products to comply with EPR
(hereafter referred to as the End-of-life Recycling strategy). This implies that EPR
does not induce secondary market interference only if the recycling requirement is
sufficiently stringent.
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Note that the above result shows that even when the collection cost of end-of-life
products is substantially low, (i.e., k  δ), the producer may recycle used products
to meet EPR obligations. In order to explain the rationale behind this, consider
the case where the producer utilizes a Mixed Recycling strategy. In this setting, it
can be shown that the cost to recover used products pu is always higher than the
cost to collect end-of-life products k (see Appendix A §A2). However, the producer
still recovers some used products to meet the target because doing so reduces the
cannibalization of new products due to the trade on the secondary market. This
positive benefit of secondary market interference makes recovering used products
overall more attractive for the producer, despite the cost of recovering used products
(pu) being higher than that for end-of-life products (k).
We next focus on the setting where the producer readily recovers used products
by interfering with the secondary market even in the absence of EPR, i.e., δ < 1− 2c
(see Lemma 1). In this case, it can be shown that the producer’s recycling strategy
to meet EPR is almost identical to those outlined in Propositions 1-2 and Figure 1
above (see proofs of Propositions 1-3 for details). The only difference is that when
δ < 1−2c, the producer may collect more used products than the volume required to
meet EPR obligations if s < s0(δ, α, c), where s0(δ, α, c) < s1(δ, α, c, k). However, the
producer’s EPR compliance strategy does not change under δ < 1− 2c: the producer
recycles used products to meet EPR obligations for s < s1(δ, α, c, k), both used and
end-of-life products for s1(δ, α, c, k) ≤ s ≤ s2(δ, α, c, k), and only end-of-life products
otherwise.
The next proposition analyzes whether EPR increases secondary market
interference in this case. Let α̂(δ, c) denote the fraction of used products collected in
the absence of EPR.
Proposition 3 Let δ < 1 − 2c. EPR increases secondary market interference if the
collection target is above the fraction of used products that the producer collects in the
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absence of EPR (α ≥ α̂(δ, c)) and s < ŝ(δ, α, c, k), where ŝ(δ, α, c, k) < s2(δ, α, c, k).
Otherwise, EPR reduces interference.
Proposition 3 suggests that the implications of EPR on the producer’s secondary
market interference are slightly different for a product with lower durability, i.e., when
δ < 1− 2c: In this case, when the producer already has a strong incentive to recover
used products and the collection target set by EPR is low, EPR reduces secondary
market interference (α < α̂(·)). This result can be explained by the fact that the
presence of EPR imposes a requirement to recycle recovered products as opposed to
discarding them at no cost in the absence of EPR. This additional cost effectively
implies a lower net profit margin for the producer, reducing the sales volume, and
in turn, increasing the market-clearing price of used goods. This makes secondary
market interference less attractive for the producer. In contrast, when the collection
target set by EPR is high (α ≥ α̂(·)), it can increase secondary market interference
because the producer has to recover a larger quantity of used products to meet the
target. In particular, this happens when the recycling cost is sufficiently low (s <
ŝ(·)), such that the producer prefers to recover used products to meet EPR obligations
(i.e., utilizes a Used Product or Mixed Recycling strategy, similar to Figure 1).
To the best of our knowledge, Propositions 1-3 are the first to identify the
interaction between EPR and secondary market strategies of a producer, which is
driven by the durable nature of the product. Hence, a natural follow-up question is
how product durability influences this interaction, which is explained in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 s0(δ, α, c), s1(δ, α, c, k) and s2(δ, α, c, k) are decreasing in δ.
Proposition 4 shows that the producer’s recycling cost thresholds for secondary
market interference are higher for a product with lower durability. This is because
lower durability implies a lower price for used products on the secondary market,
making it less expensive for the producer to recover them. Therefore, as the product
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durability decreases, the producer moves from the End-of-life Recycling strategy to
the Mixed Recycling strategy, and then to the Used Product Recycling strategy. In
other words, the lower the product durability, the more attractive it is for the producer
to interfere with the secondary market and recycle used products.
2.4.3 Numerical Study
While the analysis so far clearly demonstrates EPR’s potential to increase secondary
market interference from a theoretical perspective, a natural question is whether EPR
implementations in practice are likely to induce such an outcome. In order to address
this question, we calibrate our model based on real-life data by following a similar
approach to [116] and [19]. In this analysis, we focus on Apple MP3 players and
smartphones; in particular, 5th generation iPod Nanos and iPhones. Our choice of
these products is motivated by three different reasons: First, Apple currently buys
back used products in these categories by paying consumers through its Apple Reuse
and Recycling program [7]. Moreover, Apple currently does not remarket those 5th
generation iPod Nanos and iPhones, suggesting that they are diverted to recycling as
implied by the program’s name. Second, Apple is subject to EPR for these products
in many countries or states with EPR-based take-back legislation. Third, relevant
consumer valuation, cost, and EPR implementation data is readily available for these
products.
In order to calibrate our model and estimate the product durability δ, we first
generalize our model by considering the consumer willingness to pay to be distributed
between [0, B], where B ≥ 1 represents the maximum willingness to pay for a new
product in the market. We also modify the consumer’s per-period net utility to
include a price sensitivity term b > 0 (see Appendix A §A5 for details).3 Second, we
determine new product sales prices from Apple’s website [8]. Third, we determine
3Note that all our structural results also hold for this general model.
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the maximum consumer willingness to pay B for these two product categories using
existing experimental data in [2]. Finally, we determine the buyback prices paid for
used versions of these products from the website of Apple and its buyback partner
[9, 25]. Subsequently, we assume that these new and used product price estimates
correspond to those obtained from our general model, which allows us to estimate the
product durability δ. Please see Appendix A §A5 for further details regarding the
calibration procedure and estimates.
Given these estimates, we explore the implications of EPR for these two product
categories using our analytical model. We determine the recycling cost s and the
collection cost k from [65], which provides an estimate of the collection cost as 5
cents/lb and the recycling cost as 2 cents/lb for small consumer electronics. For the
collection target, we consider a range of values for α ∈ [0.3, 0.85], which contains
values observed in different implementations in practice. For example, the collection
target is 45% for 2016 and 65% in 2019 in the EU [55], and 80% currently in the
states of Minnesota and Wisconsin [46].
We first analyze the effect of EPR for iPod Nanos. The production cost for an
iPod Nano is $45 [81] and its weight is approximately 0.1 lb, which results in a
per-unit recycling cost of 0.2 cents or $0.002 and a per-unit collection cost of 0.5
cents or $0.005. Using these estimates, we illustrate the effect of EPR in Figure 2a.
When the product durability and collection targets are both low (light gray region in
Figure 2a), EPR decreases secondary market interference, which also coincides with
the region where the producer prefers a Used Product Recycling strategy.4 For higher
durability (gray region in Figure 2b), EPR increases secondary market interference,
which also coincides with the region where the producer prefers a Mixed Recycling
strategy. Finally, for sufficiently high durability (white region in Figure 2a), the
4Note that this alignment of the producer’s recycling strategies and regions of decreased and
increased interference only holds for these specific estimates, and may not hold in general.
22





































Note: In panel (a) for iPods, B = 190, b = 0.84, s = 0.002, c = 45 and k = 0.005. In
panel (b) for iPhones, B = 948.23, b = 0.84, s = 0.005, c = 200 and k = 0.0125. The
producer utilizes a Used Product Recycling strategy in the light gray region, Mixed
Recycling strategy in the gray region and End-of-life Recycling strategy in the white
region. In the absence of EPR, the producer interferes with the secondary market if
δ < 0.6 for iPod Nanos and δ < 0.65 for iPhones.
producer only recycles end-of-life products and does not interfere with the secondary
market regardless of whether it is subject to EPR or not. Note that the calibration
procedure explained above provides an estimate for the durability of a 5th generation
iPod Nano as δ = 0.13. As illustrated in Figure 2a, our analysis suggests that the
producer will interfere with the secondary market for any α if δ < 0.6, which is
satisfied for our estimate of durability δ = 0.13. Therefore, our results from the
calibration study are consistent with Apple’s strategy in practice of recovering iPods
through a buyback program. For iPod Nanos (with δ = 0.13), Figure 2a suggests that
a collection target above 70%, such as the current target in Minnesota and Wisconsin,
may lead to increased interference. Figure 2a also suggests that an increase in the
collection target may result in increased interference by the producer for even lower
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collection targets if the product durability were higher.
We next analyze the effect of EPR for iPhones. The production cost for an iPhone
is $200 [82] and its weight is approximately 0.25 lb, which results in a per-unit
recycling cost of 0.5 cents or $0.005 and a per-unit collection cost of 1.25 cents
or $0.0125. Using these estimates, we illustrate the effect of EPR for iPhones in
Figure 2b, which is similar to that for iPods as shown in Figure 2a. Using the
calibration procedure explained above provides an estimate for the durability of a
5th generation iPhone as δ = 0.15. As illustrated in Figure 2b, our analysis suggests
that the producer will interfere with the secondary market for iPhone 5 for all α
if δ < 0.65, which is satisfied for our estimate of durability δ = 0.15. Therefore,
our results are also consistent with Apple’s strategy of recovering iPhones through
a buyback program. Similar to Figure 2a, Figure 2b suggests that a collection rate
target above 74% may lead to increased interference for iPhones.
In sum, this numerical study demonstrates how our results relate to practice
for these two product categories. The key observation from this analysis is that
even for such high margin products with low collection and recycling costs that may
appear inconsequential, EPR may influence the producer’s secondary market strategy.
In particular, stringent collection targets (e.g., above 75%) may lead the producer
to increase secondary market interference, implying reduced reuse and increased
consumption. Finally, it is important to note that electronic firms in other product
categories facing EPR also utilize buyback practices similar to that of Apple. For
example, HP is currently utilizing a third-party service provider, Market Velocity, to
buy back used HP products from end-users and recycle them [73] for profit or WEEE
compliance [72]. Fujitsu states that their trade-in programs pay for used products,
and some of these products are recycled for WEEE compliance [59]. We expect that
the implications of our results will be stronger for these product categories as they
have lower profit margins (i.e., higher c) and they are heavier, and therefore, more
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expensive to collect at end-of-life (i.e., higher k).
2.5 Designing Effective EPR Implementations for Durable
Products
The insights from the previous section suggest that results from the existing
operations management literature on EPR [18, 15, 54] does not fully characterize
the impact of EPR on durable goods. This stream of literature ignores the effect of
secondary markets for durable goods and implicitly assumes that the producers will
only recycle end-of-life products. This assumption effectively leads one to conclude
that EPR brings environmental benefits by reducing new production and achieving
higher recycling and landfill diversion. However, our results show that when the
product durability is accounted for, EPR may lead to recycling of only end-of-life
products for a limited set of conditions, viz., when the recycling costs are high or the
imposed collection rate is high. Otherwise, EPR may achieve only the “recycle” goal
at the expense of the “reduce” and “reuse” goals, the negative implications of which
are explored next.
In order to analyze the environmental effectiveness of EPR for durable products,
we first define three key environmental performance measures utilized by the Waste
Management Hierarchy (WMH). WMH ranks the most environmentally-sound waste
management strategies, in order of environmental preference, as reduce, reuse and
recycle [142]. Recycling products has the lowest priority because it only ensures
environmentally-sound disposal of products, and does not influence the impact of
products in production or use. In our model, the recycling level is determined by
EPR and is fixed at α as defined in §2. Encouraging product reuse is the next
preferred strategy in the WMH, as reusing products decreases customers’ replacement
frequency, and extends their useful life. Note that reuse may be environmentally
undesirable for some products such as refrigerators, whose use impact may increase
over time [86]. However, we focus on the setting where reuse is environmentally
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desirable, as suggested by the WMH. In our model, the level of product reuse can be
defined as (qn − qu)/qn, where qn − qu is the quantity of products that are reused
after the first period of their useful life. A higher value indicates that a larger
fraction of products manufactured by the producer are reused. Finally, reducing
new production is the most desirable option in the WMH. It not only reduces the
environmental impact of production, but also lowers the environmental impact during
use and eventual disposal of products. In our setting, these combined effects can be
measured by the new production level qn. In sum, analyzing the effectiveness of EPR
under the WMH effectively boils down to an investigation of new production qn and
used good collection qu volumes, which we analyze in detail below.
5
As identified by Propositions 1-3, EPR may lead to increased secondary market
interference, which may in turn result in increased new production (negating the
highest priority reduce objective), and premature recycling of products (negating the
next highest priority reuse objective).
Hence, an EPR implementation needs to take these unintended outcomes into
account in setting instruments for effective policy implementation, the conditions for
which are explored below. We start by analyzing the setting of effective recycling
standards under EPR for durable goods.
Proposition 5 A more stringent recycling standard, i.e., a higher recycling cost s,
leads to a higher reuse level and reduces the new production level.
The above result parallels the intuition from Proposition 2 and the illustration
in Figure 1. Recall from the discussion of Proposition 2 that as the recycling cost
increases due to a more stringent recycling standard, the price of used products on
the secondary market increases. This makes recovery of used products less attractive
5We note that a combined measure of total environmental impact can be derived as a function of
new production qn and used good collection qu volumes, and used in a total welfare analysis leading
to similar insights, which we omit here for brevity (see Appendix A §A6 for details).
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to meet EPR obligations. As a result, there is a larger fraction of products that
are reused. Similarly, as the recycling cost increases, new production becomes more
expensive for the producer due to the EPR obligations, leading to a lower level of
new production. Therefore, a more stringent recycling standard may achieve better
outcomes along all three environmental performance measures under the WMH.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that given the recent trends in the economics
of recycling [93], the effectiveness of increased recycling stringency may be limited:
Due to rising prices for materials that can be recovered from e-waste, the effective
recycling cost can be low even for very stringent recycling standards. This implies that
while recycling standards may be able to attenuate the negative effect of lower reuse
and higher new production levels due to EPR, they may not be able to completely
overcome them.
We next explore the effect of collection infrastructure requirements. Conventional
wisdom may suggest that similar to the effect of recycling standard, a more stringent
collection infrastructure requirement will lead to a higher end-of-life collection cost
for the producer and reduce the production level. However, the next result shows that
higher collection costs or more stringent requirements on the collection infrastructure
may backfire by leading to increased secondary market interference, and in turn,
higher new production and reduced reuse levels. Note that collection infrastructure
requirements do not influence the producer if it does not collect any end-of-life
products as under the Used Product Recycling strategy; hence the next result focuses
on the cases where k has an impact on the reuse and production levels.
Proposition 6 A more stringent collection infrastructure requirement, i.e., a higher
collection cost k, leads to a lower level of production only under the End-of-life
Recycling strategy (qeol > 0, qu = 0). Under a Mixed Recycling strategy (qu, qeol > 0),
a more stringent collection infrastructure requirement leads to a higher level of new
production and lower level of reuse.
27
Proposition 6 states that a more stringent requirement on the collection
infrastructure (i.e., a higher collection cost k) may lead to the environmentally
beneficial outcome of reducing the level of new production only if the producer
utilizes the End-of-life Recycling strategy (see Figure 3). Otherwise, increasing
the stringency of collection infrastructure requirements may actually increase the
level of new production. The intuition behind this result is as follows: If the
producer finds it optimal to utilize the End-of-life Recycling strategy, more stringent
collection infrastructure requirements lower the producer’s margins and imply a
lower production level. The firm shifts from the End-of-life Recycling strategy to
the Mixed Recycling strategy as k increases beyond a threshold, and the producer
finds it attractive to begin interfering with the secondary market, leading to a lower
reuse level and a higher production level. Furthermore, once k increases beyond
a threshold, the producer switches to recycling only used products. This implies
that if EPR dictates more stringent collection infrastructure requirements such as
enforcing a broader collection network (i.e., requiring end-of-life product collection
from scarcely-populated locations) or allowing only local municipalities to collect
end-of-life products, and charge high collection costs to the producers with the
intention to support local economies, EPR may backfire by curtailing reuse and
increasing the level of new production. Moreover, when the producer finds it optimal
to utilize the Mixed Recycling strategy, it may even be environmentally beneficial
to decrease the stringency of collection infrastructure requirements as illustrated by
Figure 3.
This brings us to perhaps the easiest to implement and enforce, and most popularly
utilized EPR instrument, i.e., the collection target, which is used throughout Europe
and in several U.S. states. The conventional wisdom is that increasing collection
targets is environmentally beneficial, which is exactly why the WEEE Directive Recast
has increased collection targets to be imposed on European Member States (45% by
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Figure 3: Levels of production qn (panel a) and reuse (qn − qu)/qn (panel b) as a
function of cost to collect end-of-life products k.
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Note: In the above figure, α = 0.48, c = 0.2, s = 0.4 and δ = 0.6.
2016 and then to 65% by 2019, see [55]). One would expect that a higher collection
target α makes new production more expensive, leading to lower new production
and a higher reuse level. This is indeed the case when the producer readily collects
more than the volume required to meet EPR (s < s0(δ, α, c)) or adopts a Mixed or
End-of-life Recycling strategy (s > s1(δ, α, c, k)); see Appendix A §A2). However, the
next result shows that when the producer utilizes a Used Product Recycling strategy,
a higher collection target may have the opposite effect.
Proposition 7 Let s0(δ, α, c) ≤ s ≤ s1(δ, α, c), i.e., Used Product Recycling strategy
(0 < qu = αqn and qeol = 0) is optimal. Then, a higher collection target leads to a
lower reuse level. It also leads to a higher level of new production if α < α1(δ, c, s).
Proposition 7 identifies two counter-intuitive results as illustrated by Figure 4. It
states that (i) an increased collection target results in a lower reuse level as long
as the producer utilizes the Used Product Recycling strategy, and (ii) a higher
collection target may lead to a higher production level under the Used Product
Recycling strategy when the collection target is below a certain threshold. These
results are driven by the balance (or lack thereof) between two contrasting effects of
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Figure 4: Levels of production qn (panel a) and reuse (qn− qu)/qn = 1−α (panel b)
as a function of collection target α, for a Used Product Recycling strategy.
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Note: In the above figure, k = 0.3, c = 0.2, s = 0.4 and δ = 0.6.
the collection target on the new production volume: As the collection target increases,
the producer effectively incurs a higher effective cost to comply with EPR, implying
reduced margins and leading to a negative effect on the new production volume. In
contrast, to make recovering used products more cost effective, the producer may also
need to increase new production to increase used product availability and reduce the
price of used products on the secondary market.
In sum, these observations suggest that increasing collection targets do not
necessarily imply environmental benefits in a durable goods setting (as demonstrated
in §4.3). These results also highlight a trade-off involved with setting a collection
target for an efficient EPR implementation: Higher collection targets may lower levels
of new production for durable goods, but this may happen at the expense of lower
reuse levels.
2.6 Extensions
We now provide three extensions that capture additional considerations and relax
some of the assumptions used in our main analysis.
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2.6.1 Refurbishing.
In our main analysis, we assumed that the producer does not refurbish recovered
used products and sell them back to consumers. We now generalize our model to
allow the producer to refurbish recovered used products. Therefore, we consider two
different used goods markets in our model, viz., a secondary market where consumers
can purchase used products from other consumers, and one where the producer sells
refurbished products to consumers (in a similar vein to [150]). We assume that the
gross utility of a consumer with valuation θ from using a refurbished product is given
by Ur(θ) = δrθ, where δr ∈ (δ, 1). This captures that the consumers’ valuation for a
refurbished product will be lower than that for a new product, but higher than that
for a used product (see [110] for a similar formulation). In other words, refurbishing
improves the quality of the used product from δ to δr. Let the per-unit refurbishing
cost be denoted by cr > 0, where cr < δr − δ. If this condition does not hold, then
refurbishing would trivially never be profitable for the producer.
The detailed derivation of the inverse demand functions for this scenario is
relegated to the Appendix A §A7. There are at most four undominated consumer
strategies in this case: Consumers of type θ ∈ (θr1(pn, pu, pr), 1] purchase a new
product and sell their used product on the secondary market in every period,
consumers of type θ ∈ (θr2(pu, pr), θr1(pn, pu, pr)] purchase a remanufactured product
from the producer in every period, consumers of type θ ∈ (θr3(pu), θr2(pu, pr)] purchase
a used product from the secondary market in every period, and the rest remain














Accordingly, the demand for new, refurbished and used products from consumers
is given by qn = 1−θr1(pn, pu, pr), qr = θr1(pn, pu, pr)−θr2(pu, pr) and qud = θr2(pu, pr)−
θr3(pu). The market-clearing price of used products can be found by solving qn =
qud + qu. Solving for the market-clearing price and inverse demand functions yields
pu(qn, qu, qr) = δ(1−2qn−qr+qu), pn(qn, qu, qr) = 1+δ+2δqu−qn(1+3δ)−qr(δr+δ)
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and pr(qn, qu, qr) = δr(1− qr) + δqu − qn(δ + δr).
2.6.1.1 No EPR.
We begin by focusing on the setting without EPR by assuming α = 0. Similar to our
main analysis, the producer will have no incentive to recover end-of-life products in the
absence of EPR. The producer’s problem is then given by maxqn,qu,qr(pn(qn, qu, qr)−
c)qn − pu(qn, qu, qr)qu + (pr(qn, qu, qr)− cr)qr such that 0 ≤ qr ≤ qu ≤ qn.
Lemma 2 In the absence of EPR, the producer undertakes refurbishing of recovered
used products (qr > 0) if and only if cr < r1(c, δr, δ). Otherwise, the producer does not
refurbish (qr = 0) and still interferes with the secondary market (qu > 0) if δ < 1−2c.
Lemma 2 shows that if the refurbishing cost is low (cr < r1(·)), the producer
will find refurbishing profitable, which requires the producer to recover used products
by interfering with the secondary market. Note that if the refurbishing cost is high
(cr ≥ r1(·)), then the producer does not refurbish and the results are identical to
those in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 When cr < r1(·), there exists a threshold r2(c, δr, δ) such that when δ <
1− 2c and cr > r2(·), the producer does not refurbish all recovered used products, i.e.,
qu > qr. Otherwise, the producer refurbishes all recovered used products (qu = qr).
When refurbishing is profitable, the producer may recover used products that it
does not intend to refurbish, i.e., qu > qr. In other words, the producer recovers some
of the used products simply to interfere with the secondary market. This happens for
products with low durability (δ < 1 − 2c) when the refurbishing cost is sufficiently
high (cr > r2(·)).
2.6.1.2 Refurbishing under EPR.
In the presence of EPR, when the producer recovers qu used products and refurbishes
qr to sell back to consumers, only qu − qr used products are available for recycling
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to meet the EPR obligations (in addition to end-of-life products). Therefore, the
producer’s problem is given by the following steady-state formulation:
max
qn,qu,qeol,qr
(pn(qn, qu, qr)− c)qn − pu(qn, qu, qr)qu + (pr(qn, qu, qr)− cr)qr − kqeol − sαqn
such that qeol ≤ qn − (qu − qr), αqn ≤ (qu − qr) + qeol, qr ≤ qu ≤ qn, qn, qu, qeol, qr ≥ 0.
In this setting, the quantity of end-of-life products that the producer can recover
is larger due to refurbishing, qeol ≤ qn − qu + qr. However, the quantity of used
products that can be recycled to meet the collection target is lower, αqn ≤ (qu−qr)+
qeol.
6 Finally, the quantity of products that can be refurbished is constrained by the
quantity of used products recovered by the producer (qr ≤ qn) and the quantity of
used products that can be recovered by the producer is constrained by the quantity
of new products sold (qu ≤ qn).
Lemma 4 In the presence of EPR, the producer undertakes refurbishing (qr > 0) if
and only if cr < r3(c, δr, δ, k, s, α).
As in the absence of EPR, the producer undertakes refurbishing of recovered used
products only if the refurbishing cost is sufficiently low. An important implication of
this result is that when cr ≥ r3(·), then it is optimal for the producer to not refurbish,
and all our results from the main analysis (Lemma 1, Propositions 1-7) hold exactly.
For the rest of this analysis, we focus on cr < min(r1(·), r3(·)) to analyze the case
where the producer undertakes refurbishing.
Recall that in our main analysis without refurbishing, greater secondary market
interference due to EPR implied a larger quantity of used products recycled to meet
EPR obligations. However, with refurbishing, the producer may have two different
reasons to interfere with the secondary market, which have contrasting effects on the
6Note that this formulation assumes that refurbishing does not count towards collection and
recycling obligations under EPR, as in the majority of EPR implementations in the US [43]. It can
be shown that the results presented in this section will be moderated but continue to structurally
hold if refurbishing counts towards recycling obligations.
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reuse level. First, the producer may recover used products for refurbishing, which
maintains the reuse level as these products are sold back to consumers. Second, it
may recover used products for recycling to meet EPR obligations, which reduces the
number of used products available to consumers and effectively reduces the reuse
level. Hence, the reduction in the reuse level is now measured only by the level
of secondary market interference for recycling, i.e., the quantity of used products
recovered and recycled. Accordingly, for the rest of this discussion, to understand the
effect of EPR in a context with refurbishing, we focus on the producer’s secondary
market interference for recycling, measured by qu − qr.
We next investigate how EPR influences secondary market interference for
recycling in the presence of refurbishing. We begin by focusing on the setting with
δ ≥ 1−2c, where the producer refurbishes all recovered used products in the absence of
EPR (see Lemma 3). We analyze whether EPR induces secondary market interference
for recycling.
Proposition 8 Let δ ≥ 1 − 2c. If k ≥ δr − cr, EPR leads the producer to interfere
with the secondary market for recycling (i.e., qu− qr > 0) and only used products are
recycled to meet the EPR obligations (i.e., qeol = 0).
The above result shows that the producer recovers used products for recycling to
meet EPR obligations if refurbishing is not very attractive (i.e., δr− cr < k, implying
that the maximum additional benefit from refurbishing a used product is smaller than
k). Otherwise, the producer will find it profitable to refurbish more of the recovered
products, requiring recycling end-of-life products to meet the target. Note that the
result in the above proposition is structurally similar to that in the no refurbishing
case (see Proposition 1), except that it requires a more restrictive condition k > δr−cr
(as δr − cr > δ). That is, when the collection cost for end-of-life products is high,
recovering used products for recycling to meet EPR obligations is less attractive in
the presence of refurbishing.
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Proposition 9 Let δ ≥ 1 − 2c and k < δr − cr. There exists thresholds
sr1(δ, α, c, k, cr) ≤ sr2(δ, α, c, k, cr) such that the producer utilizes a Used Product
Recycling strategy for s ≤ sr1(δr, δ, α, c, k, cr), a Mixed Recycling strategy for
sr1(δr, δ, α, c, k, cr) < s < s
r
2(δr, δ, α, c, k, cr), and End-of-life Recycling strategy
otherwise. The thresholds sr1(·) and sr2(·) are increasing in cr.
The above result shows that the producer’s recycling strategy is similar to that
obtained in our main analysis (see Proposition 2). That is, the producer recycles
recovered used products to meet EPR obligations even with refurbishing. As the
thresholds are increasing in cr, we have that when refurbishing is more attractive
(i.e., low cr), the producer will recycle fewer used products for EPR compliance.
Overall, Propositions 8-9 show that EPR induces secondary market interference for
recycling for high durability products, i.e., the results are aligned with those from our
main model.
We next focus on the setting with δ < 1−2c, where the producer may not refurbish
all recovered used products in the absence of EPR (see Lemma 3). In this case, it
can be shown that the producer’s recycling strategy to meet EPR when it refurbishes
is almost identical to that identified in Proposition 9. The only difference is that
when δ < 1 − 2c, the producer may recycle more used products than the volume
required to meet EPR obligations if s < sr0(δr, δ, α, c, cr), where s
r
0(·) < sr1(·). This,
however, does not change the structure of the producer’s EPR compliance strategy:
the producer recycles used products to meet EPR obligations for s < sr1(·), both used
and end-of-life products for sr1(·) ≤ s ≤ sr2(·), and only end-of-life products otherwise.
In order to investigate whether EPR leads to greater secondary market interference
for recycling when the producer refurbishes, we compare qu − qr in the absence and




, which denotes the fraction of used products
recovered but not refurbished in the absence of EPR.
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Proposition 10 Let δ < 1 − 2c. EPR increases secondary market interference
for recycling if α > α̂r(·) and s < ŝr(δ, α, c, k, cr), where ŝr(δ, α, c, k, cr) < sr2(·).
Otherwise, EPR reduces interference.
Proposition 10 shows that EPR may increase the volume of used products
recovered and recycled for EPR compliance even when a producer refurbishes. Note
that the above result identifies similar conditions for increased interference as in our
main model without refurbishing as summarized in Proposition 3. In particular,
EPR increases secondary market interference when the collection target set by EPR
is high and the recycling standard is low. As such, our conclusion in §4 that EPR
may lead to greater new production and lower reuse continues to hold in the context
of refurbishing.
We next investigate whether our insights from §2.5 regarding the effect of
EPR parameters on the level of production, reuse and recycling also hold under




We find that our results in Propositions 5-7 hold in the presence of refurbishing
(see proofs of Propositions 8-10 for details): A more stringent recycling standard
leads to a higher reuse level and lower new production. A more stringent collection
infrastructure requirement may lead to a higher new production and a lower level of
reuse. Finally, under the Used Product Recycling strategy, a higher collection target
leads to a lower reuse level, and it may also lead to a higher level of new production.
A natural follow-up question is how EPR affects the refurbishing level for durable
goods. We find that there are two contrasting effects that determine the answer
to this question: On one hand, refurbishing may become less attractive under EPR
because the producer may recycle used products to meet its EPR obligations. On
the other hand, EPR increases the effective production cost faced by the firm (due
to the recycling and collection costs), making reusing products through refurbishing
more attractive. Overall, we find that EPR may increase or decrease the refurbishing
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Figure 5: Effect of EPR on refurbishing level qr.
Lower  qr
Higher  qr









Note: In the above figure, δ = 0.5, δr = 0.6, c = 0.1, k = 0.1 and cr = 0.05. EPR
leads to a higher refurbishing level in the light gray region and a (weakly) lower
refurbishing level in the gray region. The producer utilizes a Used Product Recycling
strategy below the black dashed line, a Mixed Recycling strategy between the dashed
lines, and an End-of-life Recycling strategy above the gray dashed line.
level. This can be observed by the numerical example illustrated in Figure 5. When
the collection target and the recycling costs are both low (the dark grey area in the
figure), refurbishing is not as attractive and the producer utilizes a Used Product
Recycling strategy. Under this setting, EPR reduces the refurbishing level as the
producer has to divert recovered products from refurbishing to recycling. However,
when either the collection target or the recycling cost are high (the light grey area in
the figure), the effective cost faced by the firm is higher, making refurbishing more
attractive under EPR.
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2.6.2 Limited Access to Used and End-of-life Products.
We made an implicit assumption in our main analysis that the producer can access
all used and end-of-life products in the market. However, in practice, some consumers
may simply hold onto their used or end-of-life products even though they have
purchased a new or a used product. Therefore, the producer may not have access to
the entire supply of used and end-of-life products in the market. We can consider
this case by making the following modification to our model: Let γ ∈ (0, 1] denote
the fraction of consumers who do not hold onto a used (end-of-life) product when
they purchase a new (used) product, i.e., γ denotes the recovery yield for used and
end-of-life products.
Generalizing our model for γ < 1 has two important effects (see §A8 in the
Appendix A for details): First, the supply of used products on the secondary market
is now lower, resulting in a higher price for used products (pu). Second, the quantity
of used and end-of-life products that the producer can recover is lower, i.e., qu ≤ γqn
and qeol ≤ γ(γqn − qu). Accordingly, when some consumers hold onto their used or
end-of-life products, it becomes more difficult for the producer to meet the collection
target. Also note that the reduction in the supply of end-of-life products is much larger
than that for the used products. In addition, it can be seen from the constraints on
the supply of used and end-of-life products that if the collection target is higher than
the recovery yield, i.e., α ≥ γ, the producer will not be able to meet the target.
Therefore, we assume α < γ hereafter.
We begin by focusing on the situation where α < γ2, i.e., the collection target
is low. Under this setting, we find that our structural results in Lemma 1 and
Propositions 1-7 remain unchanged (see Appendix A §A8 for details). Qualitatively,
a lower recovery yield makes recovering used products more costly, making it less
attractive for the firm to utilize them to meet EPR obligations. However, EPR may
still increase secondary market interference. We next consider the situation where
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α ≥ γ2, i.e., the collection target is high. Under this setting, again our structural
results in Lemma 1, Propositions 1, 3-5 and 7 remain unchanged (see Appendix A §A8
for details). However, Proposition 2 changes in the following manner: The producer
always utilizes a Used Product or Mixed Recycling strategy (i.e., qu > 0). This is
because the supply of end-of-life products (γ(γqn− qu) < γ2) is not sufficient to meet
the collection target, requiring utilizing used products to meet the target. Therefore,
the producer never utilizes the End-of-Life Recycling strategy. This implies that under
this setting, a lower recovery yield may necessitate secondary market interference by
the producer to meet EPR obligations.
2.6.3 EPR Implementations with Recycling Fees.
Our main model assumes that the producer can independently determine how it
fulfills EPR obligations. While this is allowed under most EPR implementations (e.g.,
in Wisconsin, Minnesota and European Member States after the WEEE Directive
Recast), some implementations may limit the producer’s EPR compliance role.
This may be the case especially when a state authority (which is often a not-for
profit entity) manages or operates the recycling system (i.e., collecting and recycling
end-of-life products through an existing state infrastructure) and charges producers
(or consumers) a unit recycling fee.
For example, consider the two well-known models of state-operated systems in
California [116] and Washington State [65]. In California, the state-level electronics
recycling system is based on an Advance Recovery Fee (ARF) model [29], where
consumers pay the ARF at the moment of purchase. A set of registered consolidators
then manage the collection and recycling of electronics, the costs of which are
covered by the funds generated by the ARF. In Washington state, a state-authority
(WMMFA) manages the collection and recycling of electronics on behalf of the
producers participating in the state’s standard EPR plan. WMMFA coordinates
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a system of registered collectors and recyclers and funds the system by charging the
participating producers a unit fee for the recycling of the products they are responsible
for. It is nevertheless important to note that while a producer may not manage its
own recycling operations in these EPR compliance systems, it may still contribute
to these state systems as a collector. For example, Apple is a registered collector in
California [30]. In this case, the producer can divert used products recovered from
the secondary market to the organization in charge of the system and get paid as a
collector.
To analyze the implications of such EPR implementations, we modify our model as
follows: The not-for-profit authority incurs collection and recycling costs and passes
them to the producer or consumers in the form of a per-unit recycling fee σ. Let the
collection fee paid to the producer for bringing in recovered used products to the EPR
system be denoted by κ. The producer’s problem is then given by the following7:
max
0≤qu≤qn
Π(qn, qu) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn − (pu(qn, qu)− κ)qu − σqn.
The producer’s problem in this setting is structurally similar to the producer’s
problem in our main analysis with κ ≡ k and σ ≡ α(k + s) (see Appendix A §A9
for details). Therefore, while the interpretation of these EPR-related parameters
are different than our main analysis, the qualitative insights regarding the effect of
EPR remains unchanged: EPR may increase secondary market interference (similar
to the results in Propositions 2-3). Increasing the unit fee charged to the producer
(σ) may help achieve greater reuse and lower production (similar to the effect of s in
Proposition 5). A higher collection fee (κ) paid to the producer may lead to higher
level of new production and lower reuse (similar to the effect of k in Proposition 6).
7Note that this formulation assumes that the unit fee is charged to the producer. It can be shown




In this essay, we analyze the effect of EPR on the markets for durable goods. We find
that a producer’s response to EPR may involve secondary market interference and
this involvement depends on product durability. For products with high durability,
the producer does not interfere with the secondary market in the absence of EPR.
However, EPR may directly induce such interference, leading to premature recycling
of used products with remaining useful lives to meet the obligations. We find
that this unintended effect will occur when: (i) recycling standards do not lead to
sufficiently high recycling costs, (ii) collection infrastructure requirements significantly
inflate collection costs for end-of-life products, and (iii) stringent collection targets
are imposed on producers. For products with low durability, the producer may
readily interfere with the secondary market even in the absence of EPR and the
effect of EPR differs substantially for such products. In this case, EPR with high
(low) collection targets and low (high) recycling stringency increases (reduces) the
producer’s secondary market interference. In turn, these results suggest that such
increased secondary market interference may be attenuated by increased recycling
standards and non-stringent collection targets.
Collectively, these results suggest that EPR implementations for durable goods
may require different approaches because of the inherent interactions between
producers’ recovery strategies and secondary markets. Implementation approaches
that may be considered successful for non-durables, i.e., for packaging or end-of-life
batteries, may backfire for certain durable goods such as electronics. Along these
lines, our results imply that recent calls in the U.S. for a unifying model of EPR that
applies across several different waste categories [106, 77], may need to be cautiously
evaluated, should they target durable goods.
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CHAPTER III
A MARKET-BASED EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY IMPLEMENTATION - THE CASE OF
MINNESOTA ELECTRONICS RECYCLING ACT
3.1 Introduction
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) employs a market-based approach to waste
management if it provides producers implementation flexibility in organizing their
compliance efforts in a competitive market. EPR in this form is favored because
it promotes cost efficiency [83, 28]. A market-based approach can be expected to
better manage the tension between landfill diversion and economic objectives in
a regulated system by setting desirable targets for collection, and then providing
operational flexibility to manufacturers to achieve these targets. This perspective on
EPR has been supported by industry and some NGOs. For instance, HP, a company
with strong interest in forming and implementing e-waste policies, announced
its support for market-based solutions [74]. Recycling Reinvented, a non-profit
organization focusing on EPR implementation, indicates several projected benefits
of a market-based approach such as improved efficiency, decreased cost, increased
recovery rates and ultimately better environmental and economical outcomes [60].
These arguments follow from the assumption that allowing flexibility to the private
sector enhances the effectiveness of operations relative to the case where government
dictates specific operational choices for implementation and pursues a centralized
coordination approach such as the Washington State implementation [65].
In this article, we consider the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act [101] as
an example of a market-based EPR implementation and use it as a benchmark
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to explore efficiency conditions for market-based EPR implementations. To do so,
we use publicly available data/reports and stakeholder interviews we conducted
in Minnesota, as well as information on the Washington E-Waste Recycling Law
implementation, which we interpret as a representative example of a centralized
coordination approach. We find that the Minnesota Act achieves a significantly
higher collection rate than most other states in the U.S. and has high cost efficiency.
This however appears to happen at the expense of other environmental or economic
efficiency measures, which include selective collection and recycling, increased
economic burden on local governments, and an uneven competitive landscape for
certain stakeholders. We nevertheless posit that these unexpected drawbacks are not
necessarily driven by the market-based approach itself. They are rather outcomes of
certain operational flexibility provisions in implementation that aim to increase the
efficiency of the working system. Accordingly, we suggest that the effectiveness of
an EPR implementation; be it market-based or centrally coordinated, will depend
significantly on the operational rules chosen for its implementation.
We begin our discussion by summarizing implementation details and outcomes of
the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act along with different stakeholder perspectives
in §2. In §3, we provide a critical discussion of the Minnesota Act, and contrast it
with Washington State Law. We conclude with a summary of insights in §4.
3.2 An Overview of the Minnesota Electronics Recycling
Act
The Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act was enacted in 2007 to administer the
increasing amounts of e-waste and the rising costs of its proper management in
the state of Minnesota. This act imposes stringent obligations on brand-owners,
hereafter referred to as manufacturers, in terms of collection and recycling targets,
but does not intervene in operational decisions and price dynamics in the market (see
Manufacturers in subsection below). The underlying motive is to allow manufacturers
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to create a collection and recycling infrastructure as economically as possible, i.e., to
achieve high cost efficiency for collection and recycling. Such characteristics make
the Minnesota Act a prevailing example of a market-based EPR implementation in
practice. In this section, we present how the market-based approach was translated
into operational rules determining its implementation in Minnesota (e.g., product
scope, covered entities, assigned responsibilities, extent of operational flexibilities,
etc.) along with resulting perspectives of stakeholders.
Covered Products and Entities: The act defines manufacturer obligations
based on two product classifications: Video Display Devices (VDDs) and
Covered Electronics Devices (CED). VDDs are televisions (including TV-DVD/VCR
combinations, monitors for home security/CCTV systems, etc.) and computer
monitors (including laptop computers, tablet PCs, eBook readers, digital picture
frames, etc.) that contain a cathode-ray tube (CRT) or a flat-panel screen with a
screen size diagonally greater than 9 inches, excluding refurbished or used products.
CEDs are computers, peripherals (i.e., external input or output devices of computers
such as keyboards and printers), facsimile machines, DVD players, and VCRs in
addition to the VDDs [105]. Covered entities, i.e., entities that can utilize the
collection and recycling system at no cost, are households in the state of Minnesota.
More specifically, the Minnesota Act covers the CEDs marketed to households and
excludes devices sold to schools, businesses and non-profit/charity organizations [49].
Stakeholders: In line with the EPR concept, the Minnesota Act places collection
and recycling obligations on manufacturers. In order to ensure a transparent
working system, the act also specifies obligations for other parties including collectors,
recyclers, retailers, and local governments. These obligations clearly affect key
operational decisions of the stakeholders, which in turn determine the economics
of collection and recycling in the state. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the
stakeholder obligations and perspectives is essential for a critical overview of the act.
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a) Manufacturers
Obligations: The act mandates manufacturers of VDDs that market their products
to households in Minnesota to annually register with the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA) and to pay a registration fee to the Minnesota Department of
Revenue based on their sales of VDDs in the previous year ($2500 for companies with
sales of 100 or more in the previous program year, $1250 for companies with sales
fewer than 100) (see the Oversight Entities subsection below for duties of the MPCA
and Minnesota Department of Revenue). Additionally, the act requires manufacturers
of VDDs to collect and recycle CEDs at a level at least equal to 80% of the weight
of VDDs they sell in Minnesota in the concurrent program year. Note that the
act uses only the market share of manufacturers to determine their obligations, i.e.,
the act does not take into account their return share, which utilizes information
on the type and volume of returned devices sold by each manufacturer. This is to
eliminate sampling and brand counting in the collection or recycling stages and the
associated administrative cost. Note also that the act bases manufacturer obligations
on their sales of VDDs, however, it counts CEDs, which include a much wider scope
of products, towards compliance. The goal behind this differentiation is to target
the manufacturers of VDDs, (as these products pose an imminent threat to the
environment due to CRT and leaded glasses contained within) while providing them
with a broad scope of products with which they can fulfill their obligations. Within
the scope of this flexibility, the act allows manufacturers to use any combination of
the following four options: (i) Obtain pounds of Recycled CEDs: Manufacturers can
directly undertake collection and recycling operations to obtain pounds of recycled
CEDs. (ii) Buy pounds of Recycled CEDs: Manufacturers can contract with recyclers
(see the Recyclers subsection below) to buy the pounds of recycled CEDs. Under both
of these options, CEDs should be collected and recycled during the current program
year in order to be eligible. (iii) Use Recycling Credits: Manufacturers can maintain
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recycled or purchased pounds that exceed recycling obligations of the program year
as recycling credits. These credits can be used to meet at most 25% of the recycling
obligations in the subsequent years or sold to other manufacturers. This can be
interpreted as flexibility for manufacturers on the timing of the recycling. (iv) Pay
Recycling Fees: If a manufacturer fails to or does not prefer to satisfy its collection
and recycling obligations by using any of the options above, then it pays a recycling
fee. This corresponds to a penalty fee charged per pound of the shortfall depending
on the percentage of the shortfall ($0.3/lb if it is 10% or less, $0.4/lb if it is between
11% and 50%, $0.5/lb if it is 51% or more).
To ensure uniform collection (i.e., collection evenly from urban, suburban and rural
locations), several EPR implementations for e-waste in the U.S. impose convenience
standards, defined in terms of the minimum number of required locations by
geography or by other similar measures (e.g., Washington, Oregon, Texas) [51].
Given this definition, the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act does not introduce
any convenience standard for CED collection. Instead, the act offers incentives for
rural collection to encourage uniformity in collection by assigning additional recycling
pounds to collection from areas where collection is expensive due to diseconomies of
scale (e.g., low population or insufficient infrastructure). Accordingly, each pound
of CEDs collected in Greater Minnesota, outside the 11-county metropolitan area
surrounding the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, earns an additional 0.5 pound
towards the producers obligation. To reflect the multiplier established for the weight
of collected CEDs from the 11-county and the Greater Minnesota areas, we refer to
this rule as the 1:1.5 ratio. In addition to the 1:1.5 ratio, to further boost collection
from the Greater Minnesota area, the MPCA has formed a competitive grant program
funded from recycling fees paid by manufacturers.
Another manufacturer obligation under the Minnesota Act is to submit annual
reports to the Minnesota Department of Revenue including the total weight of VDDs
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sold to Minnesota households, the total weight of CEDs recycled from the 11-county
and the Greater Minnesota areas, documentation of contracts with recyclers and
collectors, total recycling weights from each recycler contracted, and transactions of
recycling credits.
Perspectives: Our stakeholder interactions suggest that manufacturers in
Minnesota are generally supportive of the components of the Minnesota Electronics
Recycling Act. The majority of manufacturers consider the proper disposal of e-waste
as an inevitable trend, hence they prefer to actively engage in the legislative process.
In this way, they have the opportunity to cooperate with other stakeholders and
increase their competence to shape the act towards their interest, i.e., to minimize
any negative impact on their operations and profitability.
Manufacturers selling their VDDs in Minnesota appear to enjoy the market-based
approach and its flexibility provision, which is reflected by the high volume of
collection and recycling credits in the state. More specifically, manufacturers of the
VDDs recycle beyond their obligations and hold an abundant amount of recycling
credits in every program year: The total recycling obligation is almost half (54%) of
the total pounds recycled, therefore the number of accumulated recycling credits held
has increased significantly (22.7 million pounds in 2009, 33.2 million pounds in 2010,
and 43.4 million pounds in 2011)1.
The total credits available are approximately equivalent to requirements of all
manufacturers for two years. Despite the abundance of recycling credits, statistics
indicate that manufacturers of the VDDs generally rely on purchasing eligible pounds
of recycled CEDs (approximately 90% of the total pounds) to comply with their
obligation, while using fewer credits (around 8%) than the legislative limit (25%), and
rarely paying recycling fees (1-3% of the total pounds on the average) as a penalty
1MPCA 2011a, op. cit., p.12
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for the short-fall2.
On the other hand, manufacturers of VDDs express some concerns regarding
the assignment of obligations based on market share. First, the time lag between
production and recycling of products causes manufacturers in the current market
to recycle devices produced by other manufacturers a long time ago. Second,
manufacturers of electronics such as TVs and monitors that have low market share
but high return share have an advantage over other manufacturers.
An analysis of sales by manufacturers demonstrates that although the number
of VDDs sold increased, the overall weight has dropped for the second consecutive
year in 2011 (31.2 million in 2009, 29.2 million in 2010, 26.9 million in 2011)3.
As the majority of e-waste legislation in the U.S. (including the Minnesota Act)
determines the recycling obligations of manufacturers based on the weight of their
sales, manufacturers have the incentive to design lighter products to decrease their
obligations, in addition to other factors such as minimizing material costs or exploiting
new opportunities for miniaturization.
b) Collectors
Obligations: Collectors in the Minnesota Act refer to private (e.g., retailers,
independent collectors) or public entities (e.g., local governments) that receive the
CEDs from households and deliver them to recyclers (see also the Retailer and Local
Governments subsections). The act requires collectors to annually register with the
MPCA (at no cost) and to submit annual reports at the end of each program year on
collection sources, amounts and names of the recyclers they contracted with.
Perspectives: The act does not set any registration fee or permanent location
requirement on collectors, resulting in low start-up costs for collection businesses.
Consequently, many private entities have entered the market to undertake collection
2MPCA 2011a, op. cit., p.11-12
3ibid., p.4
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operations. An evaluation report of the MPCA illustrates an increase in the number of
registered collectors (207 in 2010, 229 in 2011, 204 in 2012)4 with a growing presence
of retailers. This translated to a high collection rate per capita (6.5 pounds in 2010,
6.2 pounds in 2011, 6.6 pounds in 2012)5.
Our discussions with Minnesota stakeholders suggest that the competition
between collectors has increased together with the number of collectors and the
volume of collection, leading to a low margin and a high volatility for collection
businesses, especially for independent collectors. The majority of collectors in
the state stay in the market for approximately 3 years and this appears to limit
the negotiation power of collectors in their contracts with manufacturers, which
potentially further decreases their margins.
An analysis of current collection options in Minnesota demonstrates that
permanent locations take up about 75% of the total collection amount, while curbside
(4%), collection events (12%) and pick-up services (8%) complete the rest6. A similar
analysis in terms of collection areas highlights that the total weight of collection from
the 11-country area is twice that of the collection from the Greater Minnesota Area
(22.2 vs. 11.1 million pounds in 2011), which has stayed nearly same throughout
all the program years for which data is available7. Although the ratio of pounds
between these areas reflects the respective population ratio, collection entities in these
areas differ significantly: Local governments offer nearly half of the collection services
in the Greater Minnesota Area, whereas independent collectors, i.e., profit-oriented
collectors, concentrate their collection efforts in urban areas (e.g., densely populated
areas with a developed collection infrastructure) such as the 11-county metropolitan
area (See Table 2). Discussions with stakeholders in the state indicate that this
4MPCA 2011a, p. 4.
5ERCC 2014c, op. cit.
6MPCA 2011a, op.cit., p. 2-3.
7ibid.
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is particularly because the act does not assign any additional pounds to collectors
(unlike the case for manufacturers) for the CEDs they obtain from the Greater
Minnesota area. This puts independent collectors in the Greater Minnesota at a
significant disadvantage (the effective payment they get for their collection is lower).
Despite being subject to the same disadvantage, local governments in the area provide
collection services to residents as part of their public service role (see the Local
Governments subsection for further details).
c) Recyclers
Obligations: Recyclers covered by the Minnesota Act include private or public
entities that receive CEDs from registered collectors, or directly provide collection
services to households and dismantle collected CEDs for further processing. The act
mandates recyclers to annually register (at no cost) and to file an annual report with
the MPCA to disclose information on weights of CEDs bought from each collector or
collected from households, and sold to manufacturers. The act further requires them
to specify pounds from the 11-county and the Greater Minnesota area separately.
Under the act, recyclers are the boundary of the collection and recycling system,
because the act considers the CEDs as recycled upon their arrival to the recycling
facilities. This role brings additional legislative requirements to registered recyclers
such as having a permanent site for recycling operations, obtaining a (free) license
from the county or state to establish their compliance with hazardous waste processing
requirements, and having a certain level of insurance coverage (e.g., having $1 million
liability insurance).
Perspectives: As in the case of the collection market, the enactment of the act and
the large volume of e-waste attracted entry into the recycling market in Minnesota,
reflected by a growth in the number of registered recyclers (59 in 2010, 77 in 2011)
and some increase in the weight of the CEDs recycled (34.7 million pounds in 2010,
33 million pounds in 2011, 35.1 pounds in 2012). This increased the competition in
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the recycling industry while potentially decreasing the contractual power of recyclers
vis-a-vis manufacturers. Moreover, the larger e-waste volume attracted higher-end
recyclers who now dominate the market. Anecdotally, one leading recycling company
in Minnesota expanded its capacity fourfold, while one third of the companies (mostly
smaller mom and pop operations) that once existed went out of business shortly after
the enactment of the act. Furthermore, in 2011, the top ten recyclers owned 95%
of the total recycled pounds, and the top three recyclers processed 72% of the total
pounds8. Therefore, the recycling industry in Minnesota can be considered to be
highly concentrated.
From the perspective of the recycling industry as a whole, involvement with the
act has brought a stable collection volume and a wide product mix. However, due to
intense competition and the volatility in commodity markets for recycled materials,
it remains a challenging business environment, creating the incentive to export the
collected e-waste to developing countries to maintain low cost levels. This does not
appear to be a major issue in Minnesota. Two recycling facilities in Minnesota are
certified with the e-Stewards program established by the Basel Action Network and
four are qualified for Responsible Recycling (R2), which is a standard released by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [76].
d) Retailers
Obligations: Retailers in the Minnesota Act refer to retail stores as well as
catalog and online sellers of VDDs, but exclude third party resellers, businesses,
or institutional sales. The act requires retailers to ensure that they sell only products
of registered manufacturers and provide consumers with information of where and
how the CEDs are collected for recycling. In addition, the act allows retailers to
participate in collection on a voluntary basis, in which case they are subject to
collector obligations.
8MPCA 2011a, op.cit., p. 9.
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Table 1: Program year comparison of Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act.
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011
VDD Sales 25.6M 31.2M 29.2M 26.9M
Manufacturer Obligations 15.3M 25M 23.4M 21.5M
Recycled Amount 33.6 30.3M 34.7M 33M
Accumulated Recycling Credits 17.6M 5.1M 10.5M 10.2M
Registered Collectors 177 181 207 229
Registered Recyclers 55 52 59 77
Collection Rate per Capita 6.5 5.7 6.5 6.2
Note: See [104].
Perspectives: Retailers appear to evaluate the Minnesota Act very favorably as
suggested by their broad participation in collection activities. In particular, retailers
including Best Buy, Staples and Radio Shack collect approximately 20% of the
volume, significantly contributing to the collection infrastructure in the state [75].
This is presumably because the requirements coming along with the act fit the
business models of retailers well. In particular, offering take-back programs (where
they offer gift cards for some product returns) allow them collect items that have
recycling volume and simultaneously help retailers improve their consumer relations,
increase shopping occasions and improved their brand image (e.g., Best Buy E-Cycle)
[102, 27]. As retailers are politically very powerful in the state of Minnesota, it is a
common stakeholder expectation that their involvement as collectors will continue to
contribute to achieving high collection volumes.
e) Local Governments
Obligations: The act requires local governments that participate in collection
activities of the CEDs (e.g., provide curbside collection and pick-ups, set up
permanent collection points, and organize collection events for households) to comply
with collector obligations (See Collectors section above).
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Perspectives: A key observation from our discussions with Minnesotan
stakeholders is that local governments in a collector role appear to shoulder more of
the cost compared to independent collectors. The data on collection illustrates that
local governments provide the majority of collection opportunities in the Greater
Minnesota Area, where the collection cost is high and variable [127], and local
governments collect a large portion of the products that are difficult and expensive
to handle in the 11-Country Area. This suggests that local governments undertake
collection services even when collection is very costly so as to ensure the proper
management of e-waste. As a result, they may end up with a net cost burden. For
example, in the 11-county area, local governments cover approximately 50% of their
collection costs via contracting with recyclers, while they fund less than 20% by
subsidies, leaving them with a 30% of shortfall. In the Greater Minnesota Area, local
governments cannot recover costs from recyclers (e.g., the percentage is approximately
zero for Becker, Crow Wing and St. Louis)9. They (partially) handle these challenges
by utilizing free recycling pounds offered by recyclers at the beginning of each program
year. The growing e-waste volume under the Minnesota Act further increases the gap
in the economies of collection between local governments and other collectors, who
have the flexibility of offering collection services only in profitable locations and to be
more selective in the type of products they accept. In sum, part of the systems cost
is subsidized by local governments and inherently, the Minnesotan taxpayers.
f) Oversight Entities
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) and the Minnesota Department
of Revenue hold oversight duties for the implementation of the Minnesota Act. Based
on the act, registration and recycling fees collected from manufacturers are used to
cover costs associated with the duties of the MPCA and the Minnesota Department
of Revenue.
9MPCA 2011a., op. cit., p. 4.
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Figure 6: Permanent collection locations in Minnesota in 2010.
The main duties of the MPCA are (i) gathering and analyzing collection and
recycling data from all the related stakeholders (e.g., reviewing reports submitted
by collectors and recyclers on total weights of the CEDs collected and recycled,
estimating sales of the VDDs to households during the preceding program year);
(ii) publishing an annual report to the public to illustrate outcomes of the act and
suggesting recommendations for possible future improvements; (iii) maintaining a
website containing guidance and fact sheets about the act (e.g., a list of registered
manufacturers of VDDs, collectors and recyclers of CEDs); (iv) managing an e-waste
account that maintains the registration and recycling fees of manufacturers; (v)
arranging meetings with different stakeholders to discuss and examine the current
status of the act; (vi) organizing various outreach programs to educate the public
about available collection and recycling programs10.
The main duties of the Minnesota Department of Revenue are (i) compiling and
10Minnesota Legislature, op. cit., p. 8-10.
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review-ing reports submitted by manufacturers on total weight of the VDDs sold to
households; (ii) analyzing how manufacturers meet their recycling obligations and
calculating recycling credits11.
Contracts between Stakeholders: At the beginning of each program year,
recyclers provide manufacturers with their price offers. Manufacturers then estimate
their collection and recycling obligations, decide on how many pounds to buy from
each recycler, and accordingly contract with recyclers. Based on forecasts in these
contracts, recyclers form their collection plans (e.g., determine the number and
location of collection sites) and/or contract with collectors. Recyclers periodically
calculate the volume they have collected and/or purchased from collectors, and report
to manufacturers on how many pounds are available. At the end of the year, if
a recycler has obtained a volume exceeding the obligation of a manufacturer, the
manufacturer can purchase the extra pounds from the recycler and bank them up as
recycling credits. However, if the manufacturer has already fulfilled its obligations,
the manufacturer has a strong bargaining position, so the contract will often be at
a lower unit price. Conversely, when a recycler fails to provide enough volume, a
manufacturer can purchase extra pounds from other manufacturers (i.e., purchase
recycling credits of other manufacturers) or from other recyclers, usually at a higher
price, or use his banked-up recycling credits. Since this will reflect poorly on that
recycler, recyclers make efforts to be above the contracted volume and sometimes
offer to take recycling pounds for free from collectors to shore up their volumes.
Product Flow: The product flow under the Minnesota Act starts from
households discarding their CEDs. For such households, several options are available:
(i) collection programs established by manufacturers, which allow consumers to drop
off the CEDs in a store or to mail the CEDs back; (ii) collection services offered by
retailers, which in turn can offer discounts or gift cards for future purchases, such as
11Minnesota Legislature, op. cit., p. 10.
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Best Buy, Office Depot, and Staples [104]; and (iii) collection opportunities provided
by other registered collectors such as independent collectors or local governments (e.g.,
permanent collection sites, curbside collection, direct pick-up services, or collection
events). The attractive offers by retailers for some high value items allow them to
do some amount of cherry picking, with local governments shouldering more of the
cost burden. The CEDs collected through one of these options are then passed to
registered recyclers, where they are considered as recycled upon their arrival. Usually,
at recycler facilities, the CEDs are first dismantled or shredded into smaller parts, and
then sorted based on their characteristics. Valuable components and materials such
as circuit boards and metal parts are sold to brokers and smelters, and the remaining
materials are delivered to special recyclers for further recycling or landfilling.
Financial Flow: CED collection from households usually occurs at no charge
with some exceptions. The exceptions include the cases where collectors charge a
per item fee for products that exceed a certain size or need a home pick-up service,
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and manufacturers/retailers offer gift cards or discounts toward new purchases for
the return of certain CEDs. Collectors, retailers, and manufacturers sell the collected
CEDs to recyclers, and recyclers charge manufacturers per recycled pound based on
the contractual agreement they have. From CED processing, depending on product
type and vintage, recyclers can either obtain a net profit by selling valuable materials
as commodities or incur a net cost due to paying other recyclers or smelters for further
treatment or landfilling. The cost of monitoring and inspecting these operations is
the responsibility of over-sight entities, and is covered by annual registration fees of
manufacturers. As authorized by the act, all stakeholders are responsible for their
own profits and losses except local governments that are funded by environmental
taxes or sponsored by private businesses.
3.3 An Implementation Perspective on the Minnesota Act
In this section, we analyze the Minnesota Act from an implementation perspective
and provide a discussion with respect to its effectiveness in terms of cost efficiency,
incentives for environmentally benign design, collection infrastructure choices,
economic burden imposed on local governments, and the resulting competitive
landscape. We also contrast it with the Washington E-Waste Law implementation,
which adopts a central coordination approach, to assess the relative effectiveness of
what we refer to as the market-based approach used in Minnesota. We then provide a
discussion regarding the design and implementation of effective market-based EPR12.
We start with a brief overview of our benchmark: the Washington Law (see
[65] for a detailed overview). The Washington State implementation defines covered
products as TVs, monitors and computers that have screen size of 4 inch and more
(excluding peripherals). It covers collection and recycling from covered entities
such as households, small businesses, charities/non-profit organizations, schools and
12MPCA 2011a, op. cit., p. 5.
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governmental entities. It requires at least one collection site in every county and
every city with population more than 10,000. The Washington implementation
utilizes a centralized coordinating body called the Washington Materials Management
and Financing Authority, which operates the standard plan, the default plan
any manufacturer can sign up with (Manufacturers are also allowed to develop
independent plans that meet the same criteria as the standard plan, but none have
emerged to date). No manufacturer-to-recycler or recycler-to collector contracts exist
in Washington; it is the WMMFA that contracts with collectors, transporters and
recyclers, determines (in real time) to which recycler to send the e-waste from each
collection site and with which transporter, and pays these service providers based on
the contracted per pound prices. Every quarter, the WMMFA then apportions the
total operational and administrative cost to manufacturers based on a cost allocation
method that is a function of return share and market share [65].
The key differences between the Washington and Minnesota implementations
are with respect to their coverage, manufacturer obligations, convenience standards,
the financing of collection and recycling, and the form of competitive marketplace
they induce. In terms of coverage, the Minnesota implementation focuses on TVs,
monitors and computers (9 inch) from only households, while the Washington
implementation focuses on TVs, monitors and computers (4 inch) from households,
small businesses and organizations. In terms of manufacturer obligations, the
Minnesota implementation imposes producer operational responsibility and requires
manufacturers to collect and recycle 80% of their sales volumes in the previous year.
In contrast, the Washington implementation has producers participate in the state
level standard plan, and re-quires processing of all returns available in the state
for collection and recycling. With respect to convenience standards, the Minnesota
implementation has none; it only provides a rural collection incentive using the 1:1.5
ratio. In Washington, on the other hand, at least one collection point has to be
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set-up in every city and county with population above 10, 000. In terms of financing,
the Minnesota implementation has producers directly contract with chosen recyclers,
while the Washington state body WMMFA contracts with all service providers and
allocates the corresponding realized costs to manufacturers based on a combination
of market and return shares by weight. Finally, in terms of the competition in the
market place, the Minnesota implementation appears to encourage competition, while
the Washington implementation appears to favor local entities more to stimulate local
business.
3.3.1 Key Observations:
The Minnesota Act achieves one of the highest collection rates in the country: The
Minnesota and Washington programs have achieved the highest collection rates
(defined as the weight of products recycled per capita) in the U.S. In the 2012-2013
and 2013-2014 program years, the collection rate was 6.01 lb and 6.52 lb per capita
in Minnesota13. The associated numbers in Washington were 6.48 lb and 6.28 lb per
capita14. For a more informative comparison, we note that the Washington Law covers
desktop computers, laptops, monitors, TVs that are 4 inch or larger from households,
small businesses, government entities, schools and nonprofit/charity organizations,
whereas the Minnesota Act applies to the same product categories that are 9 inch or
larger and only from households [50]. This suggests that were the Minnesota Act to
have broader scope, the state would lead in collection volume. A high collection rate
implies a lower impact on the environment, but for a comprehensive evaluation, we
need to take a closer look at other dimensions such as the mix of products collected
and recycled, incentives for environmentally benign designs, and characteristics of the
resulting collection infrastructure as discussed below.




Minnesota Act defines manufacturer obligations based on the VDDs, but counts the
CEDs, which include a wider range of products, towards meeting the obligations.
That is, while the recycling obligations are in terms of TVs containing CRT, which
potentially form the majority of e-waste in the state and are costly to recycle,
manufacturers have the flexibility to use the recycling of personal computers or
laptops, some of which generate recycling profits, to meet their obligations. Under
this flexibility, manufacturers and recyclers prefer to obtain and process products
with low recycling costs or products carrying high-value materials. Such selective
recycling behavior naturally encourages selectivity in the collection market in the state
as well. In particular, stakeholder interviews we conducted indicate that independent
collectors and recyclers in Minnesota limit their collection of TVs with CRT and/or
monitors brought by households. For example, some retailers accept monitors but
not TVs thus imposing a limit on CRTs collected. Several recyclers are no longer
accepting consumer-generated material in part due to the costs of managing CRTs.
These observations suggest that collectors and recyclers handling products with high
processing costs or low material value may need to be compensated to alleviate
incentives for selectivity in collection and recycling; this is easier to accomplish in
a centrally coordinated system such as the Washington program. Alternatively, the
targets should be set more aggressively, or they could be set based on CED sales.
Design changes of manufacturers tend to be towards lighter products with limited
change in their toxicity and recyclability levels: One of the main goals of EPR
implementations is to encourage manufacturers to design environmentally benign
products, i.e., products with less toxicity and high recyclability. However, the trend
in the electronics industry appears to be designing smaller and lighter products
[76] rather than less toxic or more recyclable products. In light of our stakeholder
interviews, we saw two potential reasons that may explain this. First, both states base
manufacturer obligations on weight, not toxicity or recyclability level. Hence, there
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is no mechanism that directly reflects the benefit of environmentally benign design
improvements; the effect indirectly occurs through processing cost. Second, there
exists no direct linkage between design improvements by manufacturers to their cost
obligation because there is no brand separation in recycling operations in the state.
That is, all covered products are recycled collectively in a mix, and an average per lb.
recycling cost is charged to contracted manufacturers. Nevertheless, the market-based
approach in Minnesota appears a step ahead from this perspective: A manufacturer
with the capability to independently operate its own recycling infra-structure for its
own products only is empowered to do so in this state and can thus find improved
incentives for design.
The Minnesota Act achieves cost efficiency: Our interviews with Minnesota
stakeholders indicate that the cost of handling e-waste (including collection,
transportation, processing) can be as low as 8 cent per pound for some
collector-retailer dyads. This number, should it be representative of the state-wide
average cost, is significantly below the same reported in Washington at 24 cents per
lb.
The collection infrastructure emerging under the Minnesota Act is non-uniform
in the state: As one of the EPR implementations with a convenience standard, the
Washington program requires at least one collection site in every county and in each
population center with more than 10,000 residents. Additionally, the WMMFAs
obligation to contract with all collectors induces it to pay higher collection prices
to collectors in rural areas who do not benefit from scale economies. The convenience
standard and the compensation structure in Washington guarantee some level of
stability in revenue streams of collectors and recyclers, but also raise the average cost
of handling e-waste. On the other hand, the Washington collection infrastructure
reaches 90% of the population (estimate obtained through Census Data 2010), leading
to a uniform collection infrastructure throughout the state.
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The Minnesota Act does not set convenience standards; instead it provides credit
for collection from rural areas in the form of extra recycling pounds for manufacturers
(extra 0.5 pound for each pound collected). Despite these extra pounds, the resulting
collection infrastructure in the state is not even: independent collectors concentrate
their collection efforts in the 11-county area, whereas mainly local governments
provide collection opportunities in the Greater Minnesota area. This presumably
arises from how additional pounds are assigned to the stakeholders in the state. Only
manufacturers are allowed to obtain additional recycling pounds, whereas recyclers
or collectors do not get credit for collection from rural areas. In a competitive
supply environment with an abundance of returns (relative to the target), this
translates to lower profitability for collection from rural areas. The 1:1.5 ratio
applied to manufacturers appears to not be sufficient to achieve uniform collection
by independent retailers. In sum, geographical characteristics (e.g., transportation
infrastructure, dispersion of settlements), market dynamics (e.g., competition level
between the collectors, resulting collection cost), and incentives provided by the act
(e.g., 1:1.5 ratio) determine the number and type of collectors and accordingly the
availability of collection in Minnesota.
Some local governments in Minnesota face a substantially high economic burden
for VDD recycling: One of the fundamental premises associated with the EPR concept
is to decrease the financial and operational burden on local governments and translate
it to manufacturers, as in the Washington implementation case. However, this may
not necessarily be the case for local governments in Minnesota due to selective
collection and recycling taking place in the state. As discussed above, independent
collectors do not have sufficient incentives to offer collection services in the Greater
Minnesota area. Accordingly, local governments in this area provide the largest
portion of collection efforts. In a similar manner, some local governments in the urban
areas, i.e., the 11-county area of Minnesota, receive large volumes of products that
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are difficult to handle or costly to recycle (e.g., TVs with CRTs, monitors), because
independent collectors and recyclers may decline to accept these products. These local
governments will continue to face growing volumes of products at their collection sites,
which in turn brings them additional financial and operational responsibilities.
The Minnesota Act provides incentives for recycling technology investments and
creates some stimulation in the local economy: Our stakeholder interviews in
Minnesota indicate that the effect of recycling competition on recycling technology
investments is highly favorable. Recyclers, given the high business volume in the
state, have the incentive to adopt more efficient technologies to gain advantage against
competitors and possible entrants to the market. On the economic development
side, the act initially motivated entry into collection and recycling but then further
growth in this market is expected to be limited, given the existing concentration level
and low cost margins, unless significant scope expansion occurs. If more emphasis
on stimulating the local economy is desired, incentives for manufacturers to contract
locally could be created, paralleling the stipulation in Washington that the WMMFA
give preference to processors operating in the state.
Flexibility provisions in the Minnesotan implementation create a non-level playing
field across different stakeholders: Manufacturers can accrue recycling credits and
benefit from the 1:1.5 ratio, but recyclers and collectors cannot. The first implies
pressures to sell overstock pounds to manufacturers more cheaply and the second
implies a lower effective margin for a portion of the collection volume, eroding the
bargaining power of collectors and recyclers vis-a-vis manufacturers and creating cash
flow challenges for these entities. These could - in the long run - prove detrimental
to investments in more efficient technologies.
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3.3.2 Towards Effective Market-Based EPR Implementation
In summary, the Minnesota Act implementation achieves a high collection rate and
provides high cost efficiency. This nevertheless appears to happen at the expense
of selective collection and recycling, an uneven competitive landscape, increased
responsibility for local governments, and limited design incentives for manufacturers.
These could be overcome in the following manner:
Developing end-use markets for the recycling industry: Material costs in
commodity markets shape recycler operations and accordingly their product
preferences. Hence, developing more robust markets for materials contained in the
targeted electronic products (e.g., CRT, leaded glass, etc.,) would be valuable in
providing sufficient incentives for recyclers to reduce selective recycling, i.e., recycling
primarily products with low recycling cost or those containing high-value materials.
Maintaining a better balance among the flexibilities provided to the stakeholders:
Following the tenets of the market-based approach, the Minnesota Act provides
flexibilities to manufacturers in terms of the ability to directly contract with recyclers
to fulfill their obligations, the scope of products that can be recycled, incentives to
recycle products collected from rural areas, and the timing of their recycling (via
recycling credits). In contrast, collectors and recyclers experience fewer flexibility
benefits and are in some instances disadvantaged by benefits offered to manufacturers.
Moreover, collection and recycling are low-margin businesses with strong price
competition. These factors decrease their contractual power vis-a-vis manufacturers
and create an uncertain business environment for them. Consequently, it may be
difficult for recyclers to invest in costly, but efficiency-enhancing technologies, limiting
the long-term cost-effectiveness of operations. Therefore, it would be valuable to set
up some mechanisms that increase operational flexibilities of collectors and recyclers.
These flexibilities may take the form of subsidies in return for their contributions
to the accumulation of recycling credits or differentiated compensation as discussed
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below.
Strengthening the compensation mechanism for collection from rural areas and
the recycling of certain products: The experience with the Minnesota Act indicates
that to encourage collection from areas with disperse settlements and more costly
access, higher compensation is necessary. This compensation can be in the form of
higher additional recycling pounds, i.e., a higher ratio than 1:1.5, or a requirement
to meet a certain percentage of recycling obligations from rural areas. Furthermore,
the Minnesota experience suggests that mechanisms such as extra credit for recycling
high-cost products or the facilitation of commodity markets (as discussed above) are
critical to achieve uniform recycling of all product types covered by the act. These
implementation tools would help create higher coverage by independent collectors
across the state, reduce the burden on local governments and further stimulate the
local economy.
Decreasing the differentiation between targeted and covered products;
Distinguishing targeted and covered products is a key flexibility provision to
manufacturers under the Minnesota act. This means there is ample return product
volume to choose from in meeting recycling obligations. However, this differentiation
also appears to be one of the leading reasons for selective collection and recycling.
Therefore, decreasing this differentiation through introducing certain targets for the
recycling of targeted products, or expanding the scope of targeted products may
help improve the environmental benefits gained through the act.
Developing mechanisms to reflect design improvements of manufacturers in their
obligations: Experience with the Washington and Minnesota programs highlights
the as-yet-unrealized potential of implementation rules that reward manufacturers
design improvements in toxicity and recyclability. Possible approaches include
individualizing manufacturer obligations based on the recycling cost or value
differential of their products and subsidizing better design choices. All of these
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naturally add to the complexity of EPR implementations. Furthermore, EPR
implementations also need to expand their focus beyond recycling obligations by
considering other important elements of proper waste management and design
incentives such as design for reuse and refurbishing.
3.4 Conclusion
In this essay, we explore the on-the-ground benefits of the market-based approach by
focusing on the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act, which we consider a prevailing
example of the market-based approach. To this end, we analyze the act, including its
implementation rules, its environmental and economic outcomes, and the associated
stakeholder perspectives. Our key observation is that the Minnesota act, which boasts
of a market-based foundation, achieves a high collection rate and appears to exhibit
higher cost efficiency relative to more centrally operated systems. Another benefit of
the market-based approach is that it can provide the basis for achieving Individual
Producer Responsibility (IPR). IPR refers to the principle that each producer should
only be responsible for the processing cost of its own products [96, 100, 84]. Several
stakeholders (including some manufacturers) have advocated for IPR by arguing
that it promotes environmental benign design by allowing the manufacturers to
recoup the benefit from their design investments. In putting the IPR concept into
operation, the market-based approach holds some potential. This is because the
market-based approach allows for independent manufacturer decisions and contracts
(e.g., determining their collection strategies, contracting directly with collectors
and/or recyclers) and puts no operational constraints that could increase the cost of
achieving IPR. In particular, although the Minnesota act does not focus on individual
responsibility, the broad operational flexibilities of the act give manufactures the
opportunity to collect only their own products and to reap the greatest benefit from
their design improvements.
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However, the operational freedoms of this approach may result in unintended
outcomes that detract from the environmental and local economic benefits. For
example, (i) a non-uniform collection infrastructure may emerge and selective
collection may occur; (ii) selective recycling may take place, i.e., mainly products
with low recycling cost may be collected and recycled; (iii) local governments may be
effectively the ones who undertake collection for products with high collection and
recycling costs, increasing their operational and economic burden; (iv) low margins
in the highly competitive recycling industry may preclude recycling technology
investments that improve on environmental outcomes; and (v) incentives for designing
smaller and lighter products may be more dominant than those for designing less toxic
and more recyclable products. Moreover, despite the opportunity for manufacturers to
develop a set of contracts that simulate IPR, this has not happened yet in Minnesota
to the best of our knowledge.
Our findings suggest that these outcomes are driven by the complexity associated
with translating the market-based approach into operational specifications that
balance economic and environmental considerations. These complexities are mainly
related to strategic interactions between stakeholders and evolving market dynamics
at the execution stage. Our analysis highlights the value of understanding the
economics driving the decisions of each stakeholder and looking ahead to possible
stakeholder interactions and market dynamics in the design phase of EPR legislation
so as to attain the intended goals. In particular, our observations can help provide
policy recommendations along several dimensions: (i) to diminish incentives for
selective collection and recycling; (ii) to allocate costs in a way that rewards design
improvements that reduce the products environmental burden; and (iii) to create a
level competitive field for all stakeholders.
In sum, our analysis indicates the important role of program choices in determining
the effectiveness of EPR implementations. In particular, if the translation of the
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high-level policy approach into (operational) program choices fails to consider possible
interactions at the implementation (execution) stage, even the ideal policy approach
can result in unintended economic and environmental outcomes. What this means in
the context of a market-based approach to EPR is that operational choices need to
be carefully made to most effectively exploit the free-market premise underpinning
this approach.
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and Materials Processing Corporation. The opinions expressed in this article and any
associated mistakes are the authors’ own.
68
CHAPTER IV
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS
4.1 Introduction
Nearly half of the prescription medicines dispensed in the U.S. go unused every year
[138], corresponding to more than ten billion dollars of medicine wasted [61]. In
addition to the economic loss, unused pharmaceuticals accumulate at households and
create serious public health and safety concerns by increasing the risk of unintentional
poisonings, medicine diversion and abuse [137, 64]. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) has classified the abuse of prescription medicines as an
epidemic, because medicine-induced deaths have been the second leading cause of
unintentional deaths in the U.S. for the last decade [31]. Furthermore, unused
pharmaceuticals that are thrown away end up in nature with potential adverse
effects. Pharmaceutical residuals are found in surface, ground, and even in drinking
water and pose a considerable ecological risk [92]. Consequently, preventing the
accumulation of pharmaceuticals at households and in nature has become a serious
public safety and environmental concern. In response to this concern, some voluntary
pharmaceutical collection programs have emerged in the U.S., primarily run by
local and other government entities, while calls to adopt a concept called Extended
Producer Responsibility (EPR) for pharmaceuticals have been increasing [37].
In 2005, the E.U. passed a mandate that requires pharmaceutical producers to
contribute to the collection system for unused pharmaceuticals [133]. In the U.S.,
Alameda County, CA enacted the first EPR-based legislation for pharmaceuticals in
2012, which mandates producers to submit compliance plans [5], followed by King
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County, WA in 2013 [87]. At the national level, the Pharmaceutical Stewardship
Act of 2011 was the first related bill introduced in Congress, which aimed to
require producers to establish a national collection and disposal program for unused
pharmaceuticals [78].
As its adoption in the E.U. and U.S. suggests, EPR appears to be the emerging
policy concept for managing unused pharmaceuticals. However, very little is known
regarding the effectiveness of different forms of EPR implementations in the context
of pharmaceuticals. This is because pharmaceuticals have very different product
and demand characteristics as compared to other product categories for which EPR
has been prevalent for decades. In particular: (i) pharmaceuticals are consumable
and perishable, (ii) the demand for pharmaceuticals and the associated consumption
patterns are not completely consumer-driven (i.e., patient-driven) as doctors’
prescribing behavior is a major determinant of the demand for pharmaceuticals,
and (iii) incineration (rather than value recovery) appears to be the primary
post-consumption disposal option for unused pharmaceuticals.
Given these significantly different characteristics, a natural question is whether
and how EPR can be effectively operationalized for pharmaceuticals. Because EPR
aims to minimize the environmental externalities associated with post-consumption
waste, an ideal place to look for appropriate EPR implementation policies is the
Waste Management Hierachy (WMH) of the EPA [142]. The WMH lists (i) reducing
consumption and production, (ii) reusing products, (iii) recycling materials, and
(iv) recovery and environmentally friendly disposal of post consumption products
as possible waste management options, in order of preference from an environmental
perspective. Due to the perishable and consumable nature of pharmaceuticals, their
potential for reuse and recycling is very limited, if any. Accordingly, an EPR
implementation for pharmaceuticals needs to focus on the “reduce” and “recovery
for environmentally friendly disposal” options. EPR implementation models in
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practice use two types of policies to operationalize these options, respectively: Source
Reduction and End-of-Pipe Control (see Atasu et al. 2009 for a similar discussion).
With the source reduction (SR) policy, a social planner typically imposes a cost on
a producer so that the producer internalizes the environmental externalities associated
with production and consumption. This cost is often in the form of a unit fee
associated with sales, which is then used to cover the costs of the collection and
treatment of post-consumer products. For instance, the pharmaceutical producers
in British Columbia fund the collection system by paying a cost per sale of their
products [69]. In Portugal, producers are subject to a collection-system levy that
determines a fee for each producer based on the number of his products in the market
[68]. The End-of-Pipe Control (EC) policy, on the other hand, typically imposes
a post-consumer product collection requirement on producers (e.g., the collection
targets imposed by the WEEE Directive and the Minnesota electronics take-back
legislation [103]). In the context of pharmaceuticals, this corresponds to the collection
of unused pharmaceuticals by producer-operated systems as is the case with many
implementations to date, including the models in Hungary and Belgium in Europe
[68], Alameda County, CA and King County, WA in the U.S. As such, the critical
difference between these policies for pharmaceuticals is the stage of direct financial
impact: SR aims to impose a cost for the dispensed medicine quantity, whereas EC
aims to impose a cost for the unused medicine quantity.
An important observation is that comparison between the effectiveness of these
two EPR-based policies is straightforward for non-consumable products such as
electronics: The SR policy appears more favorable. This is because the volume
of post-consumer waste is theoretically equal to the volume of production for
non-consumables (e.g., all used durables will eventually become obsolete). Hence, any
collection cost induced by a collection target imposed under EC can be equivalently
presented as a unit fee on the producers under SR [11]. This critical observation,
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however, does not apply to pharmaceuticals because of their consumable nature
and the doctor-patient interface. The same comparison for pharmaceuticals needs
to take into account the stakeholder interactions leading to a gap between volume
of dispensed and used pharmaceuticals. In this essay, we particularly focus on (i)
producers’ promotions to doctors, (ii) producers’ pricing choice, and (iii) doctors’
over-prescribing behavior, and (iv) patients’ usage choice. Capturing these factors,
our objective is to analyze how the SR and EC policies compare for an EPR
implementation for pharmaceuticals.
To address this question, we develop a game-theoretic model that involves a social
planner, a producer, a doctor, and a heterogeneous patient population. In our model,
the sequential decisions are as follows: The social planner sets the EPR-based policy
(i.e., EC vs. SR); the pharmaceutical producer makes pricing and promotional
decisions; the doctor determines the prescription quantity; and the patient decides on
the consumption level. To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first synthesized
model to analyze the interactions in the pharmaceutical supply chain with respect to
pharmaceutical overage and its management with EPR-based policies. Our analysis
shows that effective EPR-based policies for pharmaceuticals presents a departure
from the conventional wisdom obtained from non-consumables. In particular, EC
becomes more effective when for pharmaceuticals when compared to SR, particularly
if the medicines of concern (i) pose high environmental risks and social concerns
(e.g., addiction and abuse issues); (ii) require high collection costs (e.g. stringent
collection requirements or standards); and (iii) have moderate healthcare impact.
These results draw from consumable nature and mediated demand of pharmaceuticals
and suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all EPR-based policy for pharmaceuticals.
Hence, characteristics and dynamics unique to pharmaceuticals should be carefully
evaluated before EPR-based policy implementation. Finally, we extend our base
model to include a certain insurance coverage, different consumer usage behavior
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and alternative effects of promotions on the doctor’s prescription. We find that our
structural results and associated insights remain valid in all of these extensions.
EPR-based policy naturally affects the key operational decisions of the
pharmaceutical stakeholders, whose interactions then determine the effectiveness of
the policy. Given different interests and goals, the stakeholders preferences toward
the effective policy may differ significantly, possibly resulting in tensions among
stakeholders and implementation challenges. To understand these challenges, we
compare the EC and SR policies with respect to their impact on the producer,
environment and public health. We find that there are several interrelated factors
including the collection cost and healthcare impact of the medicine that influence the
stakeholders’ perspectives in different ways. This suggests that the pharmaceutical
stakeholders need to identify the effect of different EPR-based policies on their
businesses in a careful manner and engage with other stakeholders to shape their
lobbying efforts. Moreover, our analysis indicates that the aligning the policy
preferences of different pharmaceutical stakeholders may be challenging due to the
complexity of interactions.
We start our discussion by providing an overview of related literature streams and
our contributions in §4.2. We then describe our base model in §4.3 and analyze its
solution in the pharmaceutical supply chain along with stakeholder perspectives in
§4.4. We conclude with a summary of our results and their policy implications in
§4.6.
4.2 Related Literature
The environmental economics literature has long analyzed EPR-based policies, mainly
producer take-back programs. The existing work in this literature uses stylized
models to determine the optimal policy structure. Walls (2003) presents a broad
overview of adopted models and associated results. Recent operations management
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literature has also analyzed EPR-based policies, with a particular focus on operational
decisions subject to these policies such as collection network design [148], new product
introductions [116], product design [123, 135, 14], as well as their implications for
stakeholder preferences [141, 11]. These streams of literature mainly investigate the
policies for non-consumable products (e.g., electronics). The novelty of our work lies
in being the first to make a similar policy analysis for pharmaceuticals by explicitly
modeling their unique product characteristics (such as health benefit, consumable
nature) and demand complexities (such as mediated structure due to the intermediary
role of doctors). We show that the basic intuitions regarding the effectiveness of
EPR-based policies for non-consumables may not necessarily apply to in the context of
pharmaceuticals. Accordingly, we contribute to the existing literature by introducing
new perspectives on EPR-based policies.
Our work closely relates to the health economics literature, which uses highly
stylized game-theoretic models with utility maximization assumption to reflect the
doctor-patient interaction. In these models, key factors are the nature of the illness,
price of the treatment and diagnostic skills of the doctor. The well-established
assumption is that doctors recommend a treatment by balancing the gains and losses
from the treatment and patients consent by combining the information provided by
the doctor and their own values [47, 117]. We extend this stream of research by
including (i) the “ideal” doctor and patient roles from the medical sociology literature
such as the paternalistic treatment behavior of the doctor and passive involvement
of the patient [48]; and (ii) the “actual” roles, on which the pharmaceutical
promotions have a significant effect, such as increased prescription by the doctor [21]
and non-adherence of the patient due to his health-related preferences [121, 134].
In the inclusion of these roles, we focus on the pharmaceutical overage due to
over-prescription and usage of the patients. Accordingly, our contribution to the
health economics literature is to incorporate factors relevant to the provision and
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usage of pharmaceuticals into the analysis of doctor-patient interaction and analyze
their effect on the effectiveness of EPR-based policies.
4.3 Model Description
We build a game-theoretic model involving a social planner, a producer, a doctor,
and patients from a heterogeneous patient base. In our model, the social planner
determines the EPR-based policy (EC vs. SR); the pharmaceutical producer sets
the medicine price and level of promotional efforts targeting the doctor and patient
base; the doctor decides on a prescription quantity, and the patient determines the
consumption level, which may or may not lead to a volume of unused medicine. In
what follows, we develop the model by explaining the rationale behind stakeholder
decisions. For better exposition, we use bold characters when we first introduce the
notation and regular ones afterwards.
4.3.1 Doctor-Patient Interaction
The doctor-patient interaction brings a unique demand structure for pharmaceuticals,
mainly due to the intermediary role of the doctor. In essence, the doctor’s prescribing
behavior can be primarily affected by the pricing and promotional decisions of the
producer and the potential benefits for health of the patient, and may differ from the
patient’s preferences [98]. As such, we first model the interaction between the doctor
and the patient.
Patient Types and Behavior: We focus on patients from a heterogeneous patient
base that suffer from a particular type of illness (e.g. hypercholesterolemia,
depression, allergies) that require a particular type of medicine (e.g. statins,
antidepressants, antihistamines). We describe the heterogeneity in the patient base
by a two dimensional patient type: the prescription medicine quantity that a patient
(i) needs to recover from the illness (as diagnosed by doctor) and (ii) prefers to use
(private information).
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We denote the medicine quantity that the patient needs to recover by θn,
which reflects the severity of the patient’s illness. For instance, when the
illness is hypercholesterolemia, depending on his or her cholesterol level, a patient
needs different doses of statins [36]. Similarly, a patient needs different dosages
of antidepressants in a depression treatment based on the depression intensity
assessment [20]. To capture this heterogeneity in a simple way, we assume that
the illness severity θn in the patient base is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], where 0
corresponds to having no illness and 1 is the maximum possible need level. We also
assume that the doctor knows the exact value of θn; however, other stakeholders, i.e.,
the patient, producer and social planner, know only its distribution in the patient
base. This allows the doctor to provide prescription quantity qp that may exceed θn,
which we call over-prescription.
The patient with severity level θn sees the doctor to get a prescription medicine
treatment. Following the literature describing typical patient behavior [22, 48], we
assume that the patient accepts qp at the time of their encounter. However, the
patient may prefer to use a different quantity than qp.
We represent the medicine quantity that the patient prefers to use by θu. We
assume that the patient realizes the value of θu after his encounter with the doctor
under the effect of a number of influential factors. For example, side effects, difficulty
with sticking to the dosing schedules, and lack of outward symptoms affect the
statin usage of patients significantly [131, 140]. Associated factors for antidepressants
are bothersome side effects, lack of immediate recovery, complicated regimens, and
opinion of the society [118]. Although there is a rich body of studies on the effect of
these factors on usage, it is still not possible to capture all the underlying dynamics
[32, 111, 114]. Due to the difficulty in capturing this complex usage behavior, we do
not make any assumptions on how θu may depend on qp and θn. Instead, we assume
it is uniformly distributed on [0,1] in the patient base, and only this distribution
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information is known by the doctor, producer, and policy maker.
Consequently, the patient uses θu amount of medicine if the prescription is at
least as much as θu, and qp otherwise, such that used medicine quantity qu becomes
min(θu, qp), leading to an unused medicine quantity equal to (qp − qu)+.
Doctor’s Prescribing Behavior: The medical sociology literature typically
assumes that doctors exhibit paternalistic behavior, in which a doctor provides the
best medical treatment to a patient [48, 112]. However, the empirical medical
literature indicates that promotional efforts of pharmaceutical producers affect
doctors’ behavior in practice [117], hence doctors also consider their financial and
personal interests while treating patients [80, 67, 97, 136]. We combine these aspects
into a self-serving paternalistic prescribing behavior by the doctor and adopt the
utility maximization approach from the health economics literature to model it. As
such, we assume that the doctor chooses a prescription quantity that maximizes
his utility Ud, where Ud includes both patient wellbeing and his personal benefit
[42, 26, 113]. We describe how we account for the paternalistic and self-serving
aspects in more detail below.
Paternalistic Behavior: The paternalistic portion of the doctor’s utility includes
two patient-relevant factors: the prescription treatment benefit and cost to the
patient, upθn − p qp. In our model, the treatment benefit corresponds to the
health improvement provided to the patient. We assume that the doctor provides
prescription medicine at least equal to the patient’s need θn and less than 1, which
is the maximum possible need level, i.e., θn ≤ qp ≤ 1. We further assume that the
patient gets unit health benefit up from using the prescribed medicine up to his need
level θn (and none from exceeding that level). In this context, up represents the
decreased health risks as a result of taking the prescription medicine. For example,
the value of up is associated with decreased risk for asthma, insomnia, fatigue,
and decreased productivity for allergy treatment [23], whereas it is associated with
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decreased risk for heart diseases and death for hypercholesterolemia treatments [36].
The doctor calculates the treatment benefit of meeting the patient’s need, i.e., the
health improvement provided to the patient from his perspective, as upθn. The patient
incurs the cost of the medicine treatment and this becomes the second patient-relevant
factor for the doctor. In the base model, we assume that the patient does not have
any insurance coverage for the medicine treatment1, hence the patient pays the whole
unit price p of the medicine, making the treatment cost for the patient equal to p qp.
Self-Serving Behavior: As part of his self-serving behavior, the doctor takes into
account his personal gains from the pharmaceutical promotions and his reputation
in the following way. Doctors are subject to different types of promotions by
pharmaceutical producers such as personal detailing, free samples, travel subsidies,
and sponsored symposia. Such promotions are known to influence doctor prescribing
practices and increase prescription rates [94, 126, 145, 24]. We incorporate these
effects into our model by assuming that the doctor derives positive utility from the
promotional effort level targeting the doctor, denoted by ηd. We further assume his
utility increases as the prescription quantity qp increases since a higher qp implies
continuation of the promotional benefits offered by the producer. Without loss of
generality, in our model, ηd determines the unit promotional benefit that the doctor
obtains from prescribing the medicine, hence the total direct promotional benefit for
the doctor is ηd qp. In addition to this benefit, the doctor also considers his reputation
as part of his utility. When the doctor provides a prescription quantity beyond the
need of the patient (qp > θn), i.e., when he over-prescribes, he may develop a bad
reputation. Accordingly, we denote the unit over-prescription disutility to the doctor
by od and calculate the absolute bad reputation effect on his utility as od(qp − θn)+.
Promotions targeting the patient base (known as direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising) also affects the doctor’s personal benefits. According to the DTC
1We discuss the insurance extension of the base model and related implications in Conclusion.
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advertising model of Kravitz (2005), these promotions affect prescribing behavior
of doctors through changing the perception of patients. In particular, as a patient
is exposed to more promotions, he increases his medical care requests, which in turn
leads to an increase in prescription levels. Parallel to this, statins, antidepressants and
antihistamines, three medicine categories with high prescription rates, are also among
the most promoted medicines to patients in the U.S [91, 35]. We include this effect in
our model by assuming that an increase in the DTC advertising attenuates the bad
reputation associated with a doctor’s over-prescription. We represent promotional
effort level targeting the patient (DTC advertising) by ηp. To capture its fundamental
effect on the doctor reputation without losing tractability, we set the doctor’s net bad
reputation from over-prescribing to be od(1 − ηp)(qp − θn)+, where 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. For
consistency, we assume 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1. These constraints on the promotional efforts are
also in line with the legislative limitations and budget constraints for the producers.
In sum, given the pricing and promotional decisions of the producer, i.e., given
p, ηd, and ηp, the doctor determines his utility maximizing prescription medicine
quantity q∗p[p, ηd, ηp] by solving the following problem:
max
qp
Ud(qp) = up θn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Health Benefit
− p qp︸︷︷︸




− od (1− ηp)(qp − θn)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reputational Cost︸ ︷︷ ︸
Personal Utility
such that θn ≤ qp ≤ 1.
Anticipating how the doctor-patient interaction occurs, the pharmaceutical
producer maximizes expected profit Πm while maintaining a non-negative utility level
for the doctor, i.e., Ud ≥ 0. He sets the unit price of the medicine p and the level
of promotional efforts targeting the doctor and patient, ηd and ηp, respectively. We




and β are promotional cost constants [128]2, in addition to expected EPR compliance
cost CP [p, ηd, ηp] (defined in the next subsection), whose structure depends on the
policy choice of the social planner. As such, given the policy and its parameters, the
producer makes pricing and promotional decisions, i.e., determines p[xP ], ηd[xP ] and
ηp[xP ], by solving the following expected profit maximization problem:
max
p,ηd,ηp
Πm(p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p q
∗
p[p, ηd, ηp]− α η2d − β η2p]− CP [p, ηd, ηp]
such that 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1.
The usage behavior of the patient results in the following used and unused
medicine volumes: q∗u[p, ηd, ηp] = min(θu, q
∗
p[p, ηd, ηp]) and (q
∗
p[p, ηd, ηp]−q∗u[p, ηd, ηp])+.
4.3.2 Policy Choice of the Social Planner
The social planner makes the choice of EPR-based policy to manage the collection
of unused prescription medicine. If the choice is End-of-pipe Control (EC), then the
planner mandates the producer to comply with a collection rate requirement rEC .
In this case, the producer collects rEC fraction of the unused medicine by incurring
collection cost k per unit. If the choice is Source Reduction (SR), then the planner
mandates the producer to pay a unit fee t for every unit he produces and uses the funds
generated through fees to collect rSR fraction of unused medicine. In this case, the
planner may have surplus or deficit Πsp, arising from a potential mismatch between
the costs of collecting pharmaceuticals and producer fees, which equals Πsp[rSR, t]
.
=
t qp − k rSR(qp − qu)+. Accordingly, given the pricing and promotional decisions of
the producer, his expected EPR compliance cost is:
2In our model, we do not consider the effect of R&D investments and any patent protection and
we assume that unit production cost for the producer as 0 in our model without loss of generality.
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p[p, ηd, ηp]− q∗u[p, ηd, ηp])+] : P = EC
Eθn [t q
∗
p[p, ηd, ηp]] : P = SR
Note that under SR, the producer pays the unit fee t for all the dispensed
quantity, whereas under EC he pays the unit collection cost k for only the uncollected
unused medicine quantity. As the unused quantity is always less than the prescribed
(dispensed) quantity (as a result of the consumable nature of pharmaceuticals), the
producer pays the EPR-related cost for only a fraction of the dispensed quantity
under EC, whereas, he pays fee even for medicine that do not go unused under SR.
This represents an important difference between the policies and will be critical in
comparing their effectiveness.
Anticipating the interactions between the producer, doctor and patient based on
the distributions of θn and θu, the social planner maximizes the total expected welfare,
W . She calculates W through an additive formulation that includes (i) the doctor
utility Ud (which also includes the patient utility implicitly), (ii) the producer profit
Πm, (iii) any social planner surplus Πsp, (iv) environmental disutility DUe (explained
below), (v) social disutility DUs (explained below).
Environmental disutility: Medicine residuals present in the environment pose high
risks with respect to ecological balance. For example, antihistamine residuals in
streams harm aquatic communities that have vital roles for the ecosystem [125].
Similarly, organisms exposed to antidepressant residuals in the environment exhibit
behavioral changes such as reduced reaction times and reproduction rates, which in
turn can result in unbalanced changes in the population of many species [124, 34].
To reflect these risks in our model, we define a unit environmental disutility measure
εe, which represents the economic impact of the associated environmental harm (See
[11] for detailed discussion). The total environmental disutility stems from the total
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prescription medicine quantity that eventually ends up in the environment. This
quantity is equal to the sum of the prescription medicine used and metabolized
by the patient, qu, and uncollected (disposed improperly such as flushing down the
drain) unused prescription medicine quantity, (1− rP ) (qp− qu)+ where P ∈ EC/SR.
There is no known difference between metabolized or disposed medicine in terms of
their environmental impact, hence we assume that they exhibit same environmental
disutility. As such, the environmental disutility DUe[rP ]
.
= εe (qu+(1−rP ) (qp−qu)+).
Social disutility: Potential misuse, abuse and illegal diversion of unused medicine
together with related unintentional poisonings pose significant public health and
safety risks. For instance, antidepressants are one of the most abused prescription
medicines [31], and their abuse may result in heart diseases and death [129].
Additionally, certain type of antihistamines are commonly abused for their
hallucination and sensation effects [66] with risks including kidney failure and
pancreatitis [33]. We represent the economic impact of these risks by a unit social
disutility εs and calculate the social disutility related to the uncollected unused
prescription medicines as DUs[rP ]
.
= εs (1− rP ) (qp − qu)+.
In sum, the social planner maximizes total expected welfare W under
each policy by setting the associated policy parameter set xP as below.
She then compares the total welfare of policies, EC vs SR, and chooses




























































p[xP ]] + Π
∗
sp[xP ]
−DU∗e [rP ]−DU∗s [rP ]]




rEC : if P = EC
rSR, t : if P = SR
Let P ∗ and x∗P denote the policy and its parameters at the Stakelberg equilibrium.








illustrates these sequential decisions in the pharmaceutical chain.
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4.4 Analysis of Decisions in the Pharmaceutical Chain
Our analysis focuses on the management of pharmaceutical overage and related
externalities associated with the over-prescription of the doctor and the usage of
the patient. In our model, patient usage behavior is invariant with respect to
the choice of EC or SR. Therefore, the policy choice depends on how it affects
over-prescription and its externalities via its impact on producer and social planner
decisions. Accordingly, we first explore key drivers of the doctor’s over-prescription
and analyze how these drivers relate to characteristics specific to pharmaceuticals
(such as their consumable nature, their health benefit and intermediary role of the
doctor). Next, we investigate differences between the policies in relation to these
drivers and analyze how these differences shape the preferred policy from the welfare
perspective. For brevity, we relegate all the proofs and closed-form expressions to the
Appendix B.
4.4.1 Key Drivers of Over-Prescription
As a first step, we analyze the doctor’s prescription behavior given the decisions of
the producer and the social planner. Recall that the doctor provides prescription
medicine at least equal to the need of the patient and the producer guarantees the
non-negativity of the doctor utility. Hence, the promotional and patient-relevant
benefits need to exceed the cost of the treatment, imposing the condition p ≤ ηd+up.
Paralleling the practice, this condition captures the following: the health benefit of
the medicine restricts the unit price that the producer can charge and the producer
needs to increase his promotional efforts in order to set higher price. More specifically,
the market price of the medicine reflects the health benefits of the medicine and the
extent of its promotions. Given this condition, we find under what conditions the
doctor’s decision is to over-prescribe, i.e., to provide prescription medicine beyond
the patient’s need.
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Lemma 5 The doctor provides prescription medicine equal to the patient’s need if
ηd < od(1− ηp) + p and beyond the patient’s need if ηd ≥ od(1− ηp) + p.
Lemma 5 demonstrates that the doctor decides on the prescription quantity based
on its marginal benefit and cost. In particular, the doctor’s marginal utility is
U
′
d(qp) = ηd − (p + od(1 − ηp)). This consists of marginal promotional benefit ηd
and marginal cost p + od(1 − ηp), the sum of the unit price of the medicine and the
unit bad reputation to the doctor due to over-prescription (moderated by the effect
of promotions targeting the patient). When the marginal cost exceeds the marginal
benefit, the doctor prescribes medicine equal to the need of the patient; otherwise, he
over-prescribes. This suggests that the doctor over-prescribes when pharmaceutical
promotions are high and the price of the medicine is affordable.
Anticipating doctor’s behavior as above, given the EPR-based policy and the
obligations it imposes (collection rate rEC under EC and fee t under SR), the
producer makes his pricing and promotional decisions. We next analyze these
decisions by focusing on factors that drive the producer to set high pharmaceutical
promotions and a low price for the medicine, i.e., factors that induce over-prescription
by the doctor in equilibrium. For ease of discussion, we suppress the arguments in
the thresholds presented in the results below.
Proposition 11 There exists a medicine health benefit threshold ūECp (od, α, β, c)
.
=
ūECp under EC (ū
SR
p (od, α, β, c)
.
= ūSRp under SR) such that when up < ū
EC
p (up <
ūSRp ) for any r






≤ 0 and ūECp < ūSRp .
Proposition 11 illustrates how the medicine health benefit affects the producer’s
profit and inducement of over-prescription. In particular, when the health benefit
is below a threshold value for the given policy, i.e.,up < ū
EC/SR
p under EC/SR,
the producer’s profit is always higher with inducing over-prescription. The intuition
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behind this result is as follows: The pharmaceutical producer has two fundamental
levers to increase his revenue level; increase the unit price or increase the dispensed
(prescription) quantity. Recall that the health benefit of the medicine restricts
the unit price that the producer can charge for the medicine. Hence, when
the health impact is low, the producer cannot set high prices. In those cases,
to achieve a higher revenue, the producer is particularly motivated to increase
his promotional efforts to increase the prescription quantity dispensed, i.e., to
induce over-prescription. Furthermore, the health benefit threshold increases as the
over-prescription bad reputation to the doctor od decreases. This is because when
the effect of over-prescription on the reputation of the doctor gets low, the producer
has more flexibility to set higher prices. This decreases the effective cost of inducing
over-prescription and it becomes more feasible for the producer.
The results above highlight the effect of the mediated demand structure on the
effectiveness of the EPR-based policies in limiting over-prescription. In essence,
the doctor, as the intermediary between the producer and the patient, considers
the trade-off between patient-relevant and promotional benefits together with his
reputation. This, in turn, makes the unique feature of reputational consideration of
the doctor and health benefit aspect as key factors for the decisions of the producer.
Proposition 11 further illustrates that the medicine health benefit threshold under
SR is always higher than the threshold under EC, implying that the producer has
higher incentives to induce over-prescription under SR. This result follows the fact
that EC and SR policies impose producer responsibility obligations on different
volumes of medicine due to the consumable nature of pharmaceuticals. In particular,
SR charges the unit fee t for the total quantity dispensed (qp) whereas EC mandates
the collection rate rEC for the unused quantity ((qp − qu)+). Given this difference,
the producer increases his obligations and related cost at larger extent by inducing
over-prescription under EC policy as compared to SR. In other words, avoiding to
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over-prescription creates more dramatic decrease in the obligation of the producer
under EC, decreasing incentives for him to induce over-prescription. Consequently,
EC policy becomes more effective in eliminating over-prescription for the medicine
with high health utility level. This is an important difference between the EPR-based
policies in terms of their effectiveness in the management of pharmaceutical overage.
Proposition 12 Under the EC policy, there exists a unit collection cost threshold
k̄(up, od, α, β, c)
.
= k̄ such that when k < k̄ for any rEC ∈ [0, 1] the producer gains a
higher profit by inducing over-prescription.
The SR and EC policies have inherent differences in the context of managing
the collection of pharmaceutical overage. Under SR, the social planner operates the
collection system and incurs the associated collection costs; on the other hand, under
EC, the producer undertakes collection and incurs the unit collection cost k. Hence,
the collection cost becomes a direct driver of the producer decisions only under EC.
In particular, as Proposition 12 states, the producer subject to EC always induces
over-prescription when the unit collection cost is below a threshold value, i.e., k < k̄.
In those cases, the gains from dispensing a larger quantity of medicine dominate the
collection-related costs for the producer. As a result, the producer obtains a higher
profit with inducing over-prescription and has no incentive to limit the quantity
of pharmaceutical overage. This suggests that when the collection standards of
pharmaceutical collection programs are not stringent, the EC policy cannot create
sufficient incentives for the producer to avoid over-prescription.
We now analyze the inducement of over-prescription from the perspective of the
social planner under each EPR-based policy. In this part, to compare different
prescription outcomes, we only consider the cases where the policies can avoid
pharmaceutical overage due to over-prescription (i.e. k ≥ k̄ and up ≥ ūECp under
EC; up ≥ ūSRp under SR).
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Proposition 13 There exists an environmental externality threshold
ε̄ECe (εs, up, od, k, α, β, c)
.
= ε̄ECe under EC (ε̄
SR
e (εs, up, od, k, α, β, c)
.
= ε̄SRe under SR)
such that when εe < ε̄
EC
e (εe < ε̄
SR






Proposition 13 states that when the environmental impact of the medicine is below
a certain threshold, it may be too costly to eliminate over-prescription via EPR
tools. This means that the losses of other pharmaceutical stakeholders (producers
and doctors) from eliminating over-prescription dominate the environmental gains.
In those cases, the planner can impose higher collection rate imposing higher
collection rate to decrease the externality associated with the pharmaceutical overage.
Additionally, the threshold increases as the unit social disutility εs decreases, meaning
that as the public health externality decreases over-prescription becomes acceptable
for a large range of environmental impact. Similar result can be obtained for the
social disutility εs.
4.4.2 Preferred EPR-Based Policy for Pharmaceuticals
Building on the insights from the previous subsection, we compare the EPR-based
policies, EC vs. SR, from the total welfare perspective. For ease of disposition, we
focus on the cases where up < ū
SR
p , i.e., the medicines with moderate health and
reputational impact. This assumption is in line with the practice as majority of the
collection programs based on the EPR concept exclude controlled substances, whose
treatment-related impact is substantial, i.e., up  0 and od  0, (e.g. Morphine,
Xanax) [56]. This is mainly because of the regulatory complications in handling
these substances3. We provide brief discussion of the analysis for up ≥ ūSRp (See
Appendix B §A2 for details) and associated implications for the adoption of the EPR
3FDA in the U.S. has recently revised it requirements on the collection of controlled substances
to increase options for disposal by third parties.
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concept for the controlled substances in the conclusion.
Proposition 14 There exist a unit collection cost, a medicine health benefit
and an environmental disutility threshold (denoted by k̄, ūp
.
= ūECp and
ε̃e(εs, up, od, k, α, β, c)
.
= ε̃e, respectively) that determine the preferred EPR-based
approach as in Table 2.
Table 2: Total welfare maximizing EPR-based policy for pharmaceuticals.
up < ūp up ≥ ūp
k < k̄ EC∗ = SR∗
k ≥ k̄ SR ∗
EC when εe ≥ ε̃e
SR ∗ otherwise
Note: The equilibrium outcomes with ∗ exhibits over-prescription.
Proposition 14 presents how the choice of EPR-based policy changes with the
health benefit (together with over-prescription bad reputation effect) and collection
cost of the medicine along with its environmental and public health externality. To
better understand how these factors determine the preferred policy, we first discuss
the levers of EPR-based policies, EC vs. SR, to manage the total welfare through
controlling the collected pharmaceutical overage. In this context, the social planner
has two main levers: affecting the pharmaceutical overage and setting collection rates.
Under SR, the planner uses two independent tools, unit fee t and collection rate rSR.
He has complete flexibility in setting rSR and directs the producer decisions, which
eventually determines the overage, via unit fee t. As t applies to all units produced,
SR does not directly target the pharmaceutical overage, meaning that its impact on
the overage is indirect. On the other hand, under EC, the planner uses a single tool,
collection rate rSR, for both affecting the pharmaceutical overage and directing the
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producer decisions. This may create limitations in terms of the collection rate that
the planner can set, while making EC more focused on the pharmaceutical overage.
Under the effect of these dynamics, there exist certain conditions where the EC policy
dominates SR as explained in detail below.
Recall that we restrict our analysis to the case where up < ū
SR
p . Following
Proposition 11, this means that the SR policy results in inducement of
over-prescription. Given this, we first consider the case where the unit collection
cost is low (k < k̄). From Proposition 12, we know that both policies induce
over-prescription. In this case, the policy that can set collection rate flexibly manages
the externalities associated with pharmaceutical overage better and provides higher
total welfare. As discussed above, under SR, the planner can set any collection rate
(rSR ∈ [0, 1], corresponding to flexibility to achieve lowest or highest collection rate
possible) to manage the externalities. Similarly, the low collection cost (k < k̄) allows
EC to induce over-prescription for any collection rate (rEC ∈ [0, 1]), providing it with
the same flexibility as SR. Hence, both policies give same welfare results.
We next consider the high unit collection cost case (k ≥ k̄). In this case, the
unit collection cost is sufficiently high that flexibility of EC in setting collection
rate decreases (while there is no change for the SR policy). This is because the
planner may now use collection rate as the tool to affect the amount of pharmaceutical
overage depending on the health benefit of the medicine. For a medicine with low
health impact (up < ūp), due to the restricted pricing power, the producer has
incentives to leverage dispensed quantity to increase his revenue level, i.e., to induce
over-prescription. As both policies induce over-prescription, as before, the policy that
is flexible in setting higher or lower collection rates gives higher total welfare. In this
case, this policy is the SR. However, for a medicine with high health impact (up ≥ ūp),
the producer subject to the EC can set sufficiently high price for the medicine and
the planner can utilize the collection rate in a way to avoid over-prescription. Hence,
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in this case, the preferred policy depends on the balance between the flexibility in
setting collection rates and amount of pharmaceutical overage. At the low levels of
environmental disutility, over-prescription outcome is bearable because the flexibility
of the SR policy for the collection rate can alleviate the externalities associated with
over-prescription, making it the preferred policy. When the disutility reaches a certain




< 0), limiting environmental externalities requires
avoiding the over-prescription, hence the EC policy becomes the welfare-maximizing
policy.
To sum up, treatment-related impact, collection standards and externalities
associated with the medicine determine the effective EPR implementation policy
for managing pharmaceuticals (summarized by Table 2). In particular, EC is the
effective policy when the medicine under consideration has (i) high treatment-related
impact; (ii) stringent collection standards; and (iii) high environmental and social
risks. Otherwise, the SR policy gives equally good or better welfare outcomes. This
result is one of the key results related to EPR implementations in the pharmaceutical
context and has important implications for practice. First, it suggests that the EC
policy appears to be effective for antidepressants and pharmaceuticals with similar
characteristics. Due to their effects on the nervous system, antidepressants pose high
public health and environmental risks: They are commonly abused medicines and
they may lead to significant behavioral changes on aquatic species, endangering the
ecological balance. Moreover, their collection and handling require a high level of
security standards, leading to high collection-related costs. This further suggests
that one-size-fits-all type of EPR-based collection programs are not suitable for
managing the pharmaceutical overage and associated externalities from environmental
and public health perspectives.
Second, this result presents a critical departure from the existing EPR literature
for non-consumable products (e.g. electronics). For these products, a welfare
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comparison of EC and SR policies favors the SR policy. The reason is that the
quantity at the end-of-pipe, i.e. volume of waste, is theoretically equal to the volume
of production for non-consumables, hence any collection cost induced by a collection
target under the EC can be equivalently presented under the SR as a unit fee on
the producers [11]. This critical result, however, is not valid for pharmaceuticals due
to the consumable nature of pharmaceuticals and mediated demand structure in the
pharmaceutical supply chain. These results collectively show that the policy choice in
the pharmaceutical context depends on the characteristics specific to pharmaceuticals,
indicating the importance of analysis of these characteristics in the context of EPR
implementations.
4.5 Pharmaceutical Stakeholder Perspectives
In the previous section, we addressed the question which EPR-based policy needs
to be chosen for the management of pharmaceutical overage from a total welfare
perspective. However, the policy chosen may not be necessarily preferred by all
pharmaceutical stakeholders. More specifically, a particular EPR-based policy may
favor a certain group of stakeholders over others, leading to possible tensions among
them and challenges related to implementation. To shed light on these challenges, we
next compare the EC and SR policies with respect to their impact on the producer,
environment and public health. For brevity, we focus on more relevant case where
the externality of medicine is sufficiently high that the planner aims to prevent
over-prescription if possible (see Proposition 14 for detailed discussion).
Proposition 15 Preference of the producer for EC vs. SR policies vary as a
function of unit collection cost threshold k̄, health benefit threshold ūp and a unit
fee threshold t̄(up, od, k, α, β, c)
.
= t̄ as illustrated by Table 3.
Proposition 15 states that unit collection cost, medicine health benefit, and unit
fee under SR are key factors that determine the preference of the producer for the
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Table 3: Producer preferences for the EPR-based policies.
up < ūp up ≥ ūp
k < k̄
k < εe + εs EC if t > t̄; SR otherwise
k ≥ εe + εs EC
k̄ ≤ k < k̄
k < εe + εs SR
EC if t > t̄; SR otherwise
k ≥ εe + εs EC
k ≥ k̄
k < εe + εs SR
k ≥ εe + εs EC EC if t > t̄; SR otherwise
EPR-based policies. Table 3 indicates that the effect of unit collection cost on the
profit of producer are two fold: (i) the direct effect on the profit (represented by
thresholds k̄ and k̃), and (ii) the indirect effect in comparison with the externality
(demonstrated by the value of k with respect to εe + εs), which, in turn, determines
the collection rate imposed. The direct effect of the unit collection cost occurs only
under EC and changes the policy preference of the producer in the expected way: As
the unit collection cost decreases, it directly decreases the collection-related cost for
the producer, hence the producer’s preference shifts towards the EC policy.
However, the indirect effect of the unit collection cost is in the opposite direction:
The producer benefits from the EC policy more as the unit collection cost of the
medicine with respect to the associated externality increases. The social planner sets
the collection rate based on its marginal benefit and cost. In particular, increasing
collection rate creates the marginal benefit of εe + εs by decreasing environmental
and public health risks and has the marginal cost of k. If the unit collection cost
of the medicine is higher (lower) than unit externality, i.e., εe + εs ≤ (>)k, then
the planner sets the minimum (maximum) possible collection rate. In those cases,
the collection rate imposed on the producer under the EC policy is so low that
the producer incurs low collection-related cost. As a result, the producer tends to
gain higher profit under EC than SR as the value of unit collection increases with
respect to the externality of the medicine. The preference of the producer in this
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case depends on the unit fee imposed by the planner. As the planner charges a
higher fee, the producer naturally favors EC. This is parallel to the practice. For
instance, in the industries in which collection and recycling programs run through
fees (e.g. electronics and beverage industry), producers (e.g. HP, American Beverage
Association) oppose high fees [6, 11]. These result suggests that, contrary to the
common expectation, the producer may favor EC even at high collection cost levels
when the externality of the medicine is relatively low.
The above result has important implications for the pharmaceutical supply
chain in practice. First, pharmaceutical producers need to shape their lobbying
efforts on the EPR-based policy choices by taking into account the health aspects
of the medicine together with the existing collection infrastructure. This means
that producers may not benefit from unified collection programs set for the
pharmaceuticals. This is because the benefits of these collection programs may
disappear with the inclusion of medicine with different characteristics. Moreover,
producers may need to support different policies even for the same medicine in
different states. This arises from the fact that efficiency of collection infrastructure
may change considerably from one state to another due to several factors such as
geographical conditions and dispersion of the population. As a result, the operational
landscape for producers may differ substantially, possibly changing their perspectives.
Second, the preferences of the producer toward the EC policy does not exhibit the
same structure as the welfare maximizing policy. This suggests that the policy
makers introducing EPR-based policies need to expect significant resistance from
pharmaceutical producers.
Proposition 16 Environmental and public health externality under the EC vs. SR
policies vary as a function of unit collection threshold k̄ and unit health benefit
threshold ūp as illustrated by Table 4.
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Table 4: Environmental and public health preferences for the EPR-based policies.
up < ūp up ≥ ūp
k < k̄
k < εe + εs
EC = SR
εe + εs ≤ k
k̄ ≤ k < k̄
k < εe + εs SR EC = SR
εe + εs ≤ k EC = SR EC
k ≥ k̄
k < εe + εs SR SR if εs ≥ ε̄s; EC otherwise
εe + εs ≤ k EC = SR EC
Environment and public health always benefit from lower volumes of uncollected
unused pharmaceuticals, and in turn, from the policy that restricts the amount of
dispensed pharmaceuticals and/or establishes higher collection rates. Accordingly,
factors affecting the prescription level and collection rate shape the preferred policy
from environmental and social perspectives. Proposition 16 expresses that these
factors are the unit collection cost and medicine health benefit. As in the case of
producers, the effect of unit collection cost is two fold: the effect on the prescription
level through influencing the decisions of the producer (represented by threshold
k̄) and the effect on the collection rate imposed (demonstrated by the value of k
with respect to εe + εs). Proposition 16 further indicates that the EC policy may
be favorable from environmental and social perspectives except the cases where the
health benefit of the medicine is low and its collection cost is relatively lower than
the associated externality.
The underlying dynamics in Table 4 can be explained as follows: Recall from
our earlier discussion that the SR policy is flexible in setting the collection rate
(rSR ∈ [0, 1]) and EC has the same flexibility when the unit collection cost is low.
As both policies result in same pharmaceutical overage at low levels of the collection
cost, environmental and public health perspectives favor both policies equally. As
the collection cost increases, the flexibility of EC in terms of setting collection rate
decreases. This means that SR now has the ability to impose lower or higher collection
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rates than EC. Recall also that the planner determines the collection rate based on
the value of unit collection cost of the medicine with respect to its environmental and
public health externality, i.e., k vs. εe + εs. For a medicine with low health benefit
levels (up < ūp), the pharmaceutical overage is same under both policies. Hence, SR
becomes more favorable from the environmental and public health perspectives when
k < εe + εs, by setting higher collection rate.
Moreover, as Table 2 illustrates, the ability of EC in avoiding over-prescription
increases as the health benefit of the medicine increases. Hence, the environmental
and public health preferences shift toward the EC policy with an increase in health
benefit. Accordingly, for a medicine with high health benefit (up ≥ ūp), when
the unit collection cost of the medicine is higher as compared its externality, EC
becomes the sole preferred policy by both resulting in lower overage and setting higher
collection rate. Furthermore, when the unit collection cost of the medicine is lower,
it becomes the preferred policy except the case when the public health disutility of
the medicine is above a threshold (εs ≥ ε̄s). This is because although the SR policy
results in over-prescription, it can effectively prevent public health risks through high
collection rate (r∗SR = 1) and can only lead to some environmental externality due to
consumption. On the other hand, the EC policy can avoid the over-prescription in
this case, it sets lower collection rate, which in turn results in some environmental and
public health externality. Therefore, when the public health disutility of the medicine
is significantly high, SR policy leads to lower environmental and public health impact.
The above result implies that, similar to the case of producers, environmental
and social advocacy groups need to coordinate their political efforts differently
for different medicine categories or even for same categories in different operating
conditions. Furthermore, they need to analyze the unifying collection models that
apply to multiple categories of pharmaceuticals cautiously. All of these collectively
suggest that pharmaceutical NGOs need to consider several interrelated factors
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(e.g. factors that drive the volume of pharmaceuticals dispensed and collected,
including treatment-related aspects of the medicine, collection-related requirements
in place, and infrastructural conditions) to ensure better environmental and public
health outcomes. Consideration of such factors requires anticipating the response of
producers to different policy choices and impact of the medicine on the environment
and public health before the implementation stage. Hence, our work indicates
the importance of NGOs’ engagement with the industry (e.g. gathering relevant
information and eliciting the potential responses) and involvement in research
regarding harmful reflections on the environment and public health.
Proposition 17 The preferred policy from a welfare perspective aligns the
perspectives of producer and environmental/public health advocacy groups based on
threshold k̄ and t̄ as given by Table 5.
Table 5: Alignment of pharmaceutical stakeholder preferences.
up < ūp up ≥ ūp
k < k̄
k < εe + εs EC if t > t̄; SR otherwise
εe + εs ≤ k EC
k̄ ≤ k < k̄
k < εe + εs SR
EC if t > t̄
εe + εs ≤ k −
k ≥ k̄
k < εe + εs SR −
εe + εs ≤ k − EC if t > t̄
Based on Propositions 14-16, Proposition 17 presents the conditions under which
EPR-based policies, EC vs. SR, can align the preferences of the pharmaceutical
producer and advocacy groups along with the choice of the planner. This result
demonstrates that welfare maximizing policy can give higher welfare for all the
pharmaceutical stakeholders than the alternative policy. However, this may occur
only under limited conditions. This indicates that alignment of pharmaceutical
stakeholder perspectives may be challenging even under ideal conditions. While two
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counties in the U.S. (Alameda in CA and King in WA) passed some form of EPR-based
legislation for the collection of unused pharmaceuticals, many more counties and
states are considering to pass similar type of legislation (e.g. San Francisco [130],
Oregon, Maine, New York, Florida [120]). Given this potential growth, legislators
need to be prepared for an unending objections from pharmaceutical stakeholders.
4.6 Conclusion
Our objective in this essay is to investigate the effective implementation of EPR
for pharmaceuticals, a product category with unique characteristics. In particular,
we evaluate the effectiveness of two common EPR-based policies that are suitable
for pharmaceuticals, End-of-Pipe Collection (EC) and Source Reduction (SR). The
critical difference between these two policies arises from the different mechanisms they
use to manage the pharmaceuticals and associated adverse environmental and public
health effects. Specifically, SR aims to decrease the dispensed pharmaceuticals with a
potential decrease in the unused pharmaceuticals and associated externalities. On the
other hand, EC aims to reduce the quantity of unused pharmaceuticals and associated
externalities with a potential decrease in the quantity of dispensed pharmaceuticals.
To compare these policies, we focus on the unique characteristics of pharmaceuticals
by bringing a large body of literature from diverse fields. Accordingly, we document
the major roles and interactions of pharmaceutical stakeholders and combine all the
relevant factors with a game-theoretic interaction model in the EPR context. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first to analyze the provision and consumption
of the pharmaceuticals with respect to EPR. Based on our analysis, we provide
insights to inform the policy makers, producers, and environmental and public health
groups about their roles in the pharmaceutical context as summarized below.
Effective implementation of EPR for pharmaceuticals: Our work uncovers the
conditions for the effectiveness of EC and SR policies for pharmaceuticals. Our
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analysis demonstrates that EC may work better for pharmaceuticals than SR.
More specifically, EC gives better welfare results when the medicine has (i) high
environmental and public health risks; (ii) moderate/high treatment impact; and
(iii) high collection cost. This result has important implications for both literature
and practice. First, well-established assumptions regarding the effectiveness of
EPR implementations for non-consumable products may fail in the context of
pharmaceuticals. In particular, due to the consumable nature of pharmaceuticals
and mediated demand structure due to the intermediary role of the doctor in
the pharmaceutical chain, the seemingly more flexible SR may be suboptimal.
Second, a unified collection program approach applying to many categories of
pharmaceuticals may not work effectively from the welfare perspective. For instance,
control at the end-of-pipe approach can effectively manage pharmaceuticals with
high health impact and high collection-related requirements such as antidepressants,
whereas reduction at the source approach can work better for managing the
pharmaceuticals with low health impact such as common pain killers and over
the counter antihistamines. This suggests that the benefits of collection programs
may disappear as they expand to include pharmaceuticals that exhibit different
characteristics. Additionally, our analysis predicts that limited treatment impact
and low collection-related requirements give high incentives for producers to
maintain higher sales of pharmaceuticals. In those cases, even the most stringent
EPR implementations may not effectively reduce such incentives. Consequently,
end-of-pipe control and source reduction policies may not achieve large reductions
in the amount of dispensed pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, given the exogenous
patient usage behavior, there always exist an overage in the pharmaceutical supply
chain, which may not be completely eliminated though the collection programs.
This indicates that EPR implementations need to be complemented by some other
arrangements such as restricting promotional activities of the pharmaceutical industry
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and providing extensive education for patients to create changes in their usage
behavior.
Stakeholder perspectives on EPR-based policies for pharmaceuticals: Our work
demonstrates that collection-related requirements, medicine characteristics, and fee
mechanisms of the collection programs determine preferred EPR-based policies
from the perspectives of pharmaceutical stakeholders. In particular, producers and
environmental/public health advocacy groups should consider collection standards
(e.g. highly secure boxes, strict handling requirements, presence of security
enforcement at the collection sites, requirement to have collection cites in every
city), collection cost efficiency (e.g. diseconomies of scale), medicine treatment
aspects (e.g. health aspects associated with the medicine, strength of doctor
reputation in the society), and fees that are set by the programs (e.g. disposal
fees, point of sale fees) while evaluating different policies. Moreover, our analysis
shows that the producer perspectives may favor end-of-pipe collection policies as the
collection-related requirements as compared to externality of pharmaceuticals increase
and their treatment-related impact decreases. The preferences of environmental and
public health advocacy groups move in the opposite direction with a decrease in
the treatment impact. As such, aligning the perspectives of stakeholders in the
pharmaceutical chain may only happen under limited conditions. This suggests that
the pharmaceutical stakeholders need to identify the effects of the different policy
implementations on their and other stakeholders’ businesses while forming lobbying
strategies to avoid disadvantageous situations (e.g. decreased competitiveness
for producers and broader environmental and public health problems for NGOs).
However, as the pharmaceutical stakeholders use appropriate lobbying strategies,
aligning the preferences in the pharmaceutical chain may become more challenging.
As the significant growth of EPR-based legislation suggests, EPR legislation will find
more place in the state agendas sooner or later for management of pharmaceuticals,
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particularly in the E.U. and U.S. where the environmental and public health advocacy
is getting stronger. Therefore, it is crucial for the pharmaceutical stakeholders to
be part of the legislation process by bringing their perspectives clearly into the
attention of the legislators and society and to increase their engagement within the
pharmaceutical chain to smooth the legislation process.
In closing, we provide a brief discussion on extensions of our analysis
with insurance coverage, different DTC advertising effects, and different patient
consumption behavior, which are omitted for brevity. See Appendix B §A3 for
a detailed analysis. In the insurance extension, we consider a normalized patient
population with certain percentage of insured patients whose insurance coverage pays
a certain portion of the treatment cost. In the DTC advertising extension, we consider
increasing doctor welfare with promotions targeting the patient. In the different
patient behavior extension, we make the assumption that the patient stops using the
medicine only when he recovers, i.e., the only source of unused pharmaceuticals is the
over-prescription of the doctor. We show that our structural results (e.g. the critical
factors affecting decisions of the pharmaceutical producer, effectiveness conditions of
EC policy as compared to SR) continue to hold under these extensions. The possible
directions to expand our work in future include incorporating competition dynamics
in the pharmaceutical industry and different types of insurance contracts together
with their effects on doctor-patient interaction.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
The primary focus of this thesis is Extended Producer Responsibility, which mandates
producer responsibility to finance or operate collection and recycling of discarded
post-consumer products. In the last two decades, EPR has been employed prevalently
for durable products (e.g. electronics) and has recently gained momentum for
consumable products (e.g. pharmaceuticals). Three essays in this thesis provide
operational perspectives on EPR for durable and consumable products by focusing
on electronics and pharmaceuticals, respectively.
In the first essay, we study the environmental effectiveness of EPR in a durable
product setting. The existing analysis and current implementations for durable
products ignore the durable nature of products and related dynamics in the
market, which may have a significant effect on the environmental outcomes. We
focus on these ignored aspects and identify the interaction between durability and
EPR-based policies by explicitly modeling the durable nature of products. We find
that this interaction may result in unintended adverse environmental outcomes by
characterizing secondary market strategies of producers to EPR obligations. We
demonstrate the validity of our results by using real life data and extending our
analysis in several directions to cover different operational settings. Our work in this
essay makes contributions by (i) being the first to identify the interaction between
EPR and secondary market strategies based on the durable nature of the products;
(ii) showing that established assumptions regarding the environmental effectiveness
of EPR may not hold in the context of durable products; and (iii) generating policy
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insights on how to achieve better environmental outcomes for durable products via
EPR. These results have brought new perspectives and opened up future research
directions with a significant impact on practice:
Counting refurbishing and remanufacturing operations toward EPR obligations:
The first research direction is regarding whether and how EPR implementations
should factor refurbishing and remanufacturing operations towards compliance. There
have been recent legislative efforts towards the inclusion of related targets [109], hence
whether these operations should count toward recycling targets is an important policy
question.
Incorporating product design aspects: Another research direction in this context
regards product design strategies of durable good producers. The work in the
first essay can be extended to include the design decisions of the producer in
terms of durability and recyclability and to investigate whether/when environmental
obligations lead to superior design (e.g. higher durability, increased recyclability)
under different operational configurations.
Analyzing export practices of developed countries: Another research direction is
related to the trend in export practices and associated restriction policies [147], where
prominent examples are full restrictions suggested by Basel Convention [139] and
partial restrictions that only allow the export of products with remaining useful life
introduced by the US and the EU (The Responsible Recycling Act in the US and
the WEEE Directive in EC) [1, 62]. Given the variations across export restrictions
in different parts of the world, analyzing the effect of these restrictions on the
environmental effectiveness of EPR together with the secondary market strategies
of the producer is an interesting question in the international policy arena.
In the second essay, we analyze the adoption of a market-based approach in the
implementation of the EPR concept, which has been advocated to have several
benefits. We focus on the operational implementation details of the Minnesota
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Electronics Recycling Act as it represents the prevailing example of EPR-based policy
adopting a marked-based approach. We explore the experience with the Minnesota
act along the dimensions of underlying motivations behind its implementation
rules, associated stakeholder perspectives and resulting effectiveness. Our analysis
suggests that the Minnesota act achieves the advocated benefits of the market-based
approach, but this happens at the expense of several unintended outcomes due to
the complexity arising from translating the approach into operational specifications.
Accordingly, the second essay provides insights into EPR implementations on the
ground by showing how operational rules at the implementation stage significantly
determine the effectiveness of the market-based approach in practice. The insights
presented can be extended by future research that analyzes the implementation of
alternative approaches (e.g. central coordination approach with advanced disposal
fee and disposal program in CA [43], disposal ban with no producer responsibility
requirements in New Hampshire [44], etc.) along with their opportunities and
challenges.
In the third essay, we investigate the management of pharmaceutical overage
via EPR-based policies, which have gained significant traction in practice in recent
years. In particular, we analyze how to effectively operationalize prevalent EPR-based
policies in the pharmaceutical context by incorporating the unique characteristics
of pharmaceutical supply chain. We mainly focus on the major pharmaceutical
stakeholders and the fundamental dynamics in their interactions as they relate to
EPR. Our analysis uncovers the effectiveness conditions for EPR-based policies from
both a total welfare perspective and the perspectives of pharmaceutical stakeholders.
The main contributions of our analysis are three-fold: (i) building the first analytical
model that focuses on interactions in the pharmaceutical chain as they relate
to EPR; (ii) showing how the complexity of interactions in the pharmaceutical
chain affects the preferred EPR-based policy from the welfare perspective and
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imposes a challenge towards aligning EPR-based implementation choices among the
stakeholders; (iii) demonstrating that the characteristics unique to pharmaceuticals
may require a completely different perspective in implementation of EPR-based policy
when compared to other product categories for which EPR is prevalent. These results
have lead to several paths for future research:
Including competition and insurance dynamics in the policy analysis: The
first possible research direction relates to exploring the effect of competition and
different insurance dynamics on EPR-based policy choices in the management
of pharmaceutical overage. The underlying motivation is that the presence of
competition among pharmaceutical producers may bring interesting pricing and cost
dynamics that may affect promotional decisions of the producers. Moreover, different
insurance plans as cost-sharing tools are shown to have different effects on the doctor
practices [67] and access of the patients to the medicine [97]. The research in this
context has the potential to enrich perspectives on EPR-based policies by increasing
the influential dynamics analyzed.
Investigating the design of pharmaceutical collection networks: Another future
research direction concerns the design of collection networks for pharmaceuticals
under EPR-related obligations. It would be valuable to incorporate the real-world
challenges and opportunities associated with pharmaceutical take-back programs (e.g.
requirements to undertake collection at law enforcement offices or pharmacies, to have
security personnel at the collection sites, to impose strict handling specifications;
and economies of scale opportunities in incineration treatment) and to explore the
establishment of efficient collection infrastructure.
Analyzing the implementation details on the ground: As the second essay in this
thesis suggests, stakeholder responses and operational outcomes can vary significantly
in response to the specifics of the chosen policy and associated implementation
details. Given the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical supply chain and
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the complexity of interactions among pharmaceutical stakeholders, analyzing the
implementation choices of the current EPR-based policies with respect to expected
outcomes is an interesting research path.
In sum, the three essays in this thesis bring new perspectives on environmental
policies and their effect on business practices in electronics and pharmaceutical
industries by (i) challenging established assumptions and (ii) providing insights on
the prevalent policy questions contingent on the nature of products and market
dynamics. Accordingly, this thesis contributes to the generation of responsible policies
for industries with prominent environmental and social impacts by focusing on the




EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY AND
SECONDARY MARKETS
A1. Derivation of inverse demand functions. The action vector of
consumer with type θ in period t is denoted by Ct(θ) = (N t(θ), U t(θ), I t(θ))
where indicator variables N t, U t and I t correspond to buying a new product
(N), buying an used product (U), and remaining inactive (I), respectively.
The net utility per period is denoted by πtθ[C
t(θ), Ct−1(θ), pt, pt+1] where
pt = [ptn, p
t
u]. A consumer’s utility-maximization problem is given by
V tθ [C
t−1(θ), pt, pt+1] = maxCt(θ){πtθ[Ct−1(θ), Ct(θ), pt, pt+1] + ρV t+1θ [Ct(θ), pt+1, pt+2]},
where V tθ [C
t−1(θ), pt, pt+1] is the net present value function in period t. This decision
is subject to Ct(θ)1
′
= 1, i.e., the consumer can obtain at most one product at each
time period. Let Rtθ[C
t−1(θ), pt, pt+1] be the reaction function of the consumer type
θ in period t. Since we focus on Markov perfect equilibria where all decisions stay
constant in time, i.e., the focal point, the net present value maximization problem




Under stationarity, the per-period net utility from N is θ − pn + ρpu, from U is
δθ− pu, and 0 from I. There are nine possible strategies for the consumer which can
be shown as NN , NI, IN , NU , UN , UU , UI, IU , and II. Due to the periodicity of
two for all consumer strategies at the focal point, permutations of the same pattern
are not distinct. Hence there exist only six distinct strategies: NN , NU , NI, UU ,
UI, and II. Moreover, as the net utility from any of the actions is independent of
the action in the previous period, any strategy where a consumer chooses an action
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which is different than the action in the previous period is dominated (see [70] and
[4]). This implies that NU , NI, and UI strategies are ruled out.
The present value of the remaining strategies can be calculated using the Bellman
equation. For consumers playing the NN strategy, solving Vθ[N, p] = θ − pn + ρpu +
ρVθ[N, p], we get Vθ[N, p] =
θ−pn+ρpu
1−ρ . For consumers playing the UU strategy, solving
Vθ[U, p] = δθ−pu+ρVθ[U, p], we get Vθ[U, p] = δθ−pu1−ρ . Finally, for consumers who play






> 0. This implies that the consumers who play NN have higher
valuation θ than the ones who play UU , who in turn have higher θ than the consumers
who play II. Let θ1 and θ2 represent the indifferent consumer types between NN and
UU strategies, and between UU and II strategies, respectively. The consumers with
valuations θ ∈ (0, θ2] play the II strategy, the consumers with valuations θ ∈ (θ2, θ1]
play the UU strategy, and the consumers with valuations θ ∈ (θ1, 1] play the NN








by solving Vθ[N, p] = Vθ[U, p].
In the secondary market, the supply of used products is given by 1− θ1. Demand
for the used products is given by θ1− θ2 + qu. The market-clearing price for the used
products on the secondary market is obtained by solving 1 − θ1 = θ1 − θ2 + qu, and
is given by pu =
δ(−1+δ+2pn+(1−δ)qu)
1+δ+2δρ
. The demand for new products is given by qn =
1−θ1, which yields pn = 1+(1+ρ)pu−δ(1−qn)−qn. Solving these simultaneously, the
inverse demand functions are given by pn(qn, qu) = 1−qn+δ(−qn+qu+ρ(1−2qn+qu))
and pu(qn, qu) = δ(1−2qn+qu). Note that for 0 ≤ qu ≤ qn, we have that the maximum
value of pu is δ and is attained at qn = qu = 0. Therefore, pu(qn, qu) ≤ δ. 
A2. Proofs. We assume ρ = 1 for the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that there is no EPR legislation (α = 0). The
producer’s problem is given by maxqn,qu Π(qn, qu, 0) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn−pu(qn, qu)qu,







, which is negative definite for δ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the profit
function is jointly concave in qn and qu. The Lagrangian of the problem is given by
L(qn, qu, λ, µ1, µ2) = π(qn, qu, 0)−λ(qu− qn) +µ1qn +µ2qu. The first-order conditions




= 1− c+ δ+ λ+ µ1− 2(1 + 3δ)qn + 4δqu = 0 and




= −λ + µ2 − δ(1 − 4qn + 2qu) = 0. There are four candidate
solutions.
Case 1. qu = qn = 0, which implies λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(0, 0, λ, µ1) = 0 gives
λ+µ1 = c−1−δ. λ, µ1 ≥ 0 requires c ≥ 1+δ. To restrict our analysis to parameters
for the producer to have non-negative profit, we assume c < 1 + δ, and this case is
ruled out.
Case 2. 0 = qu < qn, which implies λ = µ1 = 0, and µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, 0, 0, 0) =






. qn > 0 due to the








Case 3. 0 < qu = qn, which implies λ ≥ 0 and µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, λ, 0) =
0 and Ψ2(qn, qn, λ, 0) = 0 gives λ = −δc < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 4. 0 < qu < qn, which implies λ = µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0 and
Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−δ−c
2(1−δ) and qu =
1−δ−2c
2(1−δ) , where qn > qu holds. qu > 0









1−δ−c denote the fraction of used products collected
by the producer.
Summarizing the above: if δ < 1 − 2c, then 0 < qu < qn, otherwise, qu = 0,
proving Lemma 1. 
Proof of Propositions 1-4. The producer’s problem is given by
maxqn,qu,qeol Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − sαqn − kqeol, such that
qeol ≤ qn − qu, αqn ≤ qu + qeol, and qn, qu, qeol ≥ 0. The Hessian of the per-period
profit function is given by




, which is negative definite for δ ∈ (0, 1).
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Therefore, the profit function is jointly concave in qn, qu, and qeol. The Lagrangian
of the problem is given by L(qn, qu, qeol, λ, µ, β1, β2, β3) = π(qn, qu, qeol) − λ(qeol +
qu − qn) − µ(αqn − qu − qeol) + β1qn + β2qu + β3qeol. The first-order conditions are




= 1 − c + δ + λ + β1 − 2(1 + 3δ)qn − α(s + µ) + 4δqu = 0,









= µ+ β3− λ− k = 0. There are seven candidate solutions (summarized below).
Case 1. qu = qeol = 0, which implies qn = 0 and λ, µ, β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0.








= s2∗(δ, α, c)}, or c ≥ 1 + δ − α(s + min(δ, k))
(details available on request). To ensure non-negativity of the producer’s profit, we
hereafter assume c < 1 + δ − α(s+ min(δ, k)) holds, which rules out this case.
Case 2. qu > 0, qeol = 0, αqn = qu < qn, which implies λ = β1 = β2 = 0
and µ, β3 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, αqn, 0, µ, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, αqn, 0, µ, 0) = 0 and
Ψ3(0, µ, β3) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+(1−α)δ−αs





1+(3−α)(1−α)δ . For qu > 0, µ ≥ 0 and β3 ≥ 0, the




= s1(δ, α, c, k)
and s ≥ 1−2c−δ+α(−1+c+δ)
α(2−α)
.
= s0(δ, α, c). As s0(·) < s1(·), s0(·) < s∗2(·), and s1(·) ≤ s∗2(·)
only for δ > k, the required conditions are s0(·) ≤ s < s∗2(·) for δ ≤ k, and
s0(·) ≤ s ≤ s1(·) for k < δ.
Case 3. qu > 0, qeol = 0 and αqn < qu < qn, which implies λ = µ = β1 = β2 = 0 and
β3 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, 0, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(0, 0, β3) = 0 gives
qn =
1−δ−c−αs
2(1−δ) , qu =
1−δ−2c−2sα
2(1−δ) , and β3 = k. For 0 < αqn < qu, the required condition
is s < s0(·), where s0(·) > 0 only if δ < 1− 2c.
Case 4. qu > 0, qeol = 0 and αqn < qu = qn, which implies β1 = β2 = µ = 0
and λ, β3 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, λ, 0, 0) = 0 and Ψ2(qn, qn, λ, 0, 0) = 0 gives λ =
−δ(c+ αs) < 0, and this case is ruled out.
Case 5. qu = 0, qeol > 0 and αqn = qeol < qn, which implies λ = β1 = β3 = 0 and
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, µ = k, and β2 =
δ(−1+δ+2c+2α(s+k))
1+3δ
− k. For qeol > 0 and
β2 ≥ 0, the required conditions are k(1+3δ)+δ(1−2c−δ−2αk)2αδ
.
= s2(δ, α, c, k) ≤ s < s1∗(·),
where s2(·) < s1∗(·) holds only for k < δ.
Case 6. qu ≥ 0, qeol > 0 and αqn < qeol ≤ qn, which gives µ = β1 = β3 = 0 and
λ ≥ 0. In this case, Ψ3(0, 0, 0) = −λ− k < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 7. qu > 0, qeol > 0 and αqn = qu + qeol < qn, which gives λ = β1 =
β2 = β3 = 0 and µ ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, µ, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, µ, 0) = 0
and Ψ3(0, µ, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−c−δ−αs+(2−α)k
2(1−δ) , qu =
k+δ(1−2c−δ+3k−2α(s+k))
2(1−δ)δ , qeol =
−k−δ(1−2c−δ+3k+α(−1+c+δ−(2−α)s−(4−α)k))
2δ(1−δ) , and µ = k. For qu > 0 and qeol > 0, the
required conditions are s1(·) < s < s2(·), where s1(·) < s2(·) holds only for k < δ. In
this case, pu =
δ+k
2
, where pu > k for δ > k.
It is straightforward to show that the above cases can be summarized as follows:
(i) δ ≤ k: if s < s0(·), αqn < qu < qn, qeol = 0; if s ≥ s0(·), qu = αqn, qeol = 0. (ii)
k < δ: if s < s0(·), αqn < qu < qn, qeol = 0; if s0(·) ≤ s ≤ s1(·), qu = αqn, qeol = 0; if
s1(·) < s < s2(·), qu, qeol > 0, qu + qeol = αqn, and if s ≥ s2(·), qu = 0, qeol = αqn. As
s0(·) ≤ 0 for δ ≥ 1− 2c, the above proves Propositions 1 and 2.
To prove Proposition 3, assume δ < 1−2c. We need to compare the qu = 1−δ−2c2(1−δ) (>
0) in the absence of EPR with the cases above that hold for δ < 1− 2c, viz., Cases 2,





Note that the condition s0(·) > 0 can be written as α < 1−2c−δ1−c−δ
.
= α̂(δ, c). If s0(·) ≤





if s < (c(2−α)−(1−α)(1−δ))(1+(3−2α)δ)
α2(1−δ)
.
= ŝ1(δ, α, c) and α ≥ α̂(·). Comparison with Case 7





0 for s < k(1+(3−2α)δ)
2αδ
.
= ŝ2(δ, α, k) and α ≥ α̂(·). Comparing with Case 5 (where
s ≥ s2(·)), 1−δ−2c2(1−δ) − 0 > 0. Therefore, EPR leads to higher qu for α ≥ α̂(δ, c) and s <
ŝ(δ, α, c, k) where ŝ(·) = ŝ1(·) for s < s1(·) and ŝ(·) = ŝ2(·) for s1(·) ≤ s ≤ s2(·), where
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) < 0, proving Proposition 4. 
Proof of Propositions 5-7. Let ru = qn−qu
qn








2(1−δ)) < 0. When δ ≤ k and s ≥ s0(·) or when
k < δ and s0(·) ≤ s ≤ s1(·), ru = 1 − α and dqnds = −(
α
2+2(3−α)(1−α)δ ) < 0. When
k < δ, if s1(·) < s < s2(·), druds =
α(1−δ)(δ−k)




1−δ ) < 0;
and if s ≥ s2(·), ru = 1 and dqnds = −(
α
2(1+3δ)
) < 0. This proves Proposition 5.












δ(c+δ−1+αs−(2−α)k)2 ) < 0. This








δ(1−c+k(2−α)−sα−δ)2 > 0. When the producer adopts a




) < 0 and ru = 1. When the producer






(1−c−sα−δ)2 > 0. Finally, when the producer adopts the Used Product








, that solves dqn
dα
= 0. It
is straightforward to show that d
2qn
dα2
|α1(·) < 0. This implies that
dqn
dα
> 0 when α <
α1(·) and dqndα < 0 otherwise. ru = 1 − α, which is decreasing in α. This proves
Proposition 7. 
Proof of Lemmas 2 and 3. Assume that there is no EPR legislation (α = 0).
The producer’s problem is given by maxqn,qu,qr(pn(qn, qu, qr)− c)qn− pu(qn, qu, qr)qu +
(pr(qn, qu, qr) − cr)qr, such that qr ≤ qu ≤ qn and qr, qu, qn ≥ 0. The Hessian of the
per-period profit function is negative definite for δ < δr and δ, δr ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
the profit function is jointly concave in qn, qu and qr. The Lagrangian of the problem
is given by L(qn, qu, qr, λ, µ, β1, β2, β3) = π(qn, qu, qr)−λ(qr− qu)−µ(qu− qn)+β1qn+














= 0. There are six
candidate solutions:
Case 1. qr = qu = qn = 0, which implies λ, µ, β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0. Solving
Ψ1(0, 0, 0, µ, β1) = 0 gives µ + β1 = c − 1 − δ. µ, β1 ≥ 0 requires c ≥ 1 + δ. To
restrict our analysis to parameters for the producer to have non-negative profit, we
assume c < 1 + δ, this case is ruled out.
Case 2. 0 < qr = qu = qn, which implies λ, µ ≥ 0 and β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving
Ψ1(qn, qn, qn, µ, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qn, qn, λ, µ, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(qn, qn, qn, λ, 0) = 0 gives qn =
qu = qr =
1−c−cr+δr
2+6δr
, λ = δr(−1+2c+δr)−cr(1+δr)
1+3δr
, and µ = −cr−δ+δr+ 2(−1+c+cr−δr)(δr−δ)1+3δr .
For qr > 0, λ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0, the required condition is cr ≤ (δr−δ)(2c+δr−1)1+2δ+δr
.
=
cr1(c, δr, δ), where cr1(·) ≥ 0 only if 2c+ δr ≥ 1.
Case 3. 0 < qr = qu < qn, which implies λ ≥ 0 and µ, β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving
Ψ1(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, qr, λ, 0, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(qn, qu, qr, λ, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+cr+2δ−δr






δr−δ ), and λ =
δ(−1+2c−2cr+δr)
1+4δ−δr . For λ ≥ 0, 0 < qu,
and qu < qn, the required conditions are cr ≤ −1+2c+δr2
.





cr3(c, δr, δ), and cr > cr1(·). As cr2(·) < cr3(·) for δ + 2c < 1, the conditions are
simplified as cr1(·) < cr ≤ cr2(·) for δ + 2c < 1 and cr1(·) < cr < cr3(·) otherwise.
Case 4. 0 < qr < qu < qn, which implies λ, µ, β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving
Ψ1(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0) = 0 gives
qn =
1−c+cr−δr












δr−δ ), where qu < qn.
For 0 < qr and qr < qu, the required conditions are cr2(·) < cr < c(δr−δ)1−δ
.
= cr4(c, δr, δ),
where cr2(·) < cr4(·) holds only if 2c+ δ < 1.
Case 5. 0 = qr < qu < qn, which implies β3 ≥ 0 and λ, µ, β1, β2 = 0. Solving
Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ3(qn, qu, 0, 0, β3) = 0 gives qn =
1−δ−c
2(1−δ) and qu =
1−δ−2c
2(1−δ) , where qn > qu holds. For qu > 0 and β3 ≥ 0, the required
conditions are cr ≥ cr4(δ, δr, c) and 2c+ δ < 1.





and the required conditions for this case are 2c + δ ≥ 1 and cr ≥ cr3(·)
(details available on request).
Summarizing the above: (i) if δ < 1 − 2c: 0 < qr = qu = qn if cr ≤ cr1(·),
0 < qr = qu < qn if cr1(·) < cr ≤ cr2(·), 0 < qr < qu < qn if cr2(·) < cr < cr4(·),
and 0 = qr < qu < qn otherwise. (ii) if δ ≥ 1 − 2c: 0 < qr = qu = qn if cr ≤ cr1(·),
0 < qr = qu < qn if cr1(·) < cr < cr3(·), and 0 = qr = qu < qn otherwise. Therefore,
qr > 0 if and only if cr < r1(c, δr, δ), where r1(·) = cr3(·) for δ ≥ 1 − 2c and
r1(·) = cr4(·) otherwise. qu − qr > 0 only for cr > r2(c, δr, δ)
.
= cr2(·) and δ < 1− 2c,
where cr2(·) < cr4(·), cr3(·) for δ + 2c < 1, which implies r2(·) < r1(·). Finally, it can
be seen from above that when cr ≥ r1(·), qu > 0 only for δ < 1− 2c. 
Proof of Lemma 4 and Propositions 8-10. The producer’s problem is given by
maxqn,qu,qr,qeol(pn(qn, qu, qr)−c)qn−pu(qn, qu, qr)qu+(pr(qn, qu, qr)−cr)qr−kqeol−sαqn,
such that qr ≤ qu ≤ qn, αqn ≤ qu− qr + qeol, qeol ≤ qn− qu + qr, and qr, qu, qn, qeol ≥ 0.
The Hessian of the per-period profit function is negative definite for δ < δr and
δ, δr ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the profit function is jointly concave in qn, qu, qr and qeol.
The Lagrangian of the problem is given by L(qn, qu, qr, qeol, λ, µ, η, ω, β1, β2, β3, β4) =
Π(qn, qu, qr, qeol) − λ(qr − qu) − µ(qu − qn) − η(αqn − qu + qr − qeol) − ω(qeol −
qn + qu − qr) + β1qn + β2qu + β3qr + β4qeol. The first-order conditions are given

















= 0. There are fourteen
candidate solutions as summarized below.
Case 1. qr = qu = qn = 0, which implies λ, µ, η, ω, β1, β2, β3, β4 ≥ 0. It is
straightforward to show that the required condition for this case is c ≥ 1 − sα −
αmin(k, δr − cr) + δr − cr. To restrict our analysis to parameters for the producer to
have non-negative profit, we assume c < 1 − sα − αmin(k, δr − cr) + δr − cr holds,
which rules out this case.
Case 2. 0 < qr < qu < qn, qeol = 0, qu − qr > αqn, which implies
114
β4 ≥ 0 and λ, µ, η, ω, β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0,
Ψ2(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ3(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ4(0, 0, β4) = 0 gives
qn =
1−c+cr−sα−δr












δr−δ ), and β4 = k,




= cr5(c, s, α, δ, δr)
and s < 1−c(2−α)+cr(2−α)−α−δr+αδr
(2−α)α
.




1−c+cr−sα−δr , which is increasing in s and α.
Case 3. qeol = 0, 0 < qr < qu, qu − qr = αqn, which implies η, β4 ≥ 0 and
λ, µ, ω, β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, qr, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, η, 0, 0) =
0, Ψ3(qn, qu, qr, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ4(η, 0, β4) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+cr+2δ−α(s+δ)−δr










1+(2−α)2δ−δr , and β4 = k − δ −
(2−α)δ(−1+c−cr−2δ+α(s+δ)+δr)
1+(2−α)2δ−δr .












= s6(c, α, cr, δr, δ, k), where s4(·) < s5(·), s6(·),
and s5(·) < s6(·) for cr < k(δr−δ)δ . qn is decreasing in s and increasing in α for α < α
r
1(·)
(expression omitted for brevity). ru = 1− α, which is decreasing in α.
Case 4. 0 < qr < qu = qn, qeol = 0, qu − qr = αqn, which implies µ, η, β4 ≥ 0 and
λ, ω, β1, β2, β3 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, qr, µ, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qn, qr, 0, µ, η, 0, 0) = 0,
Ψ3(qn, qn, qr, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ4(η, 0, β4) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+(δr−cr)(1−α)−αs
2+2(3−α)(1−α)δr , qr =
(1−α)(1−c−sα+(1−α)(δr−cr))
2+2(3−α)(1−α)δr , µ = −cr− δ+ δr +
(2−α)(δr−δ)(−1+c+sα−(1−α)(δr−cr))
1+(3−α)(1−α)δr , η = −cr +
δr+
(2−α)δr(−1+c+sα−(1−α)(δr−cr))
1+(3−α)(1−α)δr , and β4 = cr+k−δr−
(2−α)δr(−1+c+sα−(1−α)(δr−cr))
1+(3−α)(1−α)δr . The
required conditions are s5(·) ≤ s ≤ cr(1+(1−α)δr)+k(1+(3−α)(1−α)δr)+δr((1−α)(1−δr)−c)(2−α)αδr
.
=




= cr7(c, s, α, δr), where cr6(·) < cr7(·), and
s5(·) < s7(·) holds only for cr < k(δr−δ)δ . qn is decreasing in s and α. ru = 1 − α is
decreasing in α.
Case 5. 0 < qr < qu = qn, qeol > 0, qu − qr + qeol = αqn, which implies µ, η ≥ 0 and
λ, ω, β1, β2, β3, β4 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, qr, µ, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qn, qr, 0, µ, η, 0, 0) =
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s8(cr, k, c, α, δ, δr), cr < δr(c+sα)−k(1−δr(1−α))
.




where s7(·) < s8(·) holds only for cr < δr−k. qn is decreasing in s and α but increasing
in k. ru = cr+k−(c−k+(k+s)α)δr
δr(−1+c−cr−2k+(k+s)α+δr) , which is increasing in α and s but decreasing in
k.
Case 6. 0 < qr < qu < qn, qeol > 0, qu − qr + qeol = αqn, which
implies η ≥ 0 and λ, µ, ω, β1, β2, β3, β4 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, qr, 0, η, 0, 0) =
0, Ψ2(qn, qu, qr, 0, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ3(qn, qu, qr, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ4(η, 0, 0) =
0 gives qn =
1−c+cr+2k−(k+s)α+δr








1−δr ), qr =
(δr−δ)(c−2k+(k+s)α)+crδ−cr






1−δr ), and η =
k. The required conditions are s6(·) < s < δ(1−2c+2cr−δr)−k(−1+2δ(−2+α)+δr)2αδ
.
=







= cr9(c, k, α, s, δ, δr), where
s6(·) < s9(·) holds for δ > k. qn is decreasing in s and α but increasing in k.
ru = k(1+(2−α)δ−δr)−(c−cr+sα)δ
δ(−1+c−cr−2k+(k+s)α+δr) is increasing in s and α but decreasing in k.
Case 7. 0 < qr = qu < qn, qeol = αqn, which implies λ, η ≥ 0 and
µ, ω, β1, β2, β3, β4 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, qu, 0, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, qu, λ, 0, η, 0, 0) =
0, Ψ3(qn, qu, qu, λ, η, 0, 0) = 0, and Ψ4(η, 0, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+cr−(k+s)α+2δ−δr
2+8δ−2δr , qu =
cr+3crδ+(c+(k+s)α+2δ)(δ−δr)
2(δ−δr)(1+4δ−δr) , λ =
δ(−1+2c−2cr+2sα+δr)+k(−1−2(2−α)δ+δr)
1+4δ−δr , and η = k. The
required conditions are s9(·) < s < (δr−δ)(−1+2c+2kα+δr)+cr(1+2δ+δr)2α(δr−δ)
.









. qn is decreasing in s, α and k, and ru = 1.
Case 8. 0 < qr = qu = qn, qeol = αqn, which implies λ, µ, η ≥ 0 and
ω, β1, β2, β3, β4 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, qn, µ, η, 0, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qn, qn, λ, µ, η, 0, 0) = 0,









η = k. The required conditions are s10(·), s8(·) ≤ s and cr < 1− c− k(α + s) + δr
.
=
cr11(c, k, α, s, δr), where cr10(·) < cr11(·), and s8(·) < s10(·) holds only if cr > k(δr−δ)δ .
qn is strictly decreasing in s, α and k, and ru = 1 for this case.
Case 9. qr = 0, qeol = 0, qu > 0, αqn = qu. This case is identical to Case 2 from the
proof of Propositions 1 and 2, except with an additional condition cr ≥ cr7(·).
Case 10. qr = 0, qeol = 0, qu > 0, αqn < qu < qn. This case is identical to Case 3 from
the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, except with an additional condition cr ≥ cr5(·).
Case 11. qr = 0, qu > 0, qeol = 0, αqn < qu = qn. This case is identical to Case 4
from the proof of Propositions 1 and 2 and is ruled out.
Case 12. qr = qu = 0, 0 < qeol = αqn. This case is identical to Case 5 from the proof
of Propositions 1 and 2, except with an additional condition cr ≥ cr11(·).
Case 13. qr = qu = 0, 0 < qeol and qeol > αqn. This case is identical to Case 6 from
the proof of Propositions 1 and 2 and is ruled out.
Case 14. qr = 0, qu > 0, qeol > 0, αqn = qu+qeol. This case is identical to Case 7 from
the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, except with an additional condition cr ≥ cr9(·).
Summarizing the above cases, qr > 0 if and only if cr < r3(c, δr, δ, k, s, α), where:
(i) if cr <
k(δr−δ)
δ
, we have r3(·) = cr5(·) for s < s4(·), r3(·) = cr6(·) for s4(·) ≤
s < s5(·), r3(·) = cr7(·) for s5(·) ≤ s ≤ s7(·), r3(·) = cr8(·) for s7(·) < s < s8(·)
and r3(·) = cr11(·) for s8(·) ≤ s, and (ii). if cr ≥ k(δr−δ)δ , we have r3(·) = cr5(·) for
s < s4(·), r3(·) = cr6(·) for s4(·) ≤ s ≤ s6(·), r3(·) = cr9(·) for s6(·) < s < s9(·),
r3(·) = cr10(·) for s9(·) ≤ s < s10(·) and r3(·) = cr11(·) for s10(·) ≤ s. This proves
Lemma 4.
To prove Propositions 8 and 9, assume δ ≥ 1 − 2c. Note that qu > 0
for s < min{s6(·), s7(·)} (Cases 2, 3 and 4) and the condition for non-negative
profit under k ≥ δr − cr can be written as s < 1−c+(1−α)(δr−cr)α , which is always
lower than min{s6(·), s7(·)} for k > δr − cr. Therefore, for k > δr − cr,
qu − qr > 0 and qeol = 0, proving Proposition 8. The threshold for non-negative
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profit is higher than min{s6(·), s7(·)} for k < δr − cr. Therefore, under this
condition, we have Used Product Recycling and qu − qr > αqn (Case 2) for
s ≤ sr0(δr, δ, α, c, cr)
.
= s4(·), Used Product Recycling and qu − qr = αqn (Cases
2, 3 and 4) for s ≤ sr1(δr, δ, α, c, k, cr)
.
= min{s6(·), s7(·)}, Mixed Recycling for sr1(·) <
s < sr2(δr, δ, α, c, k, cr)
.
= min{s8(·), s9(·)} and End-of-Life Recycling otherwise. Note















αδr(2−α) > 0, the thresholds s
r
1(·) and sr2(·) are increasing in cr, proving
Proposition 9.
To prove Proposition 10, assume δ < 1− 2c and cr < r3(·), which implies qr > 0.
The relevant cases from the analysis in the absence of EPR are Cases 2, 3 and 4. The
relevant cases from the analysis in the presence of EPR are Cases 2-8. We begin by
considering the setting with cr ≤ cr2(·), which implies that qu− qr = 0 in the absence
of EPR. In the presence of EPR, qu − qr = 0 for Cases 7 and 8 and qu − qr > 0 for
Cases 2-6. Therefore, qu − qr is weakly higher in the presence of EPR.
We next consider the setting with cr2(·) < cr, which implies that qu − qr =
−1+2(c−cr)+δr








r(c, δr, cr). We compare this with Cases 2-8 in the presence of EPR. Comparing
with Case 2, where qu − qr = 12 −
c−cr+sα
1−δr , we have (
−1+2(c−cr)+δr





0. Note that condition sr4(·) > 0 is equivalent to α < α̂4
r(·). Comparing










r(δ, δr, α, c, cr) and α > α̂4
r(·). Comparing with Case 4, where qu − qr =
α(1−c−cr(1−α)+δr−α(s+δr))
2+2(3−α)(1−α)δr , we have (
−1+2(c−cr)+δr
2(1−δr) ) − (
α(1−c−cr(1−α)+δr−α(s+δr))
2+2(3−α)(1−α)δr ) < 0 only




r(δr, α, c, cr) and
α > α̂4



















r(δr, α, cr, k) and α > α̂4





1−δr , we have (
−1+2(c−cr)+δr









r(δ, δr, k) and α > α̂4
r(·). Finally, qu − qr = 0 under Cases 7
and 8, which implies qu − qr is lower in the presence of EPR.
Summarizing the above, we have that qu − qr is higher in the presence of EPR if
s < ŝr(δ, α, c, k, cr) and α ≥ α̂r(c, δr, cr), where ŝr(·) = ŝ1r(·) for s ≤ min(s5(·), s6(·)),
ŝr(·) = ŝ2r(·) for s5(·) ≤ s ≤ s7(·) and cr < k(δr−δ)δ , ŝ









Finally, we show that the Propositions 5-7 hold when qr > 0. Proposition 5 holds
because qn is decreasing and ru is increasing in s under all cases. As
dqn
dk
< 0 under the
End-of-Life strategy (Cases 7 and 8), dqn
dk
> 0 and dru
dk
< 0 under the Mixed Recycling
strategy (Cases 5 and 6), which shows that Proposition 6 holds. Under Used Product





< 0. Under all other strategies, dqn
dα
< 0. 
A3. Additional collection cost for used products. Assume the producer also
faces an additional collection cost for the used products (in addition to the price pu).
Let this cost be denoted by x per unit. If the firm has no incentive to collect more
than the target imposed by the regulation, we have qu = αqn− qeol. Substituting this
into the firm’s profit function Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn− (pu(qn, qu) + x)qu−
kqeol − sαqn, we get Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu) − c̃)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − k̃qeol − sαqn,
where c̃ = c+αx and k̃ = k−x. Therefore, an additional cost to collect used products
can be easily captured in our model by internalizing this cost into the production cost
and the cost to collect end-of-life products. Accordingly, our structural results remain
unchanged.
A4. Paying consumers for end-of-life products. Assume that the municipal
collection has to pay a fee x
′
to recover an end-of-life product from the consumers,
where x
′
< k, which captures that it recovers them at a lower cost than it charges
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to the producer. This additional payment to the consumers increases their valuation
of the product. To differentiate the notation for this case, we use the superscript
′
.
While the per-period utility from N and I remains the same, the per-period utility
from U is now given by δθ− pu + ρx
′
. Following the derivation of the inverse demand









. Solving for the
market-clearing price on the secondary market, we get the inverse demand functions
as p
′













u = pu + ρx
′
. The producer’s problem is then given
by (p
′
n(qn, qu)− c)qn − (p
′





u(qn, qu) + ρx
′









= c−ρ(x′)2. Note that
this is similar to the producer’s problem with an additional collection cost for used
products as discussed in §A3. Substituting qu = αqn−qeol, we get that the producer’s
problem can be rewritten as (pn(qn, qu) − c̃
′
)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − k̃
′
qeol − sαqn, where
c̃
′
= c−ρ(x′)2 +αρx′ and k̃ = k−ρx′ . Therefore, an additional payment to consumers
for end-of-life products can be easily captured in our model by internalizing this cost
into the production cost and the cost to collect end-of-life products. Accordingly, our
structural results remain unchanged.
A5. Details of numerical study and estimation of parameter values. We
now provide a detailed description of how we estimate the parameters for our two
examples in §2.4.3, viz., Apple iPods and iPhones.
In order to calibrate our model, we generalize it as follows: First, we assume that
consumer willingness to pay is distributed between [0, B], where B > 1 represents
the maximum consumer willingness to pay for a new product. Second, we modify the
consumers’ utility by assuming that the per-period net utility is given by θ−b(pn+ρpu)
from N , δθ − bpu from U , and 0 from I, where b > 0 captures the price sensitivity.






for qu < qn.
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We next describe how we estimate B, b and δ for each of our two examples.
We first begin by focusing on iPod Nanos. [2] find that the average maximum
willingness-to-pay for new Apple iPod Nanos is approximately $190. The price for
a new iPod Nano is approximately $150. Apple pays $15 to recover any used iPod
Nano. Substituting p∗n = 150, p
∗









, we get δ = 0.13 and b = 0.84. While we cannot find an estimate of B for
Apple iPhones, given the similarity between the product categories, we can assume
that the ratio of the new-product price and B for iPhones is similar to that for iPods,
which is given by 190/150 = 1.267. The average price for a new iPhone without
a contract is approximately $750, which also yields B = 750(1.267) = 948.23. We
found that Apple pays $85 for a used 5th generation iPhone. Substituting p∗n = 600,








, we get δ = 0.15
and b = 0.84.
We can also conduct the above analysis by estimating the price of a used product
using data from eBay auctions. We examined all ebay auctions for 5th generation iPod
Nano which had active bids on May 27th 2015 that offered free shipping. There were
11 such auctions, with an average highest bid of $37.5 (details available on request).
Using this value of p∗u gives δ = 0.41 and b = 1.05. We examined eBay auctions for 5
th
generation iPhones which had active bids on May 27th 2015 and were closing in less
than 1 day. There were 11 such auctions, with an average highest bid of $151 (details
available on request). Using this value of p∗u gives δ = 0.3 and b = 0.95. Therefore,
using eBay data provides slightly higher estimates for δ and b. However, it can be
shown that using these estimates further strengthens the insights and conclusions
from our calibration study, i.e., increased interference occurs at even lower collection
targets (details available on request).
A6. Welfare Analysis. We now provide a brief discussion of how the presence
of EPR for durable products influences the total welfare. Consider a total welfare
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function (W ) that consists of the following three terms: Producer’s profit Π, consumer
surplus (denoted by CS), and total environmental impact (denoted by EI), where
W = Π + CS − EI. It is straightforward to show that the producer’s profit and
consumer surplus both decrease in the recycling cost s, collection cost for end-of-life
products k, and collection target α. This is intuitive because EPR imposes these
additional recycling and collection costs, which decreases the producer’s net margin.
This has a detrimental effect on the producer’s profit, requiring higher prices, which in
turn, decreases the consumer surplus. The effect of EPR on total welfare then depends
on how it influences the total environmental impact. EI depends on the volume
of products in each life-cycle phase arising from the producer’s profit-maximizing
decisions, and the per-unit impact of a product in each life-cycle phase. Let ip, iu1,
iu2, ir, and id denote the per-unit production impact, the per-unit use impact of a
new product, the per-unit use impact of an used product, the per-unit impact due
to recycling of a product, and the per-unit impact due to disposal of a product,
respectively. As the product’s use impact may degrade over time, we assume iu2 ≥
iu1. Moreover, as recycling is an environmentally superior alternative to disposal,
we have ir < id. The total environmental impact can then be written as EI =
(ip + iu1)qn + iu2(qn − qu) + ir(αqn) + id(1 − α)qn = (i + iu2)qn − iu2qu, where i =
ip + iu1 + irα+ id(1− α). This effectively suggests that a total welfare analysis boils
down to a comparison between how different EPR parameter choices affect qu and qn,
similarly to the analysis presented in the context of the Waste Management Hierarchy.
A7. Derivation of inverse demand functions in presence of refurbishing. We
now explain how the inverse demand functions are modified to consider refurbished
products. The action vector of consumer with type θ in period t is now given
by Ct(θ) = (N t(θ), Rt(θ), U t(θ), I t(θ)), where indicator variable Rt corresponds to
buying a refurbished product (R). Under stationarity, the per period net utility from
R is δrθ − pr where 0 < δ < δr < 1. There are four additional strategies for the
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consumers, viz., RN , RR, RU and RI. As discussed before, any strategy where a
consumer chooses an action which is different than the action in the previous period
(RN , RU and RI) is dominated. The present value of RR strategy can be calculated
using the Bellman equation Vθ[R, p] = δrθ − pr + ρVθ[R, p] as Vθ[R, p] = δrθ−pr1−ρ .







> 0. This implies that the consumers who play NN have higher
valuation θ than the ones who play RR, who in turn have higher θ than the consumers




3 represent the indifferent consumer types between
NN and RR, RR and UU , and between UU and II strategies, respectively. The
consumers with valuations θ ∈ (0, θr3] play the II strategy, the consumers with
valuations θ ∈ (θr3, θr2] play the UU strategy, the consumers with valuations θ ∈ (θr2, θr1]
play the RR strategy, and the consumers with valuations θ ∈ (θr1, 1] play the NN















1−δr by solving Vθ[N, p] = Vθ[R, p]. Note that we
retain the assumption ρ = 1 for the rest of the analysis.
As before, in the secondary market, the supply of used products is given by 1−θr1.
Demand for the used products is given by θr2−θr3+qu. The market-clearing price for the
used products on the secondary market is obtained by solving 1− θr1 = θr2 − θr3 + qu,
and the demand for new and refurbished products is given by qn = 1 − θr1 and
qr = θ
r
1 − θr2. Solving these simultaneously, the inverse demand functions are given
by pn(qn, qr, qu) = 1 + δ + 2quδ − qn(1 + 3δ)− qr(δ + δr), pr(qn, qr, qu) = quδ + δr(1−
qr)− qn(δ + δr), and pu(qn, qr, qu) = δ(1− 2qn − qr + qu).
A8. Limited access to used and end-of-life products. We now consider the case
where some consumers hold onto their used or end-of-life products even though they
have purchased a new or used product. We use superscript l to denote this case. Let
γ ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of consumers that do not hold onto their product. As
this influences the secondary market price, we begin by discussing the change in the
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inverse demand functions. The per-period net utility from U and I remains the same.
However, as a fraction γ of the consumers playing N hold onto their used products,
the per-period net utility from N is now given by θ − pn + γρpu. Following the




. In order to solve for the market clearing price, the supply of used
products is now given by γ(1 − θ1). Therefore, solving γ(1 − θ1) = θ1 − θ2 + qu and
1 − θ1 = qn for pu and pn, we get pn = 1 + δ(γ + qu + γqu) − qn(1 + γ(2 + γ)δ) and
pu = δ(1 − qn(1 + γ) + qu). For the rest of the analysis, we assume ρ = 1 as in our
basic model.
We begin by considering the no EPR case, i.e., α = 0. The producer’s problem is
given by maxqn,qu(pn(qn, qu)− c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu, such that qu ≤ γqn and qu, qn ≥ 0.
The profit function is jointly concave in qn and qu. The Lagrangian of the problem
is given by L(qn, qu, λ, µ1, µ2) = (pn(qn, qu) − c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − λ(qu − γqn) +









= 0. There are four candidate solutions:
Case 1. qu = qn = 0, which implies λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(0, 0, λ, µ1) = 0 gives
λ + µ1 = c − 1 − γδ. λ, µ1 ≥ 0 requires c ≥ 1 + γδ. To restrict our analysis to
parameters for the producer to have non-negative profit, we assume c < 1 + γδ, and
this case is ruled out.
Case 2. 0 = qu < qn, which implies λ, µ1 = 0, and µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, 0, 0, 0) = 0






. qn > 0 due
to the assumption c < 1 + γδ. µ2 ≥ 0 if and only if δ ≥ γ−c(1+γ)γ .
Case 3. 0 < qu = qn, which implies λ ≥ 0, and µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, λ, 0) =
0 and Ψ2(qn, qn, λ, 0) = 0 gives λ =
−δ(1−δ−γ(1−c−δ))
1−δ(1−γ) < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 4. 0 < qu < qn, which implies λ = µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0
and Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−δ−c
2(1−δ) and qu =
γ(1−δ)−(1+γ)c
2(1−δ) , where qn > qu holds.





Summarizing the above: if δ < γ−c(1+γ)
γ
, then 0 < qu < qn, otherwise, qu = 0.
We next consider the EPR case and assume α < γ. Otherwise, the producer
will not be able to meet the target. The producer’s problem is given by
maxqn,qu,qeol Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu) − c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − sαqn − kqeol, such
that qeol ≤ γ(γqn − qu), αqn ≤ qu + qeol, and qn, qu, qeol ≥ 0. The profit function
is jointly concave in qn, qu, and qeol. The Lagrangian of the problem is given by
L(qn, qu, qeol, λ, µ, β1, β2, β3) = π(qn, qu, qeol, 0) − λ(qeol + γqu − γ2qn) − µ(αqn − qu −













= 0. There are seven candidate
solutions (summarized below).
Case 1. qu = qeol = 0, which implies qn = 0 and λ, µ, β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0.








= s2l∗ (δ, α, c, γ),
(1−γ)(1−c)+(α−γ)(kγ−δ)
α(1−γ) },
which can be simplified as c ≥ 1 − αs + max{γδ − αk, (γ−α)(δ−γk)
1−γ }. To ensure
non-negativity of the producer’s profit, we hereafter assume c < 1− αs+ max{γδ −
αk, (γ−α)(δ−γk)
1−γ } holds, which rules out this case.
Case 2. qu > 0, qeol = 0, αqn = qu < γqn, which implies λ = β1 = β2 = 0 and
µ, β3 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, αqn, 0, µ, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, αqn, 0, µ, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(0, µ, β3) =
0 gives qn =
1−c+(γ−α)δ−αs
2+2(2+γ−α)(γ−α)δ , µ =
δ(α−(c+sα)(−1+α−γ)−γ+δ(γ−α))
1+δ(γ−α)(2+γ−α) , and β3 = k − δ +
(−1+α−γ)δ(−1+c+sα+δ(α−γ))
1+δ(γ−α)(2+γ−α) . For qu > 0, µ ≥ 0 and β3 ≥ 0, the required conditions




= sl0(δ, α, c). As s
l
0(·) < sl1(·), sl0(·) < s∗l2 (·), and sl1(·) ≤ s∗l2 (·)
only for δ > k, the required conditions are sl0(·) ≤ s < s∗l2 (·) for δ ≤ k, and sl0(·) ≤
s ≤ sl1(·) for k < δ. qn is decreasing in s and increasing in α for α < αl1(·). ru = 1−α
is decreasing in α.
Case 3. qu > 0, qeol = 0 and αqn < qu < γqn, which implies λ = µ = β1 = β2 = 0




2(1−δ) , qu =
(1−δ)γ+(c+sα)(1+γ)
2(1−δ) , and β3 = k. For αqn < qu and qu > 0, the
required condition is s < sl0(·), where sl0(·) ≥ 0 only if δ ≤
γ−c(1+γ)
γ
. qn is decreasing
and ru = 1−δ−γ(1−c−sα−δ)
1−c−sα−δ is increasing in α and s.
Case 4. qu > 0, qeol = 0 and αqn < qu = γqn, which implies β1 = β2 = µ = 0
and λ, β3 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, λ, 0, 0) = 0 and Ψ2(qn, qn, λ, 0, 0) = 0 gives λ =
− δ(c+αs)
γ
< 0, and this case is ruled out.
Case 5. qu = 0, qeol > 0 and αqn = qeol < γ
2qn, which implies λ = β1 = β3 = 0 and








For qeol > 0 and β2 ≥ 0, the required conditions are k−cδ+k(−α(1+γ)+γ(2+γ))δ+γδ(1−c−δ)(1+γ)αδ
.
=
sl2(δ, α, c, k) ≤ s < s1∗(·), where sl2(·) < s1l∗ (·) holds only for k < δ. Note that this case
can only hold when αqn < γ
2qn or α < γ
2. qn is decreasing in α, s and k.
Case 6. qu ≥ 0, qeol > 0 and αqn < qeol ≤ γ2qn, which gives µ = β1 = β3 = 0 and
λ ≥ 0. In this case, Ψ3(0, 0, 0) = −λ− k < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 7. qu > 0, qeol > 0 and αqn − qu = qeol < γ2qn − γqu,
which gives λ = β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 and µ ≥ 0. Solving
Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, µ, 0) = 0, Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, µ, 0) = 0 and Ψ3(0, µ, 0) = 0 gives
qn =
1−c−sα−δ+k(1+γ−α)
2(1−δ) , qu =
cδ+k(−1+αδ(1+γ)−γδ(2+γ))+δ(sα(1+γ)−γ(1−c−δ))
2(1−δ)δ , qeol =
k−δ(α−γ)(2−α+γ)+δ(−α+(c+sα)(−1+α−γ)+γ+δ(α−γ))
2δ(1−δ) , and µ = k. For qu > 0 and qeol > 0, the
required conditions are sl1(·) < s < sl2(·), where sl1(·) < sl2(·) holds only for k < δ. qn is
decreasing in s and α but increasing in k. ru = k+k(−1+γ−αγ+γ
2)δ+δ(−1+δ−γ(−1+c+αs+δ))
δ(−1+c+αs+k(−1+α−γ)+δ) ,
which is increasing in s and α but decreasing in k.
When α ≤ γ2, the above cases can be summarized as follows: (i) δ ≤ k: if
s < sl0(·), αqn < qu < γqn, qeol = 0; if s ≥ sl0(·), qu = αqn, qeol = 0. (ii) k < δ:
if s < sl0(·), αqn < qu < γqn, qeol = 0; if sl0(·) ≤ s ≤ sl1(·), qu = αqn, qeol = 0; if
sl1(·) < s < sl2(·), qu, qeol > 0, qu + qeol = αqn, and if s ≥ sl2(·), qu = 0, qeol = αqn.
However, when α > γ2, then the result for δ ≤ k is similar as above, but for k < δ,
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qu > 0 always holds. This shows that for the case with limited access, Propositions 1
and 2 structurally hold for α ≤ γ2. The only difference for α > γ2 is that qu is always
positive.
To show that Proposition 3 holds, assume δ < γ−c(1+γ)
γ
. We need to compare
the qu =
γ(1−δ)−(1+γ)c
2(1−δ) (> 0) in the absence of EPR with the cases above that hold
for δ < γ−c(1+γ)
γ






2(1−δ) > 0. Note that the condition
sl0(·) > 0 can be written as α < α̂l(δ, c, γ)
.
= γ−c(1+γ)−γδ
1−c−δ . If s
l
0(·) ≤ s ≤ sl1(·),











l(δ, α, c) and α ≥ α̂l(·). Comparison with









l(δ, α, k) and α ≥ α̂l(·), where ŝ2l(·) < sl2(·). Finally,
comparing with Case 5 (where s ≥ sl2(·)),
γ(1−δ)−(1+γ)c
2(1−δ) − 0 > 0. Therefore, this
analysis shows that EPR increases interference if α ≥ α̂l(·) and s < ŝl(·), which
implies that Proposition 3 holds for this case.
















which shows that Proposition 4 also holds for this case. qn is decreasing and ru
is increasing in s under all cases, which implies that Proposition 5 holds. dqn
dk
< 0
under the End-of-Life strategy (Case 5), dqn
dk
> 0 and dru
dk
< 0 under the Mixed
Recycling strategy (Case 7), which shows that Proposition 6 holds. Under Used
Product Recycling strategy with s ≥ sl0(·) (Case 2),
dqn
dα
> 0 if and only if α < αl1(·)
and dru
dα
is decreasing in α. Under all other strategies (Cases 3, 5 and 7), dqn
dα
< 0.
A9. EPR implementations with Recycling Fees. Recall that the
producer’s problem under EPR where they are operationally responsible is given by
maxqn,qu,qeol Π(qn, qu, qeol) = (pn(qn, qu)− c)qn − pu(qn, qu)qu − sαqn − kqeol, such that
qeol ≤ qn − qu, αqn ≤ qu + qeol, and qn, qu, qeol ≥ 0. Assume that the producer collects
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only the volume required to meet the EPR target, i.e., qeol + qu = αqn. Substituting
the value of qeol from this into the producer’s profit yields, max0≤qu≤qn(pn(qn, qu) −
c)qn − (pu(qn, qu)− k)qu − α(s + k)qn. We now consider an implementation where a
state authority manages the recycling system and charges a unit recycling fee, and the
producer can bring in used products as a collector. The producer’s problem under
such a setting is given by max0≤qu≤qn(pn(qn, qu) − c)qn − (pu(qn, qu) − κ)qu − σqn.
Comparing these two, it can be seen that they are equivalent in structure with κ ≡ k
and σ ≡ α(s+ k).
We next solve the producer’s problem under such an implementation. The profit
function is jointly concave in qn and qu. The Lagrangian of the problem is given by
L(qn, qu, λ, µ1, µ2) = (pn(qn, qu)−c)qn−(pu(qn, qu)−κ)qu−σqn−λ(qu−qn)+µ1qn+µ2qu.









= −λ+µ2− δ(1− 4qn + 2qu) +κ = 0.
There are four candidate solutions summarized below.
Case 1. qu = qn = 0, which implies λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(0, 0, λ, µ1) = 0 gives
λ + µ1 = c− 1− δ + σ. λ, µ1 ≥ 0 requires c + σ ≥ 1 + δ. To restrict our analysis to
parameters for the producer to have non-negative profit, we assume c + σ < 1 + δ,
and this case is ruled out.
Case 2. 0 = qu < qn, which implies λ = µ1 = 0, and µ2 ≥ 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, 0, 0, 0) =






. qn > 0 due
to the assumption c+ σ < 1 + δ. ru = 1 and qn is decreasing in σ.
Case 3. 0 < qu = qn, which implies λ ≥ 0 and µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qn, λ, 0) =
0 and Ψ2(qn, qn, λ, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−c+κ−σ
2
, which is decreasing in σ and increasing
in κ. qu(= qn) is higher than that under no EPR if σ < S1 (expression not provided
for brevity).
Case 4. 0 < qu < qn, which implies λ = µ1 = µ2 = 0. Solving Ψ1(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0
and Ψ2(qn, qu, 0, 0) = 0 gives qn =
1−δ−c−σ+2κ
2(1−δ) and qu =
κ−δ(−1+2c+δ−3κ+2σ)
2δ(1−δ) , where qn
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is decreasing in σ and increasing in κ. ru = κ−δ(c−κ+σ)
δ(−1+c+δ−2κ+σ) , which is decreasing in κ
and is increasing in σ when δ > κ. qu is higher than that under no EPR if σ < S2
(expression not provided for brevity).
As can be seen from above, a higher σ may lead to greater reuse and lower
production, a higher κ may lead to higher production and lower reuse, and EPR
may lead to greater interference.
A10. Charging unit recycling fee to consumers. We now show that the model
where the recycling fee is directly charged to the consumers, is equivalent to the
model where it is directly charged to the producer. We first analyze how the demand
functions change if the consumers are charged a unit recycling fee denoted by σ.
To differentiate the notation for this case, we use the superscript ′′. The per-period
net utility from N is now given by θ − pn + ρpu − σ, while from U and I remain














. Solving for the market-clearing price on the secondary
market, we get p
′′
u = δ(1−2qn+qu) and p
′′
n = 1−qn+δ(−qn+qu+ρ(1−2qn+qu))−σ.
Note that the price of used products p
′′
u in this case is identical to our base case (i.e.,
p
′′
u = pu) and the price of new products is lower by σ, i.e., p
′′
n = pn−σ. The producer’s
problem is given by (p
′′
n(qn, qu)− c)qn − (p
′′
u(qn, qu)− κ)qu = (pn(qn, qu)− c− σ)qn −
(pu(qn, qu) − κ)qu, which is identical to the case where the recycling fee is directly
charged to the producer (as discussed in §A9).
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APPENDIX B
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS
A1. Proofs.
Proof of Lemma 5: The utility maximization problem of the doctor is given by
q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = argmax qpUd(qp) = up θn−p qp+ηd qp−od (1−ηp) (qp−θn)+, such that
θn ≤ qp ≤ 1. Due to the constraint qp ≥ θn, the utility reduces to (ηd − od (1− ηp)−
p) qp + (od (1− ηp) + up) θn. Since ∂Ud(qp)∂qp = ηd− od (1− ηp)− p and θn ≤ qp ≤ 1, the
doctor provides q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = 1 > θn, i.e., over-prescription, if ηd−od (1−ηp)−p ≥ 0;
and q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = θn if ηd − od (1− ηp)− p < 0. Note that when the doctor provides
over-prescription doctor utility is always non-negative, otherwise ηd − p + up ≥ 0 is
the required condition. This proves Lemma 5. 
Proof of Proposition 11-12: Assume that the policy is EC (SR). The producer
knows how p, ηd and ηp affect the doctor prescription behavior as given by Lemma 5.
Accordingly, the producer calculates his expected profits from the following two
problems based on θn, θu v U [0, 1] (θn v U [0, 1]).
Problem (i): Set p, ηd, ηp such that p − up ≤ ηd < od (1 − ηp) + p to have
q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = θn. Note that q
∗
u(p, ηd, ηp) = min{θn, θu}. The producer’s problem is
maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p θn − k rEC (θn −min{θn, θu})− α η2d − β η2p] =
p 1
2
−k rEC 16−α η
2
d−β η2p (maxηd,ηp,p Π
SR(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn [(p−t) θn−α η2d−β η2p] =
(p−t) 1
2
−α η2d−β η2p), such that−up ≤ ηd−p < od (1−ηp), 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1.
The Hessian of the expected profit function is




, which is negative definite.
Hence, the expected profit function is jointly concave in p, ηd and ηp. Lagrangian
of the problem is L(p, ηd, ηp, λ, µ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4) = p
1
2
− k rEC 16 − α η
2
d − β η2p −
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λ (−up− ηd + p)− µ (ηd− p− od (1− ηp)) + ω1 ηd + ω2 (1− ηd) + ω3 ηp + ω4 (1− ηp)
(L(p, ηd, ηp, λ, µ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4) = (p−t) 12−α η
2
d−β η2p−λ (−up−ηd+p)−µ (ηd−p−











= ω1−ω2 +λ−µ−2α ηd = 0,




= ω3 − ω4 − µ od − 2β ηp = 0. Ψ3(ω3, ω4, µ)
.
= 0 gives ω3 =
ω4 + µ od + 2β ηp. This implies when ηp > 0, ω3 > 0 should hold, which contradicts
with ω3 ηp = 0. Hence, ηp = 0 and ω4 = 0. Ψ1(λ, µ)
.
= 0 gives λ = 1
2
+ µ. This
implies λ > 0 and −up = ηd−p, leading to µ = 0 and λ = 12 . Using Ψ3(ω3, ω4, µ)
.
= 0,
ω3 = ω4 = 0. Since ω1 and ω2 can not be both positive, there are three candidate
solutions, which are summarized below.






. −up = ηd − p leads to p = 14α + up. ηd ≤ 1 requires 4α ≥ 1. Given rEC(t),
the producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(i)









Case 2. ω1 = 0, ω2 > 0, which implies ηd = 1. −up = ηd − p leads to p = 1 + up.
Solving Ψ3(ω3, ω4, µ)
.
= 0 gives ω2 =
1
2
− 2 α ηd = 12 − 2α. ω2 > 0 requires 4α <
1. Given rEC(t), the producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(i)















, which contradicts with ω2 = 0. Hence, this case is ruled out.
Summarizing the above cases; if 4α < 1, p = 1 + up, ηd = 1, ηp = 0, and
Π
EC(i)














ηp = 0, and Π
EC(i)









Problem (ii): Set p, ηd, ηp such that od(1 − ηp) + p ≤ ηd to have q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) =
1. Note that q∗u(p, ηd, ηp) = min{1, θu} = θu. The producer’s problem is
maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(ii)




− α η2d − β η2p (maxηd,ηp,p Π
SR(ii)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn [(p − t) 1 − α η2d − β η2p] =
(p − t) − α η2d − β η2p), such that od (1 − ηp) + p ≤ ηd, 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1.
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The Hessian of the profit function is




, which is negative definite. Hence,
the profit function is jointly concave in p, ηd and ηp. Lagrangian of the problem is
L(p, ηd, ηp, λ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4) = p−k rEC 12−α η
2
d−β η2p−λ (od (1−ηp)+p−ηd)+ω1 ηd+
ω2 (1− ηd) +ω3 ηp +ω4 (1− ηp) (L(p, ηd, ηp, λ, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4) = (p− t)−α η2d−β η2p−
λ (od (1−ηp)+p−ηd)+ω1 ηd+ω2 (1−ηd)+ω3 ηp+ω4 (1−ηp)). The first-order conditions













= ω3−ω4 +λ od− 2β ηp = 0. Solving Ψ1(λ, µ)
.
= 0 gives λ = 1,
which implies ηd = p+ od(1− ηp). ω1 and ω2 can not be both positive. Similarly, ω3
and ω4 can not be both positive. Hence, there are six candidate solutions, which are
summarized below.
Case 1. ω1 > 0, ω2 = 0, which implies ηd = 0. Solving Ψ2(ω1, ω2, λ)
.
= 0 gives
ω1 = −1 < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 2. ω3 > 0, ω4 = 0, which implies ηp = 0. Solving Ψ3(ω3, ω4)
.
= 0 gives
ω3 = −od < 0, hence this case is ruled out.
Case 3. ω1, ω3, ω4 = 0 and ω2 > 0, which implies ηd = 1 and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. Solving
Ψ2(ω1, ω2, λ)
.
= 0 and Ψ3(ω3, ω4)
.
= 0 give ω1 = 2α−1 and ηp = od2β . ηd = p+od(1−ηp)
leads to p = 1−od+
o2d
2β
. ω1 > 0 and ηp ≤ 1 require 2α < 1 and od ≤ 2β. Given rEC(t),
the producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(ii)









Case 4. ω1, ω3 = 0 and ω2, ω4 > 0, which implies ηd = 1 and ηp = 1. Solving
Ψ2(ω1, ω2, λ)
.
= 0 and Ψ3(ω3, ω4)
.
= 0 give ω2 = 1 − 2α and ω4 = od − 2β. ηd =
p + od(1 − ηp) leads to p = 1. ω2 > 0 and ω4 > 0 require 2α < 1 and od > 2β.
Given rEC(t), the producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] = 1 − α − β − k rEC2
(Π
SR(ii)
m [t] = 1− α− β − t).
Case 5. ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0, which implies 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. Solving
Ψ2(ω1, ω2, λ)
.
= 0 and Ψ3(ω3, ω4)
.






. ηd = p + od(1 − ηp)






). ηd ≤ 1 and ηp ≤ 1 require 2α ≥ 1 and 2β ≥ od. Given
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rEC(t), the producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(ii)


















Case 6. ω1, ω2, ω3 = 0, ω4 > 0, which implies 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1 and ηp = 1. Solving
Ψ2(ω1, ω2, λ)
.
= 0 and Ψ3(ω3, ω4)
.
= 0 give ηd =
1
2α
and ω4 = od−2β. ηd = p+od(1−ηp)
leads to p = 1
2α
. ηd ≤ 1 and ω4 > 0 require 2α ≥ 1 and od > 2β. Given rEC(t), the
producer’s expected profit is Π
EC(ii)











Summarizing the above cases; if 2α < 1 and 2β < od, p = ηd = ηp = 1, and
Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] = 1 − α − β − k rEC2 (Π
SR(ii)
m [t] = 1 − α − β − t); if 2α < 1 and 2β ≥
od, p = 1 − od +
o2d
2β













); if 2α ≥ 1 and 2β < od, p = 12α , ηd =
1
2α
, ηp = 1,
and Π
EC(ii)










































We now need to compare expected profit of the producer in problems (i) and (ii)
under six cases: (I) α < 1
4
and 2β < od; (II) α <
1
4




2β < od; (IV)
1
2
≤ α < 1
2




2β ≥ od. To simplify the analysis, we make the following definitions:
· ΠEC/SR(i)m : producer’s expected profit under problem (i) given EC/SR policy
· ΠEC/SR(ii)m : producer’s expected profit under problem (ii) given EC/SR policy
· ri/ti: critical collection rate below which the producer obtains non-negative expected
profit under problem (i) given EC/SR policy
· rii/tii: critical collection rate below which the producer obtains non-negative
expected profit under problem (ii) given EC/SR policy
For brevity, we only provide the proof for (I) α < 1
4




2β ≥ od. The result can be similarly proved for other cases (details are available on
request). We restrict our analysis to parameters for the producer have non-negative
profit, i.e., ri/ti ≥ 0 and rii/tii ≥ 0.
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Case I. α < 1
4
and 2β < od, which implies r
i = 3−6α+3up
k
and rii = 2(1−α−β)
k
(ti =
1 − 2α + up and tii = 1 − α − β). ΠEC(ii)m [rEC ] > ΠEC(i)m [rEC ] (ΠSR(ii)m [rSR, t] >
Π
SR(i)
m [rSR, t]) when rEC <
3(1−2β−up)
2k
= r̄EC(up, β, k)
.
= r̄EC (t < 1 − 2β − up =
t̄(up, β)
.
= t̄) and Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] ≤ ΠEC(i)m [rEC ] (ΠSR(ii)m [rSR, t] ≤ ΠSR(i)m [rSR, t] otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that r̄EC > r






= ūECp (up < α−β = ūSRp (α, β)
.
= ūSRp ) and r̄EC ≤ rii ≤ ri (t̄ ≤ tii ≤ ti) for
up ≥ ūECp (up ≥ ūSRp ). When up < ūECp , there does not exist any rEC (t) that satisfies
r̄EC < rEC < r
i (t̄ < t < ti). This implies Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] > Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ] (Π
SR(ii)
m [rSR, t] >
Π
SR(i)
m [rSR, t]) for any rEC ∈ [0, 1] (t ≥ 0). ūECp < ūSRp as riiEC(tii) ≥ 0. Furthermore,
if k < 2(1 − α − β) = k̂(od, α, β)
.
= k̂, then rii > 1, meaning that Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] >
Π
EC(i)






r̄EC > 1, meaning that Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] > Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ] for any rEC ∈ [0, 1].
Case II. α < 1
4














m [rSR, t] > Π
SR(i)
m [rSR, t]) when rEC <
3(o2d+2β(1−2od−up))
4βk





m [rEC ] ≤ ΠEC(i)m [rEC ] (ΠSR(ii)m [rSR, t] ≤ ΠSR(i)m [rSR, t]) otherwise. It is
straightforward to show that r̄EC > r







ūECp (od, α, β)
.
= ūECp (up < α +
o2d
4β
− od = ūSRp (od, α, β)
.
= ūSRp ), and r̄EC ≤ rii ≤ ri













< 0). When up < ū
EC
p (up < ū
SR
p ), there does not exist any rEC (t) that
satisfies r̄EC < rEC < r
i
EC (t̄ < t < t
i). This implies Π
EC(ii)





m [rSR, t] > Π
SR(i)
m [rSR, t]) for any rEC ∈ [0, 1] (t ≥ 0). ūECp < ūSRp as
riiEC(t




= k̂(od, α, β)
.
= k̂, then rii > 1,
meaning that Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] > Π
EC(i)





= k̃, r̄EC > 1, meaning that Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] > Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ]
for any rEC ∈ [0, 1].
Summarizing the above cases, there exists a health unit benefit threshold ūECp
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(ūSRp ) under the EC (SR) policy such that if up < ū
EC




m [rEC ] >
Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ] (Π
SR(ii)
m [rSR, t] > Π
SR(i)
m [rSR, t]), i.e., the producer’s profit is higher when





≤ 0 and ūECp < ūSRp .This
proves Proposition 11. Furthermore, there also exists a collection cost threshold
k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} under the EC policy such that if k < k̄, ΠEC(ii)m [rEC ] > ΠEC(i)m [rEC ],
i.e., the producer’s profit is higher when it induces the over-prescription outcome.
This proves Proposition 12. 
Proof of Proposition 13: Assume that the chosen policy is EC (SR). The
social planner calculates the expected welfare at the equilibrium and sets the
welfare-maximizing collection rate r∗EC (collection rate r
∗
SR and fee t
∗). Total welfare
depends on the problems (i) and (ii) that the producer solves based on θn, θu v U [0, 1]
(θn v U [0, 1]), as summarized below.
Problem (i): The producer sets p = ηd + up to have q
∗
p(p, ηd, ηp) = θn,




p(p, ηd, ηp))] = Eθn [ηdθn − od(1 − ηp)(θn − θn) + upθn − pθn] =
Eθn [θn(ηd + up − p)] = 0, DU
EC(i)
e [rEC ] = Eθn,θu [εe(q
∗
















u(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn,θu [min{θn, θu}] = 13 and
Eθn,θu [(θn − q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))+] = 16 ; and Π
EC(i)




p(p, ηd, ηp))] = 0,
DU
SR(i)
e [rSR] = Eθn,θu [εe(q
∗























Given the assumptions up ≥ ūECp and k ≥ k̃ = min{k̃, k̂} = k̄ (up ≥ ūSRp ),
there may exist rEC (t) that can satisfy r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) (t̄ < t < ti).
The social planner’s problem is maxrEC W




p(p, ηd, ηp)) +
Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ] + Π
EC(i)









sp [rSR, t]−DUSR(i)e [rSR]−DUSR(i)s [rSR]), such
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that r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) (t̄ < t < ti). Constraint r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) ensures
that the producer’s profit is higher when it sets p = ηd + up than the case it sets
ηd = p+od(1−ηp), to avoid over-prescription. Consequently, the producer’s decisions
under Problem (ii) determine the total expected welfare at the equilibrium.
Problem (ii): The producer sets ηd = p+od(1−ηp) to have q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = 1 > θn,













+ (1 − rEC) 12 and DU
EC(ii)
s (rEC) = Eθn,θu [εs (1 − rEC)(1 − q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))] =
εs (1 − rEC) 12 as Eθn,θu [min{θn, θu}] = Eθn,θu [q
∗
u(p, ηd, ηp)] =
1
2




; and Eθn,θu [Π
EC(ii)













+ (1 − rSR) 12 and DU
SR(ii)
s (rSR) = Eθn,θu [εs (1 − rSR)(1 − q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))] =
εs (1 − rSR) 12 and Π
SR(ii)
sp (rSR) = Eθn,θu [t − k rSR (1 − θn)] = t − k rSR 12 as






There exists rEC (t) that can satisfy r < r̄EC (t < t̄). The social planner’s problem
is maxrEC W




p(p, ηd, ηp)) + Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] + Π
EC(ii)
sp [rEC ] −
DU
EC(ii)




p(p, ηd, ηp)) +
Π
SR(ii)
m [t] + Π
SR(ii)
sp [rSR, t] − DUSR(ii)e [rSR] − DUSR(ii)s [rSR]), such that rEC < r̄EC
(t < t̄). Constraint rEC < r̄ (t < t̄) ensures that the producer’s profit is
higher when it sets ηd = p + od(1 − ηp) than the case it sets p = ηd + up, to
induce over-prescription. Consequently, the producer’s decisions under Problem (i)
determine the total expected welfare at the equilibrium.





∗)) to obtain the welfare-maximizing preferred prescription outcome
under six cases: (I) α < 1
4
and 2β < od; (II) α <
1
4
and 2β ≥ od; (III) 12 ≤ α <
1
2
and 2β < od; (IV)
1
2
≤ α < 1
2
and 2β ≥ od; (V) α ≥ 12 and 2β < od; and
(VI) α ≥ 1
2




and 2β < od. The result can be similarly proved for other cases (details
are available on request). First consider the EC policy. Π
EC(i)












If k ≥ εe + εs, r∗EC = r̄EC =
3(1−2β−up)
2k
, leading to WEC(i)(r∗EC) =
1
6
(3 − 6α − 3εe −












when r∗EC = r
i
EC (or equivalently









. If k ≥ εe + εs,




; and if k < εe + εs, r
∗






(2(1 − α − β − εe) − εs + up − 3(εe+εs−k)(−1+2β+up)2k ).
Comparing the total welfare under problems (i) and (ii): if k ≥ εe+εs, WEC(ii)(r∗EC) >




e (εs, up, β, k)
.
= ε̄ECe , where
∂ε̄ECe
∂εs
< 0; if k < εe + εs and k < 3 − 6α + 3up, WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > WEC(i)(r∗EC) only
when εe < −εs + k + 2(3−6β+εs−3k)k−9+18β+8k+9up = ε̄
EC
e (εs, β, k)
.






and if k < εe + εs and k ≥ 3 − 6α + 3up, WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > WEC(i)(r∗EC) only when
εe < −εs + k − 2k(−3+6β−εs+3k)3(−1−4α+6β+2k+5u−p) = ε̄
EC
e (εs, up, β, k)
.

















. If k ≥ εe + εs,
t∗ ∈ [t̄, ti] and r∗SR = 0, leading to WEC(r∗SR, t∗) =
3−6α−2εe−k+3up
6
; and if k <
εe + εs, t
















; and if k < εe + εs, t
∗ ∈ [0, t̄) and r∗SR = 1,
leading to W SR(i)(r∗SR, t
∗) = 2(1−α−β)−εe−k+up
2
. Comparing the total welfare under
problems (i) and (ii): If k ≥ εe + εs, W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) > W SR(i)(r∗SR, t∗) only when









< 0; and if k < εe + εs,
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WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > W
EC(i)(r∗EC) only when εe < 3 − β − 2k = ε̄ECe (β, k)
.




Summarizing the above; there exists a environmental externality threshold
ε̄ECe (ε̄
SR
e ) such that if εe < ε̄
EC






∗) > W SR(i)(r∗SR, t
∗)), i.e., the total expected welfare is higher when




≤ 0.This proves Proposition 13. 
Proof of Proposition 14: We now calculate the total welfare under each policy
at the equilibrium and compare them to obtain the welfare-maximizing policy.
We need to make the comparison for six cases: (I) α < 1
4
and 2β < od; (II)
α < 1
4
and 2β ≥ od; (III) 12 ≤ α <
1
2
and 2β < od; (IV)
1
2
≤ α < 1
2
and
2β ≥ od; (V) α ≥ 12 and 2β < od; and (VI) α ≥
1
2
and 2β ≥ od. For brevity,
we only provide the proof for case (I) α < 1
4
and 2β < od. The result can
be similarly proved for other cases (details are available on request). Based on
Proposition 11, the producer’s profit depends on up vs. ūp. Hence, first assume that
up < ūp. The producer always obtains higher profit with inducing over-prescription
of the doctor, hence both policies result in over-prescription. Following the proof





, such that 0 ≤ rSR ≤ 1
and 0 < t < tii. Note that any t satisfying 0 < t < tii can be considered as the
equilibrium fee. On the other hand, under the EC policy, the planner solves the





that 0 ≤ rEC ≤ min{rii, 1}. When k < min{k̂, k̃} = k̂ = 2(1 − α − β), rii > 1 and
both problems become equivalent. Therefore, when up < ūp and k < k̄, both policies
leads to same level of total welfare at the equilibrium. When k ≥ min{k̂, k̃} = k̂,
rii ≤ 1, implying that r∗SR ≥ r∗EC . Therefore, when up < ūp and k ≥ k̄, SR leads
to same or higher level of total welfare at the equilibrium. Second assume that
up ≥ ūp. The SR policy still results in over-prescription and the planner solves
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such that 0 ≤ rSR ≤ 1 and 0 < t < tii. However, in this case, the EC
policy may or may not avoid over-prescription based on the unit collection cost
k, as Proposition 12 states. When k < k̃ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̄, r̄EC > 1 and the
producer always obtains higher profit with inducing over-prescription of the doctor,
hence both policies result in over-prescription. In this case, the planner solves the





that 0 ≤ rEC ≤ 1, which is equivalent to the problem under SR. Therefore, when
up ≥ ūp and k < k̄, both policies leads to same level of total welfare at the equilibrium.
When k ≥ k̃ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̄, r̄EC ≤ 1 and the producer can avoid over-prescription.




, such that r̄ < rEC < min{ri, 1} to avoid





such that 0 < rEC < r̄ to induce over-prescription. Based on Proposition 13,
when εe < ε̄
EC
e , the total welfare is higher with the over-prescription outcome,
i.e., WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > W
EC(i)(r∗EC). As the SR policy induces over-prescription
and r∗SR ≥ r∗EC , W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) > WEC(ii)(r∗EC), i.e., the total welfare at the
equilibrium is equal or higher under SR. When εe ≥ ε̄ECe , solution under the EC
policy gives WEC(ii)(r∗EC) ≤ WEC(i)(r∗EC), where WEC(i)(r∗EC) = 16(3 − 6α − 3εe −





εe + εs ≥ k and k < 3 − 6α + 3up (or equivalently r∗EC = 1); and WEC(i)(r∗EC) =
εs(3−6α−k+3up)+3εe(1−2α−k+up)
6
if εe + εs ≥ k and k ≥ 3 − 6α + 3up (or equivalently
r∗EC = r
i




if k ≥ εe + εs and W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) =
2(1−α−β)−εe−k+up
2
if k < εe + εs. Comparing the
welfare under each policy: if k ≥ εe + εs, WEC(i)(r∗EC) > W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) only when
εe > −εs+k+ 2k(3−6β−εs+3k)3(1−2β+2k−up) = ε̃e(εs, up, β, k)
.
= ε̃e, where ε̃e = ε̄e; if k < εe+εs and k <




where ε̃e > ε̄e; and if k < εe+εs and k ≥ 3−6α+3up, WEC(i)(r∗EC) > W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗)
only when εe > −εs+k+ k(3−6β+εs−3k)3(1−2α+up) = ε̃e(εs, up, β, k)
.
= ε̃e, where ε̃e > ε̄e. Therefore,
when up ≥ ūp and k ≥ k̄, the EC policy leads to higher total welfare at equilibrium
only when εe > ε̃e, otherwise the SR policy leads to higher total welfare. This proves
Proposition 14. 
Proof of Proposition 15: We restrict our analysis to the cases where εe > ε̄e, i.e.,
the social planner avoids over-prescription if possible. For brevity, we only provide
the proof for α < 1
4
and 2β < od. The result can be similarly proved for other
cases (details are available on request). To obtain the preferred policy from the
producer’s perspective, we compare his profit at the equilibrium ΠPm[x
∗
P ] under each
policy, where P = EC/SR and xP = rEC/rSR, t. Given the assumption up < ū
SR
p , the
producer’s profit is always higher with over-prescription under SR, hence Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] =
1−α−β− t∗, where 0 ≤ t ≤ tii = 1−α−β. On the other hand, the producer’s profit
depends on up w.r.t. ūp and k w.r.t. k̄, following Propositions 11-12. First consider
up < ūp =
4α−2β−1
3
and k < k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂ = 2(1 − α − β). In this case, the
producer’s profit is higher with over-prescription, hence Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] = 1−α−β− krEC2 ,
where rEC ∈ [0, 1]. If k < εe + εs, then r∗EC = 1 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] only




= t̄. If k ≥ εe + εs, then r∗EC = 0 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗].
Second consider up ≥ ūp and k < k̄ = min{k̄, k̃} = k̃ = 3(1−2β−up)2 . In this case, the
producer’s profit is higher with over-prescription, hence Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] = 1−α−β− krEC2 ,
where rEC ∈ [0, 1]. If k < εe + εs, then r∗EC = 1 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] only




= t̄. If k ≥ εe + εs, then r∗EC = 0 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗].
Third consider up < ūp and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂. In this case, the producer’s
profit is higher with over-prescription, hence Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] = 1− α− β − krEC2 , where





m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]
only when t > 1 − α − β, which contradicts with t < tii. Therefore, ΠEC(ii)m [r∗EC ] <
Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. If k ≥ εe + εs where r∗EC = 0 and Π
EC(ii)




consider up ≥ ūp and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃. In this case, the social planner
can avoid over-prescription, hence producer’s profit is Π
EC(i)




where rEC ∈ [r̄ = 3(1−2β−up)2k ,min{r
i = 3−6α+3up
k
, 1}]. If k ≥ εe + εs, then r∗EC = r̄
and Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)





= t̄. If k < εe + εs,
r∗EC = min{ri, 1}. When k < 3−6α+3up = k̄(up, α)
.
= k̄, r∗EC = 1 and Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] >
Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] only when t >
3−6β−+k−3up
6
= t̄(up, β, k)
.
= t̄. When k ≥ k̄, r∗EC = ri and
Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] = 0, hence Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] < Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. This proves Proposition 15. 
Proof of Proposition 16-17: As before, we restrict our analysis to the cases where
εe > ε̄e, i.e., the social planner avoids over-prescription if possible. For brevity,
we only provide the proof for α < 1
4
and 2β < od. The result can be similarly
proved for other cases (details are available on request). To obtain the preferred
policy from the environmental and public health perspectives, we compare the total
environmental and social disutility at equilibrium DUP [x∗P ] under each policy, where
DUP [xP ] = DU
P
e [xP ] +DU
P
s [xP ] = εe(qu + (1− rP )(qp− qu)+) + εs(1− rP )(qp− qu)+
where P = EC/SR and xP = rEC/rSR, t. Note that DU
P [xP ] depends on the
collection rate choice of the planner rP and the prescription outcome qp, which in
turn affects the used quantity qu, where qu = min{qp, θn}. With the SR policy, the
planner can set any collection rate, rSR ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, with EC policy,
the range for collection rate rEC depends on up w.r.t. ūp and k w.r.t. k̄, following
Propositions 11-12. First consider up < ūp =
4α−2β−1
3
and k < k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂ =
2(1−α−β). In this case, both policies result in over-prescription; DUP [xP ] = εe(12 +
1−rP
2
) for any xP , where rEC ∈ [0, 1] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under SR. Therefore,
both policies lead to same level of total disutility at the equilibrium. Second consider
up ≥ ūp and k < k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃ = 3(1−2β−up)2 . In this case, both policies
result in over-prescription, where rEC ∈ [0, 1] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under
SR. Therefore, both policies lead to same level of total disutility. Third consider
up < ūp =
4α−2β−1
3
and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂. In this case, both policies result in
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over-prescription, where rEC ∈ [0, rii = 2(1−α−β)k ] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under
SR. If k ≥ εe+εs, r∗EC = r∗SR = 0, hence DUEC(r∗EC) = DUSR(r∗SR, t∗). If k < εe+εs,
r∗EC = r
ii < 1 = r∗SR, hence DU
EC [r∗EC ] > DU
SR[r∗SR, t
∗]. Finally consider up ≥ ūp
and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃. In this case, the SR policy results in over-prescription















under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under SR. If k ≥ εe + εs, r∗EC = r̄ > r∗SR = 0, hence
DUEC [r∗EC ] < DU
SR[r∗SR, t
∗]. If k < εe + εs, r
∗
EC = min{ri, 1} and r∗SR = 1. When
k < 3− 6α+ 3up = k̄(up, α)
.
= k̄, r∗EC = 1 = r
∗
SR, hence DU
EC [r∗EC ] < DU
SR[r∗SR, t
∗].
When k ≥ k̄, r∗EC = ri < 1 = r∗SR, hence DUEC [r∗EC ] < DUSR[r∗SR, t∗] only when εs <
εe(−1 + k−3+6α+k−3up ) = ε̄s(εe, up, α, k)
.
= ε̄s. This proves Proposition 16. Combining
the conditions in Table 2-4 gives the conditions in Table 5, proving Proposition 17.
A2. Policy Choice when up ≥ ūSRp . Recall that we restrict the policy
analysis to the cases where up < ū
SR
p . In this section, we extend our analysis
by investigating the policy choice when up ≥ ūSRp . This condition implies
that t̄ < tii < ti. Accordingly, under the SR policy, the planner solves





such that 0 < rSR < 1 and t̄ < t < t





, such that 0 < rSR < 1
and 0 < t < t̄ to induce over-prescription. Following Proposition 11, up ≥ ūSRp
gives up ≥ ūECp , implying r̄ < rii < ri. Under the EC policy, the planner’s
problem depends on value of k w.r.t. k̄ (See Proposition 12). If k < k̄, then




, such that 0 ≤ rEC ≤ 1. If k ≥ k̄, then
r̄ ≤ 1 and the planner solves the problem given by maxrEC WEC(i)(rEC) =
3−6α−(3−rEC)εe−(1−rEC)εs−k rEC+3up
6
, such that r̄ < rEC < min{ri, 1} to avoid






such that 0 < rEC < r̄ to induce over-prescription. As the planner can set equal of
wider range of collection rate under the SR policy to maximize the same total welfare
function, the planner can obtain the same or higher level of welfare under SR. This
suggests that the state-operated programs appear to be appropriate for the collection
and disposal of medicine with very high health impact such as controlled substances.
A3. Extensions.
A3.1. Insurance Coverage. In the base model, we focus on a patient base with
no insurance paying the whole price p charged by the producer. In order to capture
the insurance effects, we consider a normalized population with both insured and
uninsured patients. We assume that n portion of the population is insured, and the
insured patients pay ip portion of the medicine cost, i.e., insurance coverage is equal to
(1− ip). We explain the change in doctor prescribing behavior and producer decisions
below. We use subscripts I and UI for insured and uninsured patients, respectively.
Doctor Prescribing Behavior: The doctor gains separate and independent
utilities from each patient, she determines the prescription amount for each patient by
only considering the utility she gets from providing prescription to that patient. For
uninsured patients, the doctor’s prescribing behavior remains same: Given the type of
the patient is θUIn , q
∗UI
p [p, ηd, ηp] = θn for ηd < od(1− ηp) + p and q∗UIp [p, ηd, ηp] = 1 for
ηd ≥ od(1−ηp)+p. For insured patients, he solves the problem given by q∗Ip [p, ηd, ηp] =
argmaxqpUd(qp) = up θn− ip p qp+ηd qp−od (1−ηp)(qp−θn)+. In this case, given the
type of the patient is θIn, q
∗I
p [p, ηd, ηp] = θn for ηd < od(1−ηp)+ipp and q∗Ip [p, ηd, ηp] = 1
for ηd ≥ od(1 − ηp) + ipp. Therefore, depending on the relation between pricing
and promotional efforts of the producer, three different doctor prescription behaviors




p [p, ηd, ηp] = θ
I
n for od(1 − ηp) + ip p ≤ ηd <
od(1− ηp) + p, leading to total prescription quantity qp[p, ηd, ηp] = nθIn + (1− n)θUIn ;




p [p, ηd, ηp] = 1 for ηd < od(1 − ηp) + ip p, leading to
total prescription quantity qp[p, ηd, ηp] = n 1 + (1 − n)θUIn ; and (iii) q∗UIp [p, ηd, ηp] =
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1, q∗Ip [p, ηd, ηp] = 1 for ηd ≥ od(1 − ηp) + p, leading to total prescription quantity
qp[p, ηd, ηp] = nθ
I
n + (1− n) 1 = 1.
Producer Decisions: In the presence of insured and uninsured patients, the
producer calculates his profit in three problems under the EC(SR) policy as below.
Problem (i): Set p, ηd, ηp such that p − up ≤ ηd < od (1 − ηp) +
ip p to have Eθn [q
∗
p(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn [nθ
I
n + (1 − n)θUIn ] = 12 . Note that
Eθn,θu [q
∗
u(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn,θu [n(min{θIn, θIu}) + (1 − n)(min{θUIn , θUIu })] = 16 . The
producer’s problem is maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = (p− c) 12 − k rEC
1
6
− α η2d − β η2p,
(maxηd,ηp,p Π
SR(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = (p − c − t) 12 − α η
2
d − β η2p), such that p − up ≤ ηd <
od (1 − ηp) + ip p, 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. Given rEC , if 1 > od + ip(up + 1),
α ≥ 1−ip
4(od+ipup)
; or 1 ≤ od + ip(up + 1), α ≥ 14 , p =
1
4α
+ up, ηd =
1
4α
, ηp = 0 and
Π
EC(i)





−8krEC +24up) (ΠSR(i)m [rSR, t] = 1−8αt+αup16α ); if 1 > od+ ip(up+1),
α < 1−ip
4(od+ipup)
, p = od+up
1−ip , ηd =
od+ipup
1−ip , ηp = 0, and Π
EC(i)





m [rSR, t] =
1−2α−t+up
2






+ up, ηd =
1
4α
, ηp = 0, and Π
EC(i)


















Problem (ii): Set p, ηd, ηp such that od (1 − ηp) + ip p ≤ ηd < od (1 −
ηp) + p to have Eθn [q
∗
p(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn [n 1 + (1 − n)θUIn ] = n+12 . Note that
Eθn,θu [q
∗
u(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn,θu [n(min{1, θIu}) + (1 − n)(min{θUIn , θUIu })] = 2n+16 . The
producer’s problem is maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(i)






m (p, ηd, ηp) = (p−c−t) n+12 −α η
2
d−β η2p), such that od (1−ηp)+ip p ≤






, ηd = 1, ηp = 1 and Π
EC(i)







m [rSR, t] =
(1+n)(α(1+n)o2d+β(1+n−8αip(od+ipt)))
16αβi2p
); if α < 1+n
4ip


















m [rSR, t] =
(1+n)2−8αi2p(2β+t+nt)
16αi2p
); if α ≥ 1+n
4ip













m [rEC ] =
1+n
2ip





m [rSR, t] =
(1+n)2o2d−8βip(2αip+(1+n)(−1+od+ipt))
16βi2p
); and if α ≥ 1+n
4ip











m [rEC ] =
1+n
2ip





m [rSR, t] =
1
2
(1 + n)( 1
ip
− t)− α− β).
Problem (iii): Set p, ηd, ηp such that ηd ≥ od (1 − ηp) + p to have
Eθn [q
∗
p(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn [n 1 + (1 − n)1] = 1. Note that Eθu [q∗u(p, ηd, ηp)] =
Eθu [n(min{1, θIu}) + (1 − n)(min{1, θUIu })] = 12 . The producer’s problem
is maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = (p − c) − k rEC 12 − α η
2
d − β η2p,
(maxηd,ηp,p Π
SR(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = (p− c− t)−α η2d−β η2p), such that ηd ≥ od (1− ηp) + p,
0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. The solution of this problem is identical to problem (ii)
in Propositions 11-12.
Although it is possible to characterize the optimal pricing and promotional efforts
of the producer, it is algebraically intractable to compare the resulting profit values
and obtain the conditions that yield different prescription outcomes. Consequently,
we conduct a numerical analysis and we focus on the regions where the policy choice
shifts from SR to EC and show the validity of our base model results. Further details
are available on request.
A3.2. DTC Advertising. In our base model, we assume that an increase in the
promotional effort level of the producer targeting the patient, i.e., the level of DTC
advertising, decreases the bad-reputation associated with a doctor’s over-prescription.
In this section, we model the effect of DTC advertising in a different way: We
assume that the patient obtains a unit promotional benefit ηp from each prescription
medicine, giving the total promotional benefit of ηpqp to the patient. This can be
interpreted as the patient gets utility as he has the advertised medicine and its
benefits. In this case, ηpqp becomes the part of patient-relevant doctor utility and
over-prescription bad-reputation to the doctor becomes od(qp − θn)+. Accordingly,
the doctor solves the problem given by q∗p[p, ηd, ηp] = argmaxqpUd(qp) = upθn−p qp +
ηd qp + ηp qp − od(qp − θn)+. She provides q∗p[p, ηd, ηp] = 1 for ηd + ηp ≥ od + p
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and q∗p[p, ηd, ηp] = θn for ηd + ηp < od + p, where ηd + ηp + up ≥ p is the required
condition for non-negative doctor utility. Problem (i) for the producer becomes
maxp,ηd,ηp Πm(p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p θn − k rEC (θn − min{θn, θu}) − α η2d − β η2p] =
p
2
− k rEC 16 − α η
2
d − β η2p (maxp,ηd,ηp Πm(p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn [(p − t) θn − αη2d − βη2p] =
(p − t)1
2
− α η2d − β η2p), such that p − up ≤ ηd + ηp < od + p under the





























+ 8up)). Problem (ii) for the producer becomes
maxp,ηd,ηp Πm(p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p 1−k rEC (θn−θu)−α η2d−β η2p] = p−k rEC 12−α η
2
d−
β η2p (maxp,ηd,ηp Πm(p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn [(p− t) 1−αη2d−βη2p] = (p− t)−α η2d−β η2p), such

































− 4od)). Comparison of










= ūECp (od, α, β)
.







− 8od) = ūSRp (od, α, β)
.
= ūSRp )
and r̄ ≥ rii ≥ ri (t̄ ≥ tii ≥ ti) for up ≥ ūECp (up ≥ ūSRp ), where ūpSR > ūpEC .





p ). This proves Proposition 11. Under the EC policy, when up < ū
EC
p ,
if k < α+β−4αβod
2αβ
= k̂(od, α, β)
.
= k̂, then rii > 1 and the producer always induces
over-prescription. When up ≥ ūECp , if k <
9β−3α(−3+8β(2od+up))
16αβ
= k̃(up, od, α, β)
.
= k̃,
then rii > 1 and the producer always induces over-prescription. This implies that
the produce always induces over-prescription when k < min{k̂, k̃} = k̄ under the EC
policy. This proves Proposition 12. In order to prove Proposition 13, first assume that
the chosen policy is EC (SR). The social planner calculates the expected welfare at
the equilibrium and sets the welfare-maximizing collection rate r∗EC (collection rate
r∗SR and fee t
∗). Total welfare depends on the problems (i) and (ii) that the producer
146
solves based on θn, θu v U [0, 1] (θn v U [0, 1]), as summarized below.
Problem (i): The producer sets ηd + ηp = p − up to have q∗p(p, ηd, ηp) = θn,




p(p, ηd, ηp))] = Eθn [(ηd + ηp)θn − od(θn − θn) + upθn − pθn] =
Eθn [θn(ηd + ηp + up − p)] = 0, DU
EC(i)
e [rEC ] = Eθn,θu [εe(q
∗
















u(p, ηd, ηp)] = Eθn,θu [min{θn, θu}] = 13 and
Eθn,θu [(θn − q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))+] = 16 ; and Π
EC(i)




p(p, ηd, ηp))] = 0,
DU
SR(i)
e [rSR] = Eθn,θu [εe(q
∗























Given the assumptions up ≥ ūECp and k ≥ k̃ = min{k̃, k̂} = k̄ (up ≥ ūSRp ),
there may exist rEC (t) that can satisfy r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) (t̄ < t < ti).
The social planner’s problem is maxrEC W




p(p, ηd, ηp)) +
Π
EC(i)
m [rEC ] + Π
EC(i)









sp [rSR, t]−DUSR(i)e [rSR]−DUSR(i)s [rSR]), such
that r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) (t̄ < t < ti). Constraint r̄EC < r < min(r
i, 1) ensures that
the producer’s profit is higher when it sets ηd + ηp = p − up than the case it sets
ηd + ηp = p + od, to avoid over-prescription. Consequently, the producer’s decisions
under Problem (ii) determine the total expected welfare at the equilibrium.
Problem (ii): The producer sets ηd + ηp = p + od to have q
∗
p(p, ηd, ηp) =




p(p, ηd, ηp))] = Eθn [(ηd + ηp) − od(1 − θn) + upθn −





e (rEC) = Eθn,θu [εe [min(1, θn) +






Eθn,θu [εs (1 − rEC)(1 − q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))] = εs (1 − rEC) 12 as Eθn,θu [min{θn, θu}] =
Eθn,θu [q
∗
u(p, ηd, ηp)] =
1
2












e (rSR) = Eθn,θu [εe [min(1, θn) + (1 −
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s (rSR) = Eθn,θu [εs (1−rSR)(1−
q∗u(p, ηd, ηp))] = εs (1−rSR) 12 and Π
SR(ii)
sp (rSR) = Eθn,θu [t−k rSR (1−θn)] = t−k rSR 12






There exists rEC (t) that can satisfy rEC < r̄ (t < t̄). The social planner’s problem
is maxrEC W




p(p, ηd, ηp)) + Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ] + Π
EC(ii)
sp [rEC ] −
DU
EC(ii)




p(p, ηd, ηp)) +
Π
SR(ii)
m [t] + Π
SR(ii)
sp [rSR, t] − DUSR(ii)e [rSR] − DUSR(ii)s [rSR]), such that r < r̄ (t < t̄).
Constraint r < r̄ (t < t̄) ensures that the producer’s profit is higher when it sets
ηd = p + od(1 − ηp) than the case it sets p = ηd + up, to induce over-prescription.
Consequently, the producer’s decisions under Problem (i) determine the total
expected welfare at the equilibrium. We now need to compare WEC(i)(r∗EC) and
WEC(ii)(r∗EC) (W
SR(i)(r∗SR, t
∗) and W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t
∗)) to obtain the welfare-maximizing
preferred prescription outcome. First consider the EC policy. Π
EC(i)


































if k < εe + εs, r
∗
EC = min(r








k − 3up)) when r∗EC = 1 (or equivalently k <
3(α+β+8αβup)
8αβ
) and WEC(i)(r∗EC) =
3β(εe+εs)+α(3εe+3εs−24βεek−8βεsk+24β(εe+εs)up)
48αβk
when r∗EC = r
i























. If k ≥ εe+εs, r∗EC =






















Comparing the total welfare under problems (i) and (ii): if k ≥ εe + εs,
WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > W




ε̄ECe (εs, up, od, α, β, k)
.
= ε̄ECe , where
∂ε̄ECe
∂εs





EC(i)(r∗EC) only when εe < −εs + k = ε̄ECe (εs, k)
.




= −1 < 0; and if k < εe + εs and k ≥ 3(α+β+8αβup)8αβ , W
EC(ii)(r∗EC) > W
EC(i)(r∗EC)
only when εe < −εs + k = ε̄ECe (εs, k)
.





















. If k ≥ εe + εs,





−8(3εe+ εs−3up)); and if
k < εe+εs, t
































−2(2εe+εs+2od)); and if k < εe+εs, t∗ ∈ [0, t̄) and








−2(2εe+k+2od)). Comparing the total
welfare under problems (i) and (ii): If k ≥ εe + εs, W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) > W SR(i)(r∗SR, t∗)







= ε̄SRe (εs, up, od, α, β, )
.






< 0; and if k < εe + εs, W
EC(ii)(r∗EC) > W






2k − 6od − 3up = ε̄ECe (up, od, α, β, k)
.
= ε̄ECe , where
∂ε̄SRe
∂εs
= 0. Summarizing the above;
there exists a environmental externality threshold ε̄ECe (ε̄
SR









∗) > W SR(i)(r∗SR, t
∗)), i.e., the
total expected welfare is higher when the outcome is over-prescription. Moreover,
∂ε̄ECe
∂εs
≤ 0.This proves Proposition 13.
We now calculate the total welfare under each policy at the equilibrium and
compare them to obtain the welfare-maximizing policy. Based on Proposition 11,
the producer’s profit depends on up vs. ūp. Hence, first assume that up < ūp.
The producer always obtains higher profit with inducing over-prescription of the
doctor, hence both policies result in over-prescription. Following the proof of









), such that 0 ≤ rSR ≤ 1
and 0 < t < tii. Note that any t satisfying 0 < t < tii can be considered as
the equilibrium fee. On the other hand, under the EC policy, the planner solves the
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such that 0 ≤ rEC ≤ min{rii, 1}. When k < min{k̂, k̃} = k̂, rii > 1 and both
problems become equivalent. Therefore, when up < ūp and k < k̄, both policies
leads to same level of total welfare at the equilibrium. When k ≥ min{k̂, k̃} = k̂,
rii ≤ 1, implying that r∗SR ≥ r∗EC . Therefore, when up < ūp and k ≥ k̄, SR leads
to same or higher level of total welfare at the equilibrium. Second assume that










such that 0 ≤ rSR ≤ 1 and 0 < t < tii. However, in this case, the EC policy
may or may not avoid over-prescription based on the unit collection cost k, as
Proposition 12 states. When k < k̃ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̄, r̄EC > 1 and the producer
always obtains higher profit with inducing over-prescription of the doctor, hence
both policies result in over-prescription. In this case, the planner solves the problem








− 2(2εe + εs + 2od) + 2(εe + εs − k)rEC),
such that 0 ≤ rEC ≤ 1, which is equivalent to the problem under SR. Therefore,
when up ≥ ūp and k < k̄, both policies leads to same level of total welfare at
the equilibrium. When k ≥ k̃ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̄, r̄EC ≤ 1 and the producer









), such that r̄ < rEC <






εs + 2od) + 2(εe + εs − k)rEC), such that 0 < rEC < r̄ to induce over-prescription.
Based on Proposition 13, when εe < ε̄
EC
e , the total welfare is higher with the
over-prescription outcome, i.e., WEC(ii)(r∗EC) > W
EC(i)(r∗EC). As the SR policy
induces over-prescription and r∗SR ≥ r∗EC , W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) > WEC(ii)(r∗EC), i.e., the
total welfare at the equilibrium is equal or higher under SR. When εe ≥ ε̄ECe ,
solution under the EC policy gives WEC(ii)(r∗EC) ≤ WEC(i)(r∗EC). Solution under







− 2(2εe + εs + 2od)) if k ≥ εe + εs
150







− 2(εe + k + 2od)) if k < εe + εs. Comparing the
welfare under each policy: if k ≥ εe + εs, WEC(i)(r∗EC) > W SR(ii)(r∗SR, t∗) only
when εe > −εs + 3k + 16αβ(εs−9k)k9β+3α(3+8β(2k−2od−up)) = ε̃e(εs, up, od, α, β, k)
.
= ε̃e, where
ε̃e = ε̄e; if k < εe + εs and k <
α+β−4αβod
2αβ








− 2k − 6od − 3up = ε̃e(up, od, α, β, k)
.
= ε̃e, where ε̃e > ε̄e;




εe > −εs + 4k(3β+α(3+2β(εs−3k−6od)))3(α+β+8αβup) = ε̃e(εs, up, od, α, β, k)
.
= ε̃e, where ε̃e > ε̄e.
Therefore, when up ≥ ūp and k ≥ k̄, the EC policy leads to higher total welfare
at equilibrium only when εe > ε̃e, otherwise the SR policy leads to higher total
welfare. This proves Proposition 14.
To obtain the preferred policy from the producer’s perspective, we compare his
profit at the equilibrium ΠPm[x
∗
P ] under each policy, where P = EC/SR and xP =
rEC/rSR, t. Given the assumption up < ū
SR
p , the producer’s profit is always higher
with over-prescription under SR, hence Π
SR(ii)





− 4(od + t)), where
0 ≤ t ≤ tii. On the other hand, the producer’s profit depends on up w.r.t. ūp
and k w.r.t. k̄, following Propositions 11-12. First consider up < ūp and k < k̄ =
min{k̂, k̃} = k̂. In this case, the producer’s profit is higher with over-prescription,
hence Π
EC(ii)







− 4od − 2krEC), where rEC ∈ [0, 1]. If k < εe + εs,
then r∗EC = 1 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] only when t > k2 = t̄(k)
.
= t̄. If k ≥
εe + εs, then r
∗
EC = 0 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. Second consider up ≥ ūp
and k < k̄ = min{k̄, k̃} = k̃. In this case, the producer’s profit is higher with
over-prescription, hence Π
EC(ii)







− 4od− 2krEC), where rEC ∈ [0, 1]. If
k < εe + εs, then r
∗
EC = 1 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗] only when t > k2 = t̄(k)
.
= t̄.
If k ≥ εe + εs, then r∗EC = 0 and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. Third consider up < ūp
and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂. In this case, the producer’s profit is higher with
over-prescription, hence Π
EC(ii)
m [rEC ], where rEC ∈ [0, rii]. If k < εe+εs, then r∗EC = rii
and Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)





− 4od), which contradicts with
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t < tii. Therefore, Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] < Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. If k ≥ εe + εs where r∗EC = 0 and
Π
EC(ii)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)
m [t∗]. Finally consider up ≥ ūp and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃. In
this case, the social planner can avoid over-prescription, hence producer’s profit is
Π
EC(i)







− 8krEC + 24up), where rEC ∈ [r̄,min{ri, 1}]. If k ≥ εe + εs,
then r∗EC = r̄ and Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)





− 8(2od + up)) =
t̄(up, od, α, β)
.
= t̄. If k < εe + εs, r
∗
EC = min{ri, 1}. When k < k̄, r∗EC = 1 and
Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] > Π
SR(ii)





+8(k−6od−3up)) = t̄(up, od, α, β, k)
.
=
t̄. When k ≥ k̄, r∗EC = ri and Π
EC(i)
m [r∗EC ] = 0, hence Π
EC(ii)




To obtain the preferred policy from the environmental and public health
perspectives, we compare the total environmental and social disutility at equilibrium
DUP [x∗P ] under each policy, where P = EC/SR and xP = rEC/rSR, t. With the
SR policy, the planner can set any collection rate, rSR ∈ [0, 1]. On the other
hand, with EC policy, the range for collection rate rEC depends on up w.r.t. ūp
and k w.r.t. k̄, following Propositions 11-12. First consider up < ūp and k < k̄.






any xP , where rEC ∈ [0, 1] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under SR. Therefore, both
policies lead to same level of total disutility at the equilibrium. Second consider
up ≥ ūp and k < k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃. In this case, both policies result in
over-prescription, where rEC ∈ [0, 1] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under SR. Therefore,
both policies lead to same level of total disutility. Third consider up < ūp and
k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̂. In this case, both policies result in over-prescription,
where rEC ∈ [0, rii under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1] under SR. If k ≥ εe + εs,
r∗EC = r
∗
SR = 0, hence DU
EC(ii)(r∗EC) = DU
SR(ii)(r∗SR, t
∗). If k < εe + εs, r
∗
EC =
rii < 1 = r∗SR, hence DU
EC(ii)[r∗EC ] > DU
SR(ii)[r∗SR, t
∗]. Finally consider up ≥ ūp
and k ≥ k̄ = min{k̂, k̃} = k̃. In this case, the SR policy results in over-prescription












), where rEC ∈ [r̄,min{ri, 1}] under EC and rSR ∈ [0, 1]
under SR. If k ≥ εe+ εs, r∗EC = r̄ > r∗SR = 0, hence DUEC(i)[r∗EC ] < DUSR(ii)[r∗SR, t∗].
If k < εe + εs, r
∗






= k̄, r∗EC = 1 = r
∗
SR, hence DU
EC(i)[r∗EC ] < DU
SR[r∗SR(ii), t
∗]. When
k ≥ k̄, r∗EC = ri < 1 = r∗SR, hence DUEC(i)[r∗EC ] < DUSR(ii)[r∗SR, t∗] only when
εs <
3εe(α+β+8αβup)
−3β+α(−3+8β(k−3up)) = ε̄s(εe, up, α, β, k)
.
= ε̄s. This proves Proposition 16.
Combining the conditions obtained from Proposition 15 gives similar structure as
in Table 5, proving Proposition 17.
A3.3. Patient’s Consumption Behavior. In our base model, we assume that the
patient uses his desired quantity if it is available, which is not necessarily equal to the
need of the patient. In this section, we assume that the patient realizes his need as
he is using the prescription medicine and uses this amount of medicine, i.e., qu = θn.
As the doctor bases his prescribing on the need of the patient, his problem remains
same. However, this assumption eliminates the effect of external influential factors,
implying that pharmaceutical overage is only due to doctor’s over-prescription. This
does not affect the producer’s problem under the SR policy, and changes his problem
under the EC policy in the following way. In problem (i), his problem is given by
maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(i)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p θn−k rEC (θn−θn)−α η2d−β η2p] = p 12−α η
2
d−
β η2p, such that −up ≤ ηd−p < od (1−ηp), 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1. (The problem
(ii) remains same as maxp,ηd,ηp Π
EC(ii)
m (p, ηd, ηp) = Eθn,θu [p 1−k rEC(1−θn)+−α η2d−
β η2p] = p − k rEC 12 − α η
2
d − β η2p such that od (1 − ηp) + p ≤ ηd, 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, and
0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1.) This shows that the producer’s profit is higher as compared to before
in problem (i) under the EC policy. As the structure of the producer problems is
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